¶1specially concurring.
¶2I concur in the opinion of the court and in its result, with the exception I note.
¶3The only purpose of this special concurrence is to point out that while it has been loosely said by this court in Gilliland v. Steinhoefel, Wyo.1974, 521 P.2d 1350, by others, and now again, that summary judgments are not commonly interposed and even less frequently granted in negligence actions, the observation is not sound and should not discourage the use of the summary judgment technique in negligence actions, where appropriate. This court has sustained its grant in quite a number of negligence cases. Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo.1976, 550 P.2d 494; Apperson v. Kay, Wyo.1976, 546 P.2d 995; Wells v. Jeep Corporation, Wyo.1975, 532 P.2d 595; Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, Wyo. 1974, 527 P.2d 832; Clouser v. Spaniol Ford, Inc., Wyo.1974, 522 P.2d 1360; LeGrande v. Misner, Wyo.1971, 490 P.2d 1252; Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Company, Wyo.1964, 388 P.2d 516; Lieuallen v. Northern Utilities Company, Wyo.1962, 368 P.2d 949. There may be others but these are sufficient to make the point.
¶4We must not permit the viability of the summary judgment procedure to be weakened in any respect. The same standards apply to negligence actions as to any other action. If there is no genuine issue of fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, he should not be forced to trial. It is unnecessarily expensive and needlessly takes the valuable time of courts, litigants, witnesses and jurors. Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. There is no exception with respect to negligence actions. They do lend themselves to summary judgment disposition, just as any other case.