Cottingham v. State

¶1Murder in the second degree: sentence, twenty years in the penitentiary.

¶2Cottingham, according to the tendencies of the State’s evidence, talked one Odum into killing Eugene Helms. The motive was money — Helms having recently sold a Cadillac. Odum was seen near Helms's home on the day he was killed. Odum sold a pistol which was proved as being Helms’s.

¶3The trial judge overruled a defense motion to exclude the State’s evidence. The defendant, as is his right, did not testify. He produced his mother and brother as alibi witnesses.

¶4After sentencing on May 22, 1974, the trial judge appointed a different lawyer to prosecute the appeal. This attorney was seemingly never notified of his selection. The time for a new trial expired. Then on July 17, 1974, Cottingham’s kin first told appellant’s counsel of the appointment. In brief we are told that the only formal notice came from the clerk of this court, writing that the record on appeal had been filed here November 26, 1974.

¶5But the only prejudice which we can envisage was in shutting off the making of a motion for new trial. Under Code 1940, T. 13, § 119, in Jefferson County, (as in other single county circuits), the movant must file and tell the judge within thirty days of judgment of his motion for a new trial, etc.

¶6A lapsed, or dilatory, motion for new trial cannot be reviewed. Ex parte Byrd Contracting Co., 26 Ala.App. 171, 156 So. 579; Nickens v. State, 31 Ala.App. 297, 15 So.2d 633. That is, time is of the essence of the right to a new trial.

¶7A motion for new trial, however, is not a condition precedent to taking an appeal from a final judgment. Under Code 1940, T. 15, § 382 “the trial court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of granting a motion for a new trial; … If the motion is granted the appeal becomes moot. Blake v. State, 22 Ala.App. 394, 116 So. 302.

¶8The presence of an attorney at trial will not permit the inference that an appellant has the services of that same attorney (or any other) on appeal. Therefore, if appellant is proven a pauper (at least until a statute or rule of court makes trial counsel appointment a continuing one) the trial court must make a separate appointment of appellate counsel. Martin v. State, 277 Ala. 153, 167 So.2d 9121; compare ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals, § 2.2(a).2

¶9The right now conferred (though not limited) by statute, to move for a new trial is a valuable one. We consider it of equal dignity to the statutory right to a struck jury. Hence, its preclusion would, on analogy, be the deprivation of a substantial right not affected by the harmless *430error principle. Southern Ry. Co. v. Milan, 240 Ala. 333, 199 So. 711.

¶10We are affirming the judgment on the trial below based on the record before us. This action is taken under Code 1940, T. 15, § 389.

¶11However, execution is to be stayed to allow appellant thirty days to file as though under § 119, supra, a motion for new trial.

¶12We recognize this result as an exception. Exceptions test rules: here a constitutional right to counsel in the first appellate proceeding (Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811), compels us to allow a proceeding ordinarily not to be had. Lapsley v. Weaver, 44 Ala. 131; Anno. 139 A.L.R. 340, fn 1.

¶13If the motion for new trial is filed and denied, appellant may bring an independent appeal here — apart from this appeal. In such event the record on the instant appeal should not be duplicated since we take judicial notice of our records. Of course, if the motion is granted there would be a consequent venire facias de novo.

¶14At all events appellant’s counsel must advise this court of the proceeding during the ensuing thirty days, otherwise the certificate of affirmance will issue automatically. If the motion for new trial is filed and the hearing thereof is duly continued by the circuit court, this court reserves the right of granting appropriate stays of execution.

¶15Affirmed: execution stayed for thirty days.