Dinneen v. Younger’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

46 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““There can be no doubt that upon proof that Rose Dinneen signed and acknowledged the deed and handed the same to the grantee, the plaintiff established a prima facie case of complete execution—that is, of delivery with intent to make the grant operative immediately as a transfer of title. [Citing cases.] The presumption of legal delivery, thus created, is not conclusive. The concept of delivery involves more than merely physically handing possession of the deed to the grantee or someone on his behalf. [Citing cases.] The act of delivery must be accompanied with the intent that the deed shall become presently operative as such, that is, must be accompanied with the intent to presently pass title, even though the right to possession and enjoyment may not accrue until some future time. (See cases collected 9 Cal.Jur., p. 153, §52.) The rule applies not only where possession of the deed is given to a third person, but also where such possession is given to the grantee directly. [Citing cases.] Intention to part with title is indispensable—that is the factor that gives vitality to the delivery. [Citing cases.] “It is also clear that where a valid delivery is established, subsequent acts and declarations of the grantor in disparagement of his deed, outside the presence of the grantee, are not admissible. Such declarations or acts are hearsay and self-serving. (See cases cited infra.) But when the very question presented is whether or not the alleged grantor intended a valid deliver”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 96 Cal. App. 2d 348 - Szekeres v. Reed

2. ““ ‘It is, of course, well settled that acts and declarations of a grantor made after he has parted with the title to property and in disparagement of it are inadmissible when made in the absence of the grantee, and it is the claim of appellants that the conduct and declarations of Williams after the deed was handed to Kidd were inadmissible as contravening this rule. “ ‘But here the very question was whether Williams had ever parted with title to the property. This was the main issue in the case, the claim of respondents being that there had been no delivery of the deed with intent on the part of Williams to do so. The conduct and declarations of Williams covered a period subsequent to the making of the deed and while Kidd held it as a depositary, and we are satisfied that such acts, conduct, and declarations of Williams with reference to the property during that period were properly admissible as bearing on the issue as to whether there had been a delivery of the deed. All these matters had some tendency to show that there was no intention on the part of Williams to deliver it except as a part of a testamentary scheme which he had abandoned.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 96 Cal. App. 2d 348 - Szekeres v. Reed

3. ““When intent is a material element of a disputed fact, declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an alleged act that indicate the intent with which he performed the act are admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it is immaterial that such declarations are self-serving. Thus, in cases involving the delivery of deeds, declarations of the alleged grantor made before and after the making of the deed are admissible upon the issue of delivery, and it is immaterial that such declarations are in the interest of the party producing them.” (Citing cases.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw