Volume 57 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover the expense incurred by the plaintiffs in repairing a sea wall which supported a street of the defendant city; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The street in question ran through some mud flats to a bridge, and the wall supporting the sides of it was originally built by the city,, the expense being in part assessed upon the abutting owners.

<p>A railroad passenger train, run at a high rate of speed, though not higher than was usual for fast trains, ran over and killed at a highway crossing the plaintiff’s intestate, who was driving an omnibus on the highway. The crossing was in the outskirts of a city, but within the city limits, but the neighborhood was not a thickly settled one. The highway was however a much used thoroughfare. The city had authority by its charter to limit the rate at which trains might he run within its limits, but bad made no order on the subject. The railroad track approached the highway by a curve, which, with the height of the intervening ground, and the buildings, fences and trees between, for two hundred feet from the crossing, made it difficult to see from either to the other until the engine was about twenty feet from the crossing. Held that the railroad company could not be held negligent on account of the speed of the train.</p> <p>As a general rule negligence cannot be inferred from speed alone.</p> <p>The hell and whistle of the engine were sounded in the usual manner as the train approached the crossing and the bell was kept ringing up to the time of the collision, and there was nothing to materially obstruct their sound. These danger signals, with warning boards on the highway, were all that were required by the statute, and the railroad commissioners, who were authorized to require other signals and safeguards at crossings if they thought them necessary, had made no order with regard to this crossing. Held that the company was not negligent in not having provided other signals or safeguards.</p> <p>A statute which requires of railroad companies certain precautionary measures at highway crossings, is exhaustive and defines the whole of the ordinary duty of such companies in the matter.</p> <p>There may however be special circumstances which impose upon an engineer the duty of slackening the speed of his train at a particular time; as where he sees that a person is crossing the track or there are sounds which might prevent the signals from being noticed. Hi such a case the company would be liable for his negligence.</p> <p>A fireman saw the omnibus at some distance from the crossing, but did not call the attention of the engineer to it until it was again seen just before the collision; Held that the company was not made liable by this fact.</p> <p>Ho general duty rests upon an engineer in respect to a traveler whom he sees approaching a crossing. He has ordinarily a right to assume that he will regard the signals if they have been given, and will stop when he reaches the railroad, and is called upon to act only when the traveler is so near the crossing as to alarm him.</p> <p>Photographic views of the scene of an accident are admissible in evidence as a correct representation of the place. Any difference that arises from the views being taken at a different season of the year can be explained.</p>

<p>A testatrix bequeathed “a sufficient sum to constitute ” seven brothers and sisters named “life members of the American Bible Society and as a memorial of the deceased.” Held to be a bequest to the Bible Society of a sufficient sum for the purpose stated, and that it was not affected by the death of any of the persons named before that of the testatrix nor by the refusal of others to accept the life-membership.</p> <p>The testatrix gave three hundred dollars a year to TP, “ when he shall have attained a proper age and is fitted for college, to defray the expenses of a collegiate and theological education.” W studied four years in the Hartford High School and then entered the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he studied four years and graduated. Held that the bequest must be regarded as limited to his studying with a view to a theological course and to the ministry of the gospel, and that it could not be applied to supporting him in acquiring a mere scientific or business education.</p> <p>Whether his being fitted to enter the Institute of Technology was equivalent to being “fitted for college:”—Quoere.</p> <p>Another bequest was as follows:—“Should any nephew or niece desire to study for the ministry, having fitted themselves, I give the sum of three hundred dollars to be paid annually to defray the expenses of a collegiate and theological education.” B, who was a grand-niece, was fitting to enter Wellesley College and intended to obtain a collegiate' and theological training with reference to being a missionary in the Western States. Held—</p> <p>1. That grand-nephews and grand-nieces were included under the terms “ nephews and nieces ” as used by the testatrix.</p> <p>2. That as the education of nieces as well as nephews for the ministry was contemplated by the testatrix, she must have intended by “collegiate and theological education,” such academic and theological training as was available and suitable .for preparing young women to be ministers of the gospel.</p> <p>3. That B was entitled to the benefit of the bequest from the time she entered Wellesley College until her education should be completed.</p> <p>A nephew had entered Wesleyan University since the death of the testatrix and was pursuing his studies there with the intention of entering the ministry. Held entitled to the three hundred dollars a year from the time he entered college till he had completed his studies or had abandoned his intention to pursue a theological course.</p> <p>P, a niece, had completed her education in an institution for fitting young women for missionary work, a year before the will was executed and eight years before the death of the testatrix, and had ever since been engaged in missionary work. Held that the bequest contemplated only future, and not past cases of education for such work, and that she was not entitled to any thing under the bequest.</p> <p>L, a brother, was given a life estate in the residue, “for his personal comfort, to be put in trust to my executors, who shall see that he is properly cared for.” Held that, if necessary for L’s personal comfort and proper care that a portion of the principal should be used, the executors were authorized to use it.</p>

<p>J, O & M owned in fee a tract of land on the seashore, and laid it out in cottage lots, bounded on one side upon the water and on the inside upon an elliptical half acre with a drive-way around it, which was marked “Park” upon a map which they procured to be made. They sold a large number of lots to the plaintiffs and others, and in the negotiations called attention to the map, and stated that the part marked “Park” was not to be sold but to be kept open for all the lot-owners; and the purchasers took the lots upon the inducement of these representations and paid a greater price on account of them. The plaintiffs had erected cottages on the lots so purchased by them. All the deeds contained, in addition to a description of the lot conveyed, a reference to the map as to be placed on file in the town clerk’s office; and the map was soon after placed on file there. The lot marked “Park” was after-wards sold to W, who knew all the facts. In a suit by the plaintiffs for an injunction against the erection of buildings on this lot by W, in which J, O & M were also made defendants, it was held.</p> <p>1. That W, knowing of the agreement with the plaintiffs when he purchased, could have no greater rights than J, O & M would have had.</p> <p>2. That the representations made by the latter as to the space to be kept for a park, were not merged in the later written contract of the deeds.</p> <p>3. That if it were so, the deeds, by their reference to the map, made it an inseparable part of the description of the property conveyed.</p> <p>4. That the statute (Gen. Statutes, § 81), which provides that where a map is filed in the town clerk’s office and referred to in a deed, it shall be deemed part of the deed, is merely declaratory of the common law.</p> <p>5. That the declarations of the grantors were admissible, independently of the deeds, to prove a dedication of the park.</p> <p>6. That it was no objection that the plaintiffs had not alleged a dedication in their complaint. They had alleged all the facts relied on, and it was not necessary to allege their legal effect.</p> <p>7. That, besides this, the representations of the grantors operated as an estoppel against their denial that the land in question was a park, independently of their effect as evidence of a dedication.</p> <p>8. That the declarations of one of the joint grantors were admissible to affect the others.</p> <p>9. And that they were admissible against W their grantee, as he took his deed after the declarations were made.</p> <p>10. That a declaration of one of the grantors before the deeds were given, not made in the presence of the plaintiffs, that he did not intend to dedicate the piece for a park unless the lot-owners would buy it for that purpose, was not admissible against the plaintiffs, because, while such declarations might be admissible to rebut a presumption of a dedication from user, yet here the dedication was an express one, which had its origin in the sale of the lots to the plaintiffs, and the grantors were estopped from denying the dedication.</p>

<p>Action to recover for a piano sold; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court before Bradstreet, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.</p> <p>1. The defendant bought and agreed to pay for this piano out of the commissions which he should earn from the agent. It is difficult to see how he can be compelled ’to perform any other contract than the one he has entered into. It may be admitted for the purposes of this case, that the agent had no power to agree to take anything in payment for this piano but cash, and we do not deny that the principals had the right, as soon as they learned the facts, to disaffirm the acts of their agent, rescind the sale, and recover the piano from the defendant in an action of trover or replevin. And if the defendant had sold the piano and received the money the plaintiffs might perhaps waive the tort and recover in assumspit the money received. But this was not the fact.</p> <p>2. But the principals cannot adopt the agency in part only. They are not permitted to confirm so much of the act of their agent as they shall think beneficial to themselves, and reject the remainder. 1 Parsons Cont., 46, 52; Story on Agency, 250; Smith v. Hodson, 1 T. R., 211; Hovey v. Blanchard, 13 N. Hamp., 145; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Walworth, 1 N. York, 447; Bennett v. Judson, 21 id., 238; Peters v. Ballister, 3 Pick., 495; N. Eng. Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf, 8 id., 56; Lime Rock Bank v. Plimpton, 17 id., 159; Culver v. Ashley, 19 id., 300; LeBreton v. Peirce, 2 Allen, 11; Berkshire Glass Co. v. Wolcott, id., 227; Butler v. Hildreth, 5 Met., 49; Browning v. Bancroft, 8 id., 278; Sears v. Carrier, 4 Allen, 339; Snow v. Alley, 144 Mass., 546; Hastings v. Bangor House Proprietors, 18 Maine, 436; Bigelow v. Dennison, 23 Verm., 564; Whitlock v. Heard, 3 Rich., 88.</p> <p>1. The only claim of the defendant, appearing on the record, is, that the sum of $186, due as commissions from Day, the plaintiffs’ general agent, to the defendant by reason of his private stock speculations, and for which he gave the defendant credit on account pf the piano, should be credited to the defendant as payments on the piano, as against the plaintiffs, who had had no knowledge of these stock transactions. A suit against the defendant for the price of the piano was the proper one to bring and in which to meet this question. The defendant had admitted the purchase by making three payments to the plaintiffs in cash on account of the piano. It would have been impossible to maintain either replevin or trover, with the fact found that the defendant made and the plaintiffs accepted these payments in cash, the sole question in issue being whether the defendant should be allowed to maintain a mode of payment for the balance which he was bound to know was unauthorized.</p> <p>2. An agent employed to sell has, as a general rule, no authority to receive payment otherwise than according to the general course of business, and it is well settled by many decisions that a debtor cannot claim payment against the principal by crediting himself with a debt due him from the principal’s agent. Story on Agency, 4th ed., §§ 413, 430; Benjamin on Sales, §§ 742, 745 a; Squires v. Barber, 37 Verm., 558; Stewart v. Woodward, 50 id., 78; Bevis v. Heflin, 63 Ind., 129; Aultman v. Lee, 43 Iowa, 404; Bernshouse v. Abbott, 45 N. Jer. Law, 531; Pearson v. Scott, L. R., 9 Cha. Div., 198. In Squires v. Barber, supra, one C. was the plaintiff’s agent and sold the defendant a chest of tea and barrel of molasses. At the time of the sale he owed the defendant twenty dollars and agreed to pay that debt out of the price of the goods sold him. Held, that the defendant could not set off this claim against C. in an action in assumpsit for the goods by C.’s principal. The facts in Stewart v. Woodward, supra, were that the plaintiffs, who were merchant tailors, sought to recover in book account of the defendant, a physician, for clothing delivered to him by C., their general agent, upon the understanding that the goods should apply upon an existing indebtedness of C. to the defendant for medical attendance, the defendant believing that C. had an interest in the business, and authority so to dispose of the goods, and otherwise he would not have taken the goods. It was held that the plaintiffs, having held out C. as their general agent only, the defendant was bound to measure the scope of his authority, and was liable upon his implied promise in this form of action for the value of the goods, and that he could not set off his claim against the plaintiff’s agent. In Pearson v. Scott, supra, four executors, holding stock in their own name, directed their solicitor to sell the stock. The solicitor in the name of his firm gave to a broker, whom he had had dealings with in stock speculations, directions to sell the stock. He sold the stock, and the solicitor returned to him transfers of the stock with receipts indorsed by the four executors. On the completion of the sale the broker returned to the solicitor a cheque for part of the purchase money for the shares, and carried the balance, some £3,000, to the credit of the solicitor in the account between them. It was held that payment to the solicitor by credit on their mutual account, the broker having under the circumstances notice that the stock did not belong to the solicitor, was not sufficient to discharge the broker, who remained liable to the executors for the balance. In view of these cases, in nearly all of which there is an element of bonafides on the part of the defendant totally wanting in this case, we cannot conceive it possible that this defendant can be permitted to pay his debt due to the plaintiffs by crediting himself with private stock gambling debts due him from the plaintiffs’ agent.</p>

<p>Gen. Statutes, § 3013, provides that if a mortgagee shall neglect to file a certificate of foreclosure in the town clerk’s office for one month after the title becomes absolute, “he shall forfeit five dollars to him who shall sue therefor for every month of such neglect;” and § 1379 provides that no suit for any forfeiture upon any penal statute shall be brought but within one year after the commission of the offense. A mortgagee neglected to file such a certificate for sixty-six months, and suit was brought for the penalty four months after it was filed. Held—</p> <p>1. That the filing of the certificate before suit was brought was not a bar to the action.</p> <p>2. That each month’s neglect was a complete offense in itself.</p> <p>3. That all that were more than a year old when the suit was brought were barred by the limitation.</p> <p>4. That all for which a recovery could be had could be included in one count in a complaint.</p> <p>The defendant, after the foreclosure had become absolute, agreed with the mortgagor that he might remain in possession and on certain conditions have the title re-conveyed to him; he failed however to fulfil the conditions and the defendant had thereupon filed the certificate. Held that evidence of this fact was inadmissible on the part of the defendant a.s irrelevant, the title having become vested in him, and the agreement not in any way affecting the necessity for the filing of the certificate.</p> <p>The complaint alleged the sixty-six forfeitures and claimed §330 damages, but by the pleading of the limitation the amount that could be recovered was reduced to §40. Held that the court could not see, as matter of law, that the amount that could be recovered was only §40, as the defendant might not have pleaded the limitation. The plaintiffs had a right to demand as large a sum as the possibilities of recovery required.</p> <p>If the defendant would take the benefit of a statute of limitations he must plead it.</p> <p>The plaintiffs were husband and wife. Held that, as neither had any interest before the suit was brought, and the statute gives the penalty to any person suing for it, they could join in bringing the suit as well as if they were not husband and wife.</p> <p>And by Gen. Statutes, § 987, in any suit brought by a married woman her husband may join.</p>

<p>In a suit to recover possession of real estate the defendant, who was a sister of the plaintiff, claimed that he agreed to allow her to occupy the premises during her life, on condition that she would take care of their mother during her life; and that upon this agreement she and her husband had removed from Long Island, where they lived with his father, and had gone into the occupancy of the premises, and had there taken care of her mother while she lived. She testified to these facts, and was then asked by her counsel—“ What arrangement had your husband -made with his father as to remaining on Long Island, which was afterwards brought to the plaintiff’s notice ? ” Held to be inadmissible as irrelevant.</p> <p>E testified as a witness to a certain matter which she had heard and to another matter of which she had personal knowledge. The judge in his charge said—“Hearsay evidence, such as that of E, is of no value.” Held that, as the judge did not state what part of her testimony was to be disregarded as hearsay, and spoke of her testimony generally, the jury might have been misled into a disregard of all her testimony, and that it was error.</p> <p>A record of a former suit by the defendant against the plaintiff was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff for the purpose of showing that she then made a different claim as to his agreement from that now made. The judge in his charge said—“ The record has been admitted in evidence, and you will take it and from an examination determine what claims were made in that case and just what the decision of the court was upon them.” Held that, as the judgment in that ease had no relation to the present suit and the record was admissible only to show that the defendant claimed a different agreement from the one now claimed, the judge should have called the attention of the jury to what the record did prove, and that it was error to commit the matter to the jury in the way in which it was done.</p> <p>The judge said in his charge—“If the defendant offers but one witness to prove her claimed contract, and this is denied by the plaintiff, and there are no other circumstances and no other evidence to sustain her testimony, then she has failed to make out her case by a preponderance of evidence.” Held to be error.</p> <p>If the jury believe the statement of a single witness, there is no rule of law forbidding them to found their verdict upon it, though the witness may stand alone and his testimony be opposed to that of others.</p> <p>The case of Lillibridge v. Barber, 55 Conn. R., 366, remarked upon and distinguished.</p>

<p>B being indebted to K in the sum of $6,250 for which he had given his notes, procured the transfer to him of two policies of insurance of $3,000 each on a mill which he had conveyed to his wife, to hold as collateral security. B afterwards went into insolvency and the mill was conveyed to his assignee. The mill having been burned, the agent of the insurance companies claimed that the policies had become invalidated by the change of title to the property insured, but agreed that the companies should pay the full amount and take an assignment of K’s claim against B. The companies thereupon paid K the $6,000 and took an assignment of B’s notes and presented them against his insolvent estate and they were allowed in full by the commissioners. Upon an appeal by a creditor from this allowance, it was held—</p> <p>1. That if the $6,000 paid by the companies was paid on the policies, the payment canceled so much of the amount due on the notes.</p> <p>2. That the transaction must have been such a payment unless it was a purchase of the claim of K with no reference to the insurance.</p> <p>3. That upon all the facts it was to be regarded as a payment upon the policies and not as a purchase.</p>

<p>The authorities of a borough made a change of a few inches in the grade of a street, and ordered the plaintiff, a property owner on the street, to lower a sidewalk which he had already constructed of concrete, with curbing and gutter, so as to conform to the changed grade of the street. He neglected to obey the order, and the authorities of the borough, under a provision in its charter, did the work. In a suit brought by him for damages for breaking up the old walk and injuring a row of trees along the walk, it was held—</p> <p>1. That the order was sufficiently definite in directing the plaintiff to lower his walk to conform with the changed grade of the street, and that it was not necessary that the order should specify the number of inches that it was to be lowered.</p> <p>2. That the authorities of the borough, having the right to do the work on his failure to obey the order, were not answerable for the inevitable consequences to his property.</p> <p>Whenever the authorities of a municipality determine the grade of a street, they determine it for the entire space that had been subjected to the public easement, unless there is an express exclusion of a portion.</p>

<p>Gen. Statutes, § 1116, provides that in every action of libel the defendant may give proof of intention, and that if the plaintiff does not prove either malice in fact or a refusal on request to retract, he shall recover only such actual damage as he may have specially alleged and proved. Held that the “ malice in fact ” here intended is not malignity or personal ill-will, but an improper and unjustifiable motive.</p> <p>An intention to amuse the public and to stir up the plaintiff to pay a debt, is an improper and unjustifiable motive.</p> <p>The rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts, is applicable to the act of publishing a libel.</p> <p>In estimating vindictive damages the jury may take into consideration the plaintiff’s counsel fees in the case.</p>

The court (Fenn, J.), upon motion of the railroad company ordered the case stricken from the docket, and the city appealed.

Action for a libel; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Torrance, J. Verdict for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for error in the rulings of the court. The case is fully stated in the opinion. 1.

Appeal by the town of Westbrook from an order of the railroad commissioners in the matter of certain grade crossings in the appellant town, made under Gen. Statutes, § 3489; taken to the Superior Court in Middlesex county, and heard before Park, C. J. There were three petitions brought in behalf of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, which were heard together by the commissioners and a single order passed.

Action on a policy of fire insurance; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and beard before Hall, J. Facts found and judgment for the defendant and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for an injury through the negligent leaving of a pair of horses, attached to a heavy truck, unhitched and unattended in the highway; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court before Deming, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

The plaintiffs were two tenants in common of the laud taken, which was a passage way between their separate properties which abutted upon it. The matter was referred by the court to a committee for reassessment, the committee made the same assessment as before, the plaintiffs remonstrated against the acceptance of the report, the report was accepted, and the court (Fern, J.), rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed to this court.

<p>Appeal from a probate decree approving and allowing the will of Mary Ann Monson, deceased; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Fenn, J. Verdict for the appellees and appeal by the original appellant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.</p>

Suit for the construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved, on facts found, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action on a promissory note ; brought originally before a justice of the peace, and, by appeal, to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County. Heard before Crump, J., and judgment rendered for the plaintiff and appeal by the. defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit for the construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved on facts found for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for damages for an injury to the plaintiff and his property from the unlawful and negligent act of the defendant ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, and tried to the court, upon a general denial, before Crump, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit for the construction of the will of William Leffingwell; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Appeal of the town of Fairfield from an order of the railroad commissioners for the removal of grade crossings within the town, the order haying been made on the application of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company; taken to the Superior Court in Fairfield County.

Complaint, by a prosecuting agent, for allowing minors to loiter about premises where liquor was kept for sale, the accused being a licensed vender of liquors; brought to the City Court of the city of Norwich and, by appeal of the accused, to the Superior Court of New London County, and in that court tried to jury on the plea of not guilty, before Andrews, J. Verdict guilty and appeal by the accused for errors in the charge of the court.

Dim-mick, deceased; taken to the Superior Court in Windham County, and heard before Sandford, J. The court found, the following facts: The instrument in question was signed by the testatrix as her will at Killingly, in this state, in January, 1879, but on what day of the month did not appear.

Writ of replevin, brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The defendants pleaded in abatement the insufficiency of the recognizance attached to the writ; the plaintiff demurred to the plea; and the court (Hall, J.,) held the plea sufficient and rendered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit for the construction of a will; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and reserved, upon facts agreed, for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Scire Facias upon a process of foreign attachment in which the defendant company was garnisheed by the plaintiffs as the debtor of Leopold Levy and as having his goods in its possession; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Phelps, J. Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, that Leopold Levy, on July 1st, 1885, opened a store on the corner of Canal and Lispenard streets in the city of New…

Action on a joint and several guaranty for the payment of loans made by the plaintiff bank to a joint stock manufacturing company of which the guarantors were stockholders ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. The defendant filed an answer, the plaintiff replied, the defendant demurred to the reply, and the case was reserved upon the demurrer for the advice of this court. The guaranty, answer and reply are set out in the opinion. 1.

The appellants (original petitioners to the probate court) were Augustus S. Chase and Edward C. Lewis, trustees of the assigned estate of Brown & Brothers, and Farrel before named, a creditor. Held: and efforts were made to secure some one to take the management of the company and raise or provide money to carry on its business.

Writ of Error to reverse two judgments of justices of the peace; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Litchfield County, and heard before Warner, J. Judgment rendered for the defendant and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Facts found and case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

Criminal prosecution by the city attorney in the city court of the city of New Haven for a violation of an ordinance of the city; appealed by the defendant to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, criminal side.

Application to the Superior Court in Fairfield County for relief from proceedings of the common couucil of the defendant city in laying out the extension of a street and in the assessment of damages therefor. The facts were agreed upon and the case reserved for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit for the construction of the will of Henry J. Beers ; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield. County. The allegations of the complaint were found true and the case reserved for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion. 1. We will consider first the provisions of the ninth paragraph of the will.

Action to recover for work done and materials furnished in repairing a barn; brought, by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried to the court before Studley, J. Judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant on the ground of an amendment of the complaint allowed by the court, which is fully stated in the opinion.

Indictment for murder in the first degree; in the Superior Court in Fairfield County. The case was tried to the jury, on the plea of “not guilty,” before Torrance, J. Verdict, “guilty of murder in the first degree,” and appeal by the defendant for error in the charge of the court and in the refusal to charge as requested.

Action to recover the amount of a judgment; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County. A committee made a report in favor of the plaintiff, which, upon remonstrance against its acceptance, the court (Warner, J.,) rejected, and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Appeal by the plaintiff to the Superior Court in New Haven County from the District Court of Waterbury; dismissed by the court (Fenn, J.,) for want of jurisdiction, and appeal by the plaintiff to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action on a policy of insurance against fire ; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The plaintiff held the contract of insurance by assignment from the insured. The court made a finding of the facts and reserved the case for advice. The case is fully stated in the principal opinion, and the points made by the counsel on both sides in argument are fully presented in the prevailing and dissenting opinions.

Qui tam action to recover a penalty for not maintaining a guide post on a public highway; brought, by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace, to the District Court of Waterbury. The defendant demurred to the complaint, and the court (Bradstreet, J.,) sustained the demurrer, and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Applications of sundry bankers and commercial correspondents to the Superior Court in New Haven County, for orders compelling the receiver of the New Haven Wire Company, an insolvent corporation, to surrender to the applicants their several portions of a large quantity of wire rods, which he held as the property of the corporation, and of which they claimed to be the owners.

Action to recover the value of spirituous liquors attached by the defendant, as an officer, upon a writ against one Corture ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and ‘heard before Crump, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion. The facts place this case clearly outside the limit which this court fixed for itself in the case of Lewis v. McCabe, 49 Conn., 155.

Action to recover for an injury from the negligence of the defendant company; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. The defendant demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was overruled, and the case was heard in damages before Fern, J. Facts found and nominal damages assessed. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion. Where facts are undisputed negligence is a question of law.

Action to recover the value of certain bonds of the plaintiff claimed to have been in the possession of the defendant; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Andrews, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for error in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action upon an indorsement and guaranty of a promissory note; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County, and heard before Fenn, J. The note was dated January 14th, 1884, was executed by Hurd, Hotchkiss & McFarlane, was for $5,000, payable in four months to the order of the makers, and by them‘indorsed, and was afterwards indorsed by the defendant and Charles B. Hotchkiss.

Action for the killing of a horse of the plaintiff by a railroad train of the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fairfield County. The defendant suffered a default and was heard in damages before Hall, J. The facts were found and substantial damages were awarded, and the defendant appealed.

Suit for an injunction against the obstruction of a pass-way by the erection of a building encroaching upon it; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, and heard before Hall, J. Facts found and injunction granted, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Suit by the plaintiff, as trustee of the property of his wife, for an injunction against the levy, by the defendant as an officer, of an execution against the plaintiff in his individual capacity upon certain corporate stock claimed to be the property of the wife; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and heard before Sanford, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

Complaint to the City Court of the city of New Haven against the present defendant and Mary Reese for a conspiracy to commit the crime of theft. The defendants were found guilty in that court and appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County. The present defendant was tried to the jury in that court on the plea of “ not guilty,” before Deming, J. The jury returned a verdict of “ guilty,” and the defendant appealed to this court.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the levy of an execution; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and heard before Cowell, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action by the administrators of the estate of Denison P. Coon to recover the amount of an account charged against the defendant on the books of the intestate ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County, and tried to the jury before Crump, J. Coon, the intestate, bad kept a grocery store in Norwich, where the defendant also resided, and after his death the account was found by his administrators upon Ms books, in his own bandwriting, and a transcript of it in…

Action for damages for the breach of a contract to deliver to the plaintiff the possession of certain premises leased to him by the defendant; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, and tried to the court before Deming, J. The following facts were found by the court: On and prior to the 18th day of August, 1888, the plaintiff Cohn was at work as a foreman in the clothing establishment of M. & L. Cohn, in the city of New York, and was receiving $35 a week…

Indictment for murder in the first degree, in the killing of Catherine J. Swift, the prisoner’s wife; in the Superior Court in Hartford County. The ease was tried to the jury upon the plea of “not guilty,” before Sanford, J. Verdict “ guilty of murder in the first degree,” and appeal by the prisoner. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. 1.

Action to recover possession of land; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New London County, and tried to the court upon a general denial, before Crump, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for money paid out; brought to the District Court of Waterbury and, by appeal, to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and heard before Fenn, J. The complaint contained the common counts and the following special count. “1. On November 25th, 1882, the plaintiff made and delivered to John C. Booth, late of Waterbury, deceased, his promissory note for $4,000, payable to said Booth or order, three months after date, at the Litchfield National Bank. “ 2.

Criminal complaint, by a prosecuting agent, against the defendant, a licensed dealer in intoxicating liquors, for allowing a minor to loiter on the premises where he kept liquors for sale, in violation of Gen. Statutes, § 3092; brought before a justice of the peace, and, by the defendant’s appeal, to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury in that court, on a plea of not guilty, before Andrews, J. Verdict guilty, and appeal by the defendant for errors…

Action to recover damages for trespass on land; brought to the City Court of the city of Meriden, and tried to the jury before Thayer, J. Verdict for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant for errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Criminal prosecution for neglect and refusal of the defendant to support his wife; brought before a justice of the peace and, by the appeal of the defendant, to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County.

The appellees moved that the appeal be erased from the docket on the ground that it did not appear that the appellant was aggrieved by the decree appealed from, and the court (Andrews, J.,) granted the motion and ordered the appeal to be stricken from the docket. 'The appellant appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Replevin for a horse and other articles of personal property ; brought to the City Court of the city of New Haven, and beard before Pickett, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff as to all the articles except the horse, and for the return of the latter to the defendant, and that the defendant recovered five dollars damages and his costs. The plaintiff appealed. The case is fully stated in the opinion. 1.

Suit to obtain a construction of the will of Mary Yemmans; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, and reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover the possession of land with rents and profits; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and heard before Bradstreet, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The court made the following finding of facts: During the spring, summer and fall of 1886 Sheldon Clark boarded at intervals in the family of Charles B. Clark, the appellant, an aggregate of several weeks, leaving the last time January 31st, 1887, paying Charles for board the agreed sum of three dollars per week. He owned a farm near by, on which he kept oxen and other cattle.

Suit for an injunction to restrain the defendants from removing stakes placed to mark oyster grounds belonging to the plaintiff and from taking oysters and shells from the grounds; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Fair-field County, and heard before Doten, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action by an operative in a factory of the defendants, to recover damages for an injury by falling into an elevator well by reason of a defect in the elevator and the machinery connected with it, such defect being owing to the negligence of the defendants; brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County.