Arrowsmith v. Nashville & D. R.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““By section 2 of tlie act of 7875, any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, brought in a state court, Where the matter in dispute exceeds the value of §500, and arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or in which the United States is plaintiff, or in which there is a controversy between citizens of different states, or a controversy between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign state, citizens or subjects, either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district, and when, in any such suit, there is a controversy wholly between citizens of different states, which can be fully determined as between them, one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit to the circuit court of the United States for the proper district. This is the fundamental section based on the constitutional grant of judicial i>ower. The succeeding sections relate to the forms of proceeding to effect the desired removal. By section 3 it is provided that a petition must be filed in the state court before or at the term at which the cause can be first tried, and before the trial thereof, for the removal of the suit into the circuit court, and with such petition a bond, with condition, as i>rescribed in the act. The second section defines the cases in which a removal may be made. The ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Powers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.

2. ““Where obligations are imposed by charter or statute law upon a railroad company Tor the protection and advantage of the general public not having contract relation with it, it may very well be sa.id that a general authority to lease out its road, which contains no provision exempting it from such public obligations, will not absolve it from liability. So, if a railway be In such condition that it Is a nuisance when leased out, by reason of the absence of something necessary to Its safe operation, or the presence of something dangerous to its safe operation, and this nuisance bo continued by the lessee, both the lessor and lessee would be liable, — the one as having created, and the other as having continued, a nuisance. But to say that, after the lessor has, by authority of law, transferred the control and management of its road to another, he shall, unless specially exempted, remain liable for all the torts and contracts of the lessee, is to ignore the contract of lease and the legislative sanction under which, it was made. The state, on grounds of public policy, may well refuse its consent to the transfer; but, if it consent, then there is no public policy to authorize the courts to say that the responsibility for the future management and operation of the road has not been exclusively imposed upon the lessee, as the lawful substitute for the company owning the road.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hayes v. Northern Pac. R.

3. ““To a certain extent this proposition is true. If the injury results from negligence in the handling of trains or in the omission of any statutory duty connected with the management of the road, matters in respect to which the lessor company could, in the nature of things, have no control, then the lessee company will alone he responsible; but, when the injury results from the omission of some duty which the lessor itself owes to the public in the first instance, — something connected with the building of the road-then we think the company assuming the franchise cannot divest itself of responsibility by leasing its track to some other company. Thus, for instance, in the case at bar, the defendant was charged with the duty of placing sufficient cattle guards before it either used this track which it constructed, or permitted any one else to use it; and it cannot divest itself of responsibility for injuries resulting from such omission by leasing its track to some other company. The injury resulted directly from its own wrong, and not from any mere negligence on the part of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company. It cannot relieve itself by contracting with some other party to discharge its statutory duty.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hayes v. Northern Pac. R.