Volume 57 — Iowa Reports

The defendants are bankers, and as such had on deposit public money collected by the county treasurer. The plaintiff was township clerk, and said treasurer gave a check payable to the plaintiff in his individual capacity. The money in fact belonged to the township of which defendant was clerk. The check was paid by plaintiffs and the money deposited in the bank of Kirk Bros, to the individual credit of the plaintiff.

This action was brought against the defendant Barbara Smith to quiet title to forty acres of land in Warren county. After-wards her husband, John Smith, tiled a petition in intervention to set aside a convej'ance made by him to the plaintiffs oí one hundred and twenty acres of land in Marion county. The defendant, Barbara, in answer to the plaintiffs’ petition admits that she claims an interest in the land in Warren county, as the plaintiffs aver.

This action was commenced on the 30th day of April, 18S0> The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of fourteen thousand dollars. There was a demurrer to the petition which was sustained. Plaintiff appeals.

Action to recover for persoual injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employment of defendant, by reason of the negligence of his co-employe. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action upon an account. The defendant in her answer denies that she is indebted to plaintiff upon the account in any sum, and alleges that a part of it is for a debt of another, for which she is not liable. The cause was tried to the court without a jury and judgment was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action of replevin for 850 bushels of corn. The cause was referred to a referee who made certain written findings of fact aud recommended that a judgment be entered for the defendant, which was accordingly done. Plaintiffs appeal.

Action ill chancery to foreclose a mortgage. The Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to the petition filed by the assurance company, and plaintiff electing to stand on his petition, it was dismissed. From this decision he appeals.

There was a demurrer to the petition on the ground that the cause of action wa3 barred by the statute of limitations. The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff appeals.

Appeal fiiorn Sioux Circuit Court. In June, 1877, the defendant, Plumb, commenced an action by attachment against the plaintiff before a justice of the peace, to recover $87. Th’e ground of the attachment was that the plaintiff herein was a foreign corporation. There was no personal service made upon appellant, but service of the original notice was made by publication. The attachment was served by the garnishment of a third party, who was indebted to appellant.

W. A. McDowell executed a chattel-mortgage to the plaintiff. The defendant, as sheriff, as the plaintiff claims, levied upon and sold the mortgaged property under an execution against McDowell. The defendant had constructive notice at the time of the levy, and express notice of the mortgage before the sale. This action was brought to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff. Judgment for the defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Action upon a promissory note for $26. The action was originally brought before a justice of the peace. The defendant for answer averred that the note was given for interest on money borrowed and was wholly usurious. The plaintiff recovered, but upon an appeal being taken to the Circuit Court' judgment was rendered against her and in favor of the defendant for costs. She now appeals.

Action to recover tlie value of certain household goods delivered to defendant at Chicago for transportation to Atchison, Kansas, which defendant has failed to deliver to plaintiff, the consignee. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; defendant appeals.

Action for rent of a coal mine.. The petition--shows that the plaintiff is the widow of A. 0.

Charles Wilshire died in 1878, seized in fee of 560 acies of land in Adair county, and 155 acres in G-uthrie county. The plaintiff is administrator of his estate. The personal property being insufficient for the payment of the debts the plaintiff asked an order for the sale of real estate for that purpose. Ina M. Cook, widow of the deceased, and Wm. Wilshire, his only child were made parties to the proceeding.

Action to recover damages for a nusiance. The petition, states: The gas works of defendant were erected in 1872, and that “defendant in manufacturing gas ever since that time causes and creates unwholesome, noisome and offensive smells which * * all caused, created and permitted by the defendant, to the great injury of the plaintiff, rendering her property uninhabitable and worthless.” In a second count it was stated that “the defendant manufactured gas in such a careless,…

The defendant was convicted in the mayor’s court of the city of Centerville of having violated an ordinance of the city.

Action to foreclose a mortgage executed by Helen and Daniel Desney. Messrs. Jackson and C. Aultman & Co. were made defendants,it being stated they claimed title to or a lien on the mortgaged premises, but that the same was junior to the mortgage.

In 1866 R. Gr. Bishop was appointed guardian of the plaintiff, who was then a minor, and he gave bond as provided by law. In January, 1873, a citation was issued, requiring Bishop h> show cause why he should not file a new bond, because the surety on the old bond was not a resident of the State, and was not worth the amount of the bond. On the 29th day of said month Bishop, in pursuance of an order of the court, gave such bond — the one sued on.

Appeal from Cedar District Court. Action for the partition of real estate.- Trial to tbe court, judgment for the defendants and the plaintiffs appeal.

The defendant Park, was at the time of the acts complained of justice of the peace for Junction township, Greene county. His codefendants were sureties upon his official bond. In August, 1880, the plaintiff was convicted of an assault and battery before the defendant Park, as justice of the peace, and was sentenced to ten days imprisonment in the county jail, and was committed to jail.

The defendants constitute the board of supervisors of -Warren county, and the relief asked is that a mandamus issue commanding them to perform what is claimed to be an official duty. A demurrer to the petition was overruled, and defendants 'electing to stand thereon, a peremptory mwncUmms was ordered to be issued. The defendants appeal.

Action in chancery. There was a decree entered in the court below against the Hawkeye Insurance Co., from which it appeals to this court.

Action in equity to set aside a certain sale under execution of real estate and deeds made by the sheriff in pursuance thereof. The court granted the relief asked in substance, but both parties appeal.

On tbe 6th day of March 1874, the plaintiff being the owner of certain real estate in Mason City conveyed the same to R. 0. Mathews. On the 17th day of the same month Mathews conveyed the same property to the defendant C. H. Day, and on the 9th day of August 1876, Day conveyed to Edwin Hamblin. When the property was conveyed by plaintiff to Mathews the same was encumbered by certain tax-liens mortgages and judgments.

The plaintiff Thomas B. Lash, claims to be the owner of an undivided three-fourths of certain land in Woodbury county, and brings this action to quiet his title to the same. The defendants for answer admit that he is the owner of an undivided fraction of the premises, but they deny that his fraction amounts to three-fourtlis.

The defendant, John Reddington, was the owner of a farm of about eighty-seven acres, upon which he with his wife resided as their homestead. They were far advanced in age. Their children were grown up and married. Their youngest daughter, Delilah, married Samuel Geiger. On the 27th day of December, 1871., they conveyed their farm by. deed of general warranty to their said daughter. .

Action upon a delivery bond executed by the defendant for the purpose of delivering certain property attached in an action in which the present plaintiff was plaintiff and one Shiffer was defendant. The plaintiff avers that he obtained judgment against Staffer, and demanded of this defendant a return of the property discharged, but that the defendant has wholly failed to return the same.

<p>1. Verdict: indefinite: equity. Where the verdict is indefinite and does not express the true intention of the jury, the mistake or omission being known upon the return of the verdict, a complete and adequate remedy exists at law, and relief therefor cannot be sought in equity.</p>

Action originally brought before a justice. Upon an appeal to the Circuit Court there was a judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals to this court.

The defendant was arrested upon an information charging him with the sale of ale, beer, porter, and mixed liquors, contrary to the statutes of Iowa, and the ordinancés of the incorporated town of Eldora. Upon a trial before a justice of the peace, he was adjudged guilty. He appealed to the District Court, where he was tried and acquitted upon the ground that the ordinance of the town of Eldora, under which the prosecution was had, was not legally enacted.

Action upon a written acceptance of a draft drawn by the Buckeye Lantern Company, and indorsed to the plaintiff. There was an answer denying the signature of the defendants to the acceptance of the dralt, and denying that the plaintiff was the owner thereof.

The petition states the defendant “with malice toward plaintiff and for the purpose of compelling him to remove from the house in which he was living, and from the farm on which said house is situated, and without probable cause,” filed an information before a justice of the peace, charging that the plaintiff stole one bushel of corn belonging to the defendant; that plaintiff was tried and acquitted of said charge.

Action in chancery to quiet the title to lands. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff. Defendants appeal.

Action to recover the possession of and quiet the title to certain lands. The defendant set up an adverse title, and prayed that it be quieted in him. There was a decree granting to defendant the relief sought in his cross-petition. Plaintiff appeals.

Action for the abatement of a nuisance committed in obstructing, by a fence, a public highway and to recover damages resulting therefrom to plaintiffs. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals. The facts of the case, so far as they are involved in the questions ruled by the court, appear in the opinion.

Action to recover the value of certain hay and corn burned by a fire, set out by an engine operated upon defendant’s railroad. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action in chancery. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for in plaintiff’s petition. The intervenors, S. Biniord & Caswell and Meeker, appeal. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Action in chancery to cancel and set aside an assessment made upon plaintiff’s property for a sewer constructed in a street adjacent thereto. Upon a trial on the merits plaintiff’s petition was dismissed. She now appeals to this court.

The original petition states that the plaintiff and defendants entered iuto a written contract whereby the plaintiff was to furnish the.required timber and cut and hew ties and deliver the same to the .defendants at any point on the grade of the Iowa Southwestern Railroad Company for which the defendants were to pay him forty cents for each tie.

The plaintiff filed his petition in the Circuit Court, asking for an order authorizing the sale of the lands belonging to the estate of which he is administrator, for the payment of the debts of the intestate. The order was made, and defendants appeal. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.

Action in equity to quiet plaintiff’s title to certain real estate The defendant filed an answer and also a cross-petition in which he claimed to be the owner of the land. There was a demurrer to the answer and cróss-petition which was sustained, and a decree was entered for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of rape. He was convicted of an assault with intent to commit a rape, and he appeals.

The plaintiff is the owner of eighty acres of land, upon which there is a stone quarry, patent limekiln, and a railroad track or switch, leading from ithe stone quarry and limekiln to the track of the Rock Island R. R. Co. The township assessor assessed the property for the year 1879 at $15 per acre.

Action in chancery to enforce a trust of certain land, the fee simple title whereof, it is alleged, was held by the defendant in trust for the plaintiff. The relief prayed for in the petition is, that defendant be required to account to plaintiff for the proceeds of the land which has been sold. There was a decree dismissing plaintiff’s petition, from which she appeals.

This is an action in equity to caucel certain conveyances of a lot in the city of Des Moines, and to quiet plaintiff’s title thereto, upon the alleged ground that a deed made by the plaintiff .to the defendant Alcott, was without consideration, and was obtained by fraud. There was a decree for the plaintiff, and the defendant Geo. H. Gardner appeals.

In the month of January, 1875, B. E. Allen, a banker at Des Moines, Iowa, closed the doors of his banking house and stopped the payment of claims against him. Shortly afterward his creditors filed their petition in bankruptcy against him in the U. S. District Court, and in April of the same year he was in said court duly adjudged a baukrupt. The plaintiff herein held Allen’s certificates of deposit for several thousand dollars.

The essential facts in this ease, and about which, there is no dispute, are as follows: Alexander Blair was seized in fee of about 210 acres of land. On the 2d day of December, 1874, he executed and delivered to Martha Blair, his wife, a deed for eighty acres of said land, to have and to hold the same daring her natural life.

<p> Appeal from Guthrie Circuit Court. </p> <p>Action to enforce a mechanic’s lien. There was a judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.</p>

Action at law to recover for negligence of defendant, who was clerk of the District Court, in approving a stay bond. The case was tried to the court without a jury, and judgment rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action upon the covenants of warranty in a deed. The plaintiff claims damages in the sum of $2,450. The defend! ant denies the breach of warranty. There was a trial by jury. Yerdicfc for plaintiff for $028.07. Defendant appeals,

The plaintiff avers that in February and March, 1879, .he shipped from West Union to Postvilie, Iowa, certain grain, seed and pork, over the defendant’s road; that the defendant demanded of him and received as freight for such shipment, $265.50 more than was allowed by law; that the defendant did so in violation of law to the damage of the plaintiff in five times the amount of the overcharge, to-wit, the sum of $1,327.50, for which he asks judgment.

On the 10th day of July, 1880, there was filed in the court below a petition in habeas corpus. It appears from the allegations thereof that the plaintiff herein and Sophia B. Rivers are husband and wife; that they have two minor children of tender years, one being about nine years old and the other younger. That a separation of the husband and wife had taken place on account of the gross neglect of the husband to provide for his family.

This action was brought by the plaintiff as execution credtor of the defendant, Geo. W. Baker, to subject to the payment of the judgment certain premises occupied by the defendant, Geo. W. Baker and his wife, the defendant Hannah Baker, as a homestead.

A demurrer to plaintiffs’ petition was sustained by tbe court below and a judgment rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

This is an action upon a policy of insurance to recover the value of a dwelling house and its contents insured by the defendant for a term of five years from the 7thday of May, 1878, and destroyed by fire on the 8th day of April, 1879. The plaintiff alleges that as the assured under said policy he has in all things performed his agreement with the defendant.

The plaintiff’s claim is based on bis actual and adverse possession for a period of twenty years under a claim of title. The defendants claim under a conveyance made by the plaintiff to E. B. Newton. Judgment for the plaintiff and defendants appeal.

This is an action in equity, the object of which is to redeem certain lands from tax sales, it being alleged that the plaintiff who was the owner of the land was a minor when the sales were made. There was a trial by the court upon written evidence, and a decree was entered fixing the amount which the plaintiff should pay in redemption. Defendants appeal.

The plaintiff brings this action to quiet his title to certain land in the petition described. The plaintiff' claims that he is the absolute owner of the real estate in question, in virtue of a sale thereof under execution as the property of one West-brook, and a sheriff’s deed executed pursuant to said sale.

This is a proceeding by petition under Code, sections 3155— 3162, to obtain a new trial in an action at law in which the defendant herein was plaintiff. The judgment was vacated and it was found that the defendant therein had a good and complete defense to the action, and final judgment was entered accordingly. Defendant appeals.

The defendant was convicted in the Major’s court of the City of Centerville with having violated ordinance 113 of that city.

This is an action in equity to recover forty acres of land, and to redeem from á mortgage by the payment of the amount the defendant Schlapkahl, advanced in payment thereof. There was a demurrer to the petition which was sustained. Plaintiffs appeal.

The plaintiff averred in his petition in substance that the sale was wrongfully and irregularly made, and should he set aside for that reason. He also averred in his petition that he had offered to redeem, and he prayed that, in case the sale is held valid, he be allowed to redeem therefrom. The defendant denied the allegations of the petition. After tbe commencement of the action the plaintiff, Charles Chase,'tiied intestate, and his heirs, G-eo.

Action of mandamus to compel the defendants, who are trustees of Washington township, to pay a claim held by the plaintiff against the township. Judgment was rendered for the defendants for costs. Plaintiff appeals.

Action in chancery to foreclose a contract for the sale of certain city lots. There was a deeree for plaintiff; a part of the defendants appeal.

Action in replevin. A demurrer to the petition was sustained and judgment was rendered for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

This is an action to recover the value of certain property upon which the plaintiff had procured the levy of an attachment, and which the defendants, Smith & Crittenden and J. M. Phillips, had caused to be released from the attachment by “the execution of a delivery bond. The cause was tried to (he court and judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff for $278. The defendants appeal. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>1. Instructions: possession of stolen goods: presumption of daw. Where the instruction stated that the presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen goods, was one of law, but left to the jury the power to say whether such a presumption warranted a verdict of guilty, the defendant was not prejudiced by calling it a presumption of law.</p> <p>2. -: preponderance of evidence: reasonable doubt. The defendant can only be required to introduce evidence which creates a reasonable doubt whether he honestly came into the possession of stolen goods. An instruction that he must overcome the presumption arising from such possession by a preponderance of evidence is erroneous.</p>

The defendant under the right of way act commenced proceedings and sought to condemn a portion of the right of way belonging to the plaintiff and this action was brought to restrain such proceedings. The hearing was had upon petition, answer, exhibits and affidavits filed by both parties. The injunction was refused and the plaintiff appeals.

This is a proceeding for a writ of certiorari. The petition and amended petition in .substance allege that plaintiff is a resident taxpayer of the city of Keokuk, and brings the suit in his individual capacity, and for the public; that the defendants compose the city council of the city of Keokuk; that the assessor of the city of Keokuk for the year 1880 duly assessed the Commercial Bank, a banking corporation under the laws of Iowa, resident within said city, at $35,000,…

The plaintiff's allege that the defendant, as sheriff of Appanoose county, had in his hands for service ayi execution against Gilliam & Ogle, and that he took possession of and sold certain property in the-petition described, without making any (■levy thereon. The plaintiffs further allege that at the time of such seizure and sale they had a chattel mortgage upon said property, executed by H. S. Gilliam and J3.

This is a proceeding in this court for a review upon certiorari of the action of the Nan Burén Circuit Court in imposing a fine for comtempt upon E. F. Baldwin, John Trout, James T. Jones, and Addison Kerr, trustees of a religious corporation called the “ Union Meeting House of the Methodist Church.” On the 17th day of June, 1880, a writ of certiorari issued from this court to the Hon. Robert Sloan, Judge of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District, commanding him…

<p>1. Bill of Exceptions: bar docket. A bar docket is not a part of a court record, and is not available on appeal to show that a case was disposed of out of its order, unless duly incorporated in or sufficiently identified by a bill of exceptions,</p> <p>2. Jury: waiver of. Where the defendant failed to appear at the trial, he will be deemed to have waived a jury.</p> <p>3.-: new trial. The facts in this case excusing default in the court below, are not sufficient to entitle the defendant to a new trial.</p>

This is an action in chancery asking for a specific performance of a contract to issue a policy of insurance, and to recover thereon the value of the property covered by the contract, which has been destroyed by fire. There was a trial upon the merits and a decree entered dismissing plaintiff’s petition, from which he appeals.

This case was before us on a former appeal. See 51 Iowa, 296, to wliick, for a statement in part of tlie case, reference is here made. The cause having been remanded to the court below, the defendant filed an amendment to his counter-claim as follows: “That there are equitable circumstances entitling the defendant to relief and that the counter-claim though not» proved within one year after the giving notice by the administratrix of her appointment is not barred.

<p> Appeal from Clarke District Court. </p> <p>Action to foreclose a mortgage. Defense usury. Decree for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.</p>

<p> Appeal from Adams Circuit Court. </p> <p>This is an action to recover for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage. There was a decree for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals. The facts of the case appear in the opinion.</p>

This is an action in equity, the object of which is to set aside and cancel a sheriff’s deed to certain real estate of which plaintiff claims to be the owner and to restrain the defendants from prosecuting against plaintiff a certain action for the possession of the premises founded upon said deed. There was a decree for the plaintiff. Defendants appeal.

Action upon a promissory note, and upon an accepter order. There was a cross-demand by which the defendant claimed judgment against the plaintiff upon a promissory note. A jury was waived and upon a trial by the court judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The plaintiff brings this action to recover of tlie defendant damages for the alleged conversion of certain property which the plaintiff claims as the assignee of a chattel mortgage executed on the 17th day of November, 1877, by James Heatham to William D. Bradley to secure a promissory note of the same date for the sum of $S4.20, payable1 October 1, 1878.

On the 8th day of October, 1880, the plaintiff commenced an action by attachment against the defendants, J. and H. Wheaton, to recover the sum of $60.

An action to recover of the estate of T. C. Livingston, deceased, §731, on account of a subscription of §500 to the University of Des Moines. Under the direction of the court the jury returned a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion.

The plaintiffs presented a petition to the board of supervisors asking the location and construction of a ditch. The county surveyor was appointed to make the necessary survey, plans and specifications, and after due notice the ditch was ordered constructed and a contract was let therefor in accordance with the plans and specifications.

The plaintiff claims to be the. owner of certain lands in his petition described, by virtue of certain tax deeds executed on the 29th day of October, 1877, pursuant to a sale made October 5, 1871, for a delinquent tax of 1873, and brings this action to quiet his title to said lands.

Action od a bond executed by defendant Fields, and Meyerhoif as his surety. Judgment against both of the defendants, but Meyerhoff alone appeals.

Action to quiet the title of certain land in plaintiff, and to recover the possession thereof. There was a decree granting the relief sought in plaintiff’s petition; defendants appeal.

Action upon a promissory note. A judgment was rendered for plaintiff from which defendant appeals. The facts of the case fully appear in the opinion.

Appeal from Butler District Court. The defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of larceny, and he appeals.

Appeal from Allamakee District Court. Action in equity to foreclose a mortgage. There was a judgment and decree for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action in replevin to recover possession of certain corn. The petition avers that the corn was taken upon an execution issued upon a judgment against plaintiff which wag illegal and void, because the court which rendered the judgment had no jurisdiction of the defendant therein, the present plaintiff, nor of the subject-matter of the action. The defendant moved for a more specific statement showing the facts upon which the want of jurisdiction was based.

<p> Appeal from Black Hawk Circuit Court. </p> <p>In tbe petition and the amendment thereto it is alieged that John Howe, Sr., and Martin Howe, were in possession of certain lands described, and that in the spring and summer of 1876 they planted certain crops thereon and tended and cultivated them until August 1st, 1876, with the knowledge and assent of the defendant J. T. Knapp; that on August 1, 1S7C, defendant Knapp commenced an action against the said Efowes, and one Edward Carrigan, claiming to be the owner of said premises and entitled to said crops, and asking a temporary writ of injunction restraining the defendants from removing any of the grain growing upon the premises, and from appropriating it to their own use.</p> <p>That said Knapp on that day, filed a bond with the defendant Miller as surety, in the snm of six hundred dollars, conditioned that said Knapp should pay all damages that the Jlowes and Carrigan should sustain by the wrongful issuing of said writ; that the writ issued and the said Howes and Carrigan were restrained from entering upon the premises, and from removing the crops <Jr appropriating them to their own use; that the defendant Knapp entered upon the premises, and cut, harvested and carried away and appropriated to his own use the crops and grass growing thereon; that at the April term, 1878, Knapp withdrew the action commenced by him, without the consent of the defendants therein; that the writ of injunction was wrongfully and unlawfully issued, and by reason thereof John and Martin Howe were prevented from entering upon said premises, and from caring for and preserving the crops, whereby a large amount thereof went to waste and decay and was damaged by exposure to the weather, to the damage of said Howes in the sum of fourteen hundred and seventy-five dollars; that the cause of action arising to the said John Howe, Sr., and Martin Howe, has been by them duly assigned in writing to the plaintiff and he is the owner thereof. Plaintiff asks judgment against the defendants Knapp and Miller for the snm of $600, and against the defendant Knapp for the futher sum of $875.</p> <p>The defendants answered alleging that on the 2nd day of May, 1876, the defendant Knapp became the owner in fee simple of the premises described in the petition by virtue of a deed of that date, executed to him by the sheriff of Grundy county, pursuant to a sale of said premises by said sheriff on the 1st day of May, 1875, under an execution issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Black Hawk county, upon a judgment in said court recovered by H. Ruble against the said .John Howe, Sr.; that Knapp remained such owner until the 29th day of August, 1876, when he lost the title thereof, by the duo execution and delivery of a deed from the said sheriff to one Marietta H. Candee, which deed was made under a sale by the sheriff on the 28th day of August, 1876, under a special execution issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Grundy county, pursuant to a decree in an action wherein said Candee was plaintiff, and said John Howe, Sr., and his wife, and the said H. Ruble, were defendants, for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by said Howe and wife to said Candee to secure the purchase-money of said premises;- that as the owner of said land and entitled to the possession, profits and use thereof, said Knapp, during the time of such ownership, as alleged herein, took and converted to his own use the wheat and oats tlieréon at that time, and after the 29 th day of August, 1876, said Knapp as the agent of said Candee, the owner of said premises, did take certain other crops at that time standing and growing thereon; and defendants say that John and Martin Howe had no interest in or right to the said premises, and no right to the possession thereof or the said crops growing at the date of said deeds.</p> <p>The plaintiffs filed a reply averring in the first count that the sale and deed to Knapp were and are wholly void because of the fact that said John Howe, in whom the legal title was vested, at the time of said deed, was a married man, the head of a family, and then lived with his family on a farm composed of the premises in question and forty acres contiguous thereto, which he used and cultivated as one farm, and which farm then constituted his homestead, and before said sale and deed no homestead of said John Howe on said farm had been platted or recorded, or in any manner selected by him as provided by law, and the sheriff making the sale failed to cause the homestead to be platted before making the sale. The second count of the reply contains the same allegations as to the sale and deed to Candee.</p> <p>The third count of the reply alleges that after Knapp had received his deed under the first sale, he suffered and permitted the said John Howe to remain in the peaceable possession of said premises and to rent the same as his own to plaintiff’s assignor, Martin Howe, who was wholly ignorant of said sheriff’s sale and deed, and permitted said Howe to plant the land with crops, and expend large sums of money and much labor in the cultivation thereof, all of which was done with the full knowledge and consent of said Knapp, and after said crops had been raised and matured, he wrongfully sued out the writ of injunction mentioned in the petition, and deprived said Martin and John Howe of the fruits of their labor. The defendants filed a demurrer to the first and second counts of the reply on the ground that the plaintiff in this action cannot collaterally attack the titles of Knapp and Candee under said sales and sheriff’s deeds. This demurrer was overruled, to which the defendants excepted. The defendants filed a second and third amendment to their answer, which need not here be set out. The cause was tried to a jury, and a verdict was returned and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for two hundred dollars. Both parties appeal.</p>

On the 20th day of July, 1878, the plaintiff commenced against the defendant, James McMillan, sheriff, an action of replevin for certain personal property, alleging that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession thereof. A writ of replevin was issued and the plaintiff was placed in possession of said property.

At the September term, 1880, of the Story District Court the defendant was indicted for resisting an officer serving legal process, and at the same term he appeared in person and by counsel and waived arraignment and filed a plea of not guilty. The cause was thereupon continued to the February term, 1881, and the defendant gave bond for his appearance in the sum of $200.

Appeal from Winnesheik Circuit Court. Action upon a promissory note. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff; defendants appeal.

The petition of plaintiff alleges that on the 10th day of March, 1878, the defendant, Arent Thompson Lee, entered into a written lease for certain premises from plaintiff for the term of three years, commencing on the 1st day of March, 1879, and agreed to pay one-half of grains raised thereon; that when the term commenced there was about 90 acres of plowed land on the premises, and defendant, by the terms of the lease, in part consideration for the use of the premises,…

Appeal from Floyd Distict Court. Action to foreclose a mortgage. Defense, usury. Trial to the court, judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

The plaintiffs filed a petition alleging in substance that on the 21st of December, 1877, plaintiff recovered a judgment against J. H. Sheak for the sum of $509.53, no part of which has been paid; that on the 19th of November, 1878, the plaintiff caused execution to issue on said judgment, which was served by garnishing Sheak & Sharra and Alexander Sharra; that said Sheak & Sharra were then, and are now, a firm composed of J. H. Sheak and Alexander Sharra; that since the…

Action to recover for interest alleged to be due upon delinquent interest upon a promissory note.

Action for divorce on the ground of desertion. The defendant denied that she deserted the plaintiff. On the other hand, by cross petition, she averred that the plaintiff deserted her, and she prayed for a decree of divorce in her favor, and for $5,000 as alimony. The court dismissed both the plaintiff’s petition and the defendant’s cross-petition. Both parties appealed, the plaintiff perfecting his appeal first.

The plaintiff commenced this action on the 3d day of May, 1877, against Ered Baum, claiming $1,000 on six due bills and one promissory note executed by Ered Baum to H. A. Ger-hart, and alleging that George Glick, administrator of H. A. Gerhart’s estate, assigned and transferred in writing said due bills and note to the plaintiff.

On the 20th day of May, 1880, the plaintiff filed in the Marshall District Court his petition, in substance alleging that he is the owner of a certain quarter section of land, and that on the 14th day of June, 1867, the Eldora Railroad and Coal Company, being desirous of procuring a right of way over said premises, caused the appointment of a sheriff’s jury, which assessed the plaintiff’s damages at ten dollars, which sum said company deposited with the sheriff; that on the…

This is a proceeding in the Circuit Court as a court of probate instituted by the executor to obtain, by an order of the court, an interpretation of the will of the testator. The defendant, Hattie Gf. Kelsey, an infant daughter of the testator, and a legatee under the will, by a guardian ad litem, answered the petition of plaintiff and filed a cross-bill in the proceeding.

<p>1. Habeas Corpus: practice. This proceeding being regarded as an action at law, the court can only interfere where the finding below is manifestly unsupported by the evidence.</p> <p>2. Divorce: jurisdiction: custody op children. A. decree of divorce rendered in the State of Wisconsin, on service by publication, so far as it attempted to fix the custody of the minor children who were then residents of the State of Iowa, is without jurisdiction and void.</p>

The plaintiff commenced this action before a justice of the peace to recover his costs as a justice of the peace in five several suits brought by the defendant against various parties, in four of which suits judgment was rendered by default. The plaintiff claimed on account of all these suits, $12.50. The defendant admitted his liability to the extent of $8.50, but controverted the charge of one dollar in each of the default cases.

The plaintiff claims of the defendant one thousand dollars damages, and as a ground for such claim, in substance alleges that during the year 187S the defendant, without the consent and against the wishes of plaintiff, and without having instituted any condemnation proceedings, and without having assessed or paid the plaintiff the damage which he sustained, laid down and commenced to operate a branch line or switch, commencing at a point near the southwest corner of…

This is a proceeding for the admeasurement of dower. Erom the decree entered in the case Wm. B. Murry, an intervening creditor, appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion.

Action for money alleged to have been collected by defendant for plaintiff. In September, 1876, the defendant received by indorsement from the plaintiff a promissory note of which she was the payee.

The plaintiffs, who hold an unsatisfied judgment against the defendant, A. W. Perry, for $731.41, bring this action to set aside a conveyance of two hundred acres of land from A. W. Perry to his wife L. A. Perry, and to subject it to the satisfaction of said judgment. The plaintiffs allege that the.conveyance was made without consideration, and with intent to defraud creditors, and is void. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition. The plaintiff’s appeal.

Action for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff' by reason of the sale of beer to her husband by tbe defendant Kirt. Eeckermire was made defendant, as being the owner of the premises upon which the beer is alleged to have been sold. The defendants, for answer, denied all the allegations of the petition. There was a trial by jury and verdict and judgment were rendered against both defendants. The defendant Eeckermire appeals.

The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of W. L. Miller, deceased, brings this action to recover of the defendant damages for the alleged willfully and maliciously killing the said W. L. Miller. There was a jury trial resulting in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $5,050. The defendant appeals. The material facts are stated in the opinion.

Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. Action upon a written contract. Trial by jury, verdict, and judgment for defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant ivas tried and convicted of the murder of John Long. He was sentenced to'the penitentiary for life, and now aqtpeals to this court for a reversal of the judgment against him.

The petition alleged, in substance, that during the week preceding the general election of 1880, the trustees of Sioux City township, in… Held: and said election was held therein, occupying it for said purpose, and for counting the votes, two days and one night; that the plaintiffs, at the request of the trustees, furnished a large amount of fuel and lights; that the sum of $15.00 is a reasonable compensation to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs presented their bill to the board…

The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of $2,363.23 on account of alleged deposits, made by himself, and by one Stolp, his assignor, with the defendant as a private banker. The defendant alleges that he paid all of the money deposited, to the plaintiff, and to his assignor, Stolp, and fully settled the same. The cause was tried to the court, and judgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff claims of the defendant $2,000, for alleged injury to'his building, situated on the westerly one-third of lot 1, in block 32, in the city of Muscatine.

Action to recover damages resulting from injuries to a house owned by plaintiff, caused by the obstruction of a water-course by defendant, whereby the stream was diverted from its natural channel and caused to flow against plaintiff’s property. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action in chancery. There was a decree granting relief to plaintiff from which defendants appeal. The facts of the case so far as they are involved in the-questions decided by the court appear in the opinion.

The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of three hundred dollars, and alleges as a ground of such claim that he sold and conveyed to the defendant certain real estate for the consideration of two thousaud dollars, and that there is due and owing to the plaintiff on account of said sale the sum of three hundred dollars.

Action for damages for malicious prosecution. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

The petition states the defendant has the power, and under the statute holds fairs, and that in October, 1880, one of such fairs was held,… Held: and as “ an inducement to owners and persons having charge of horses to attend and enter their animals, the said defendant issued printed offers of premiums, among which offers was one of $50, first money for the best three in five, free for all trotting, and was open to all horses owned in the county of Plymouth, Iowa, and not…

Action by a wife to recover damages caused by sales of wine, beer and ale, to her husband, whereby she was injured in her person and means of support. Judgment was rendered on the verdict for the plaintiff and defendant appeals.

Action to recover possession, of a horse. The ground of recovery stated in the petition is that plaintiff was the owner of the horse and therefore entitled to the possession. The answer denied knowledge of plaintiff’s ownership, and alleged the defendant was entitled to possession under a contract with a former owner, whereby the defendant was entitled to a lieu on the horse for certain money due him by such owner.

The petition states the plaintiff Sianda Merritt is the owner of certain real estate, which is fully described, and that Thos. J. Merritt is her husband. That in 1875 the defendant obtained a judgment against said Thomas for $3,620.36, with interest at ten per cent, and á foreclosure of a mortgage on said real estate against both the plaintiffs.

The defendant was one of the judges of election of the Delaware Center voting precinct, at the general election in November, 1880. The plaintiff offered to vote at said election.

The defendant was indicted jointly with Charles Wood and James White for a robbery from the person of R. G. Edwards, perpetrated by assaulting and wounding him with deadly weapons. The defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary. He appeals. The case was before us on a former appeal. See 55 Iowa, 321.

Action to recover an alleged balance upon a promissory note. The petition avers that the note was executed by the defendants, Strother & Conklin, to the defendants, Day Bros., and indorsed by them to the plaintiff; that it was made May 10, 1877; that it was drawn for $1,100, and bears ten per cent interest. The petition admits a payment of $1,175, as made December 20, 1878.

This action is brought upon an indemnifying bond, executed by Wright & Spencer, as principals, and T. J. Fletcher, as surety, to procure a levy by the sheriff of an execution in favor of Wright & Spencer, and against W. Martin & Do., W. Martin and J. B. Sweet,.

Action upon a promissory note purporting to be executed to Davis & Collins by the defendants, Pattee Brothers & Co., by E. C. Bickford, agent, and indorsed by Davis & Collins to the plaintiffs. The defendants for answer denied that Bickford had authority to use their name in the execution of the note.

<p>1. Guardian and Ward: allowance por support. Where a guardian, who was also the step-father of his wards, and provided for them and received their services, the same as though they were his own children, had from time to time been allowed certain sums by the probate court for their support, the decree of the court below allowing him such expenditures, upon the final accounting, was approved.</p> <p>2.--: chancery: jurisdiction. The Circuit Court, sitting as a court of chancery, has jurisdiction to adjudicate all matters in controversy between the guardian and his wards, whether arising after 'or before the . wards became of age.</p> <p>3. ---: judgment: income op estate. Where the evidence showed that the judgment in favor of the guardian, for the support of his wards, could be satisfied out of the income of their estate, it was held proper under the pleadings.</p>

The plaiutiff, as administratrix of the estate of John Winkle-man, Jr., deceased, brings this action to recover of the defendant the value of certain personal property, of which it is alleged that the decedent died seizdd, and which it is alleged that the defendant has wrongfully taken and holds, under a claim of right. ^ ' The defendant admits that he claims the right to hold the property and avers that he has such right by reason of a nuncupative will, and also by a parol…

Action upon a policy of fire insurance, executed to the plaintiff by the defendants, the Germania Fire Insurance Co. and the Hanover Fire Insurance Co. The defendants for answer set up certain alleged breaches of warranty, and also a failure to serve proof of loss.

Action for an injunction to restrain an execution sale. The plaintiff avers that the judgment upon which the execution issued lias no validity, for want of jurisdiction in the court to render the judgment. He also avers that payments to the amount of about $350 dollars have been made upon the judgment, but which have not been credited thereon. The defendants for answer denied all the material allegations of the 'petition. They also moved to dissolve the injunction.

Action to recover for a personal injury. The plaintiff avers that the defendant negligently suffered one of its streets to become obstructed, and that she was thrown from a buggy by reason of the obstruction and received an injury. The defendant denies all negligence upon its part, and avers that the plaintiff’s inj ury, if she received any, was the result of her own negligence. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for the plaintiff.

Action for rent, and to enforce a landlord’s lien. A writ of attachment was issued and levied upon certain furniture used upon the premises. ' The lessee, the defendant Fowler, made no defense. Ford Bros, intervened as mortgagees of the property levied upon. They raised no question as to the existence of the plaintiff’s lien, but they claimed that the lien of their mortgage was paramount.

The plaintiff brings this action for tbe purpose of redeeming, from a tax sale, certain lands, in which it is alleged tbe plaintiff’s ward, Alvin Witt, a minor, bad an interest at tbe ti me they were sold for taxes. Tbe cause wás tried upon an agreed statement of .facts, and a decree was entered from which tbe defendant appeals.

Action upou an accouut. The plaintiffs are physicians, and as such they furnished medicine and medical attendance at the written request of the trustees of Delaware township in Delaware county. The claim as presented to the board of supervisors, amounted t $195.05. rl he board allowed thereon the sum of $114.55, and refused to allow the balance. The action is brought to recover such balance.

The plaintiff claims of the defendant one hundred and five dollars, for the killing of a cow. The cause was tried to the court on an agreed statement of facts. J udgment was rendered for the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

Action upon two promissory notes executed by the defendant, one for $35, and one for $50. The defendant admits the execution of the notes, but he avers that there is not more thau $40 due on botli of them. He avers that they were given for a mowing-machine, bought in August, 1878; that iie bought the machine with a warranty, and that the warranty has been broken; that the price of the machine was $95, and tt was not worth more than $50.

Action for an injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing and carrying out a certain ordinance providing for supplying the city of Council Bluffs with water.

Action in chancery to enjoin the sale of plaintiff’s property upon an execution issued on a judgment by confession against him ami others. There was a decree granting the relief prayed for. Defendants appeal.

<p>1. Fraudulent Sale: action to recover: demand. Where the vendor seeks to recover goods, after they have been attached as the property of the vendee, upon the ground that he was induced to deliver them through fraud, the gist of the action being the title to the property, it is not necessary, in order to maintain the action, to allege and prove a demand.</p> <p>2. -: -: rescisión of contract of sale. Where the vendor rescinded the sale of goods on account of the fraud of the vendee in inducing the sale and delivery, and brought an action to recover the goods, it was not required by law that notice of the rescission of the sale should be given before the action was commenced.</p> <p>3. -:--:-: creditors: notice of fraud. The vendor, after the attachment of the goods by the creditors of the vendee, has the right to rescind the sale for fraud perpetrated by the vendee, of whicli the credi- ,. tors had no notice. An attaching creditor parts with no consideration, and acquires no greater rights to the property than the vendee had.</p> <p>4. -: allegations of: rescission of sale. Allegations of fraud and fraudulent intentions considered. An intention on the part of the vendee not to pay for goods bought by him, which he conceals from the vendor, is a fraud which will authorize the vendor to rescind the sale.</p>

This is an appeal from an order sustaining a motion for judgment. The action was brought to recover possession of certain real estate. The defendants set up an equitable defense, averring that the defendant, S. O. Wilson, purchased the premises of the plaintiff and took a bond for a deed; that a portion of the purchase-money had been paid and the balance tendered. The plaintiff took issue upon the sufficiency of the tender.

The defendant was indicted jointly with two others for b urglary. Yerdict and j adgmeut having been rendered against him he appeals.

Action to recover of the defendant the amount of a certain promissory note which, it is alleged, he agreed to execute with C. W. Downs and Charles Downs for money loaned to the defendant and said other parties. The defendant denied that he made any agreement that he would execute the note, and averred that plaintiff ought not to recover because he claims under a verbal promise to pay the debt of another.

The plaintiff alleges in bis petition that in 1871 and 1872 be was engaged in business with Z. C. Trask et al., forming the firm of Trask, McNitt & Knapp, and on September 10, 1872, defendant J. M. Dougan recovered a judgment against said firm and tbe plaintiff for $818.87; that on August 7, 1872, a petition was filed against the plaintiff as a bankrupt, and on the 28th day of April, 1875, plaintiff received a discharge in bankruptcy from all debts and claims which existed…

<p>1. Criminal Law: amendment op abstract: practice. After the final submission of a criminal cause the defendant filed a motion for leave to amend his abstract, but made no showing therefor, and did not ask to set aside the submission. Held, that the amendment could not be allowed.</p> <p>2. -: degree oeprooe: jury: reasonable doubt. While a juror who entertains a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt is not required to surrender his convictions, because the other jurors have no such doubt, yet the refusal to so instruct, where the court gave the usual instructions in regard to the degree of proof required, was not error.</p> <p>S, -: alibi: burden of proof, ft is now tlie settled law of this State that where, iu a criminal case, the defense of an alibi is relied upon, the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.</p> <p>4. ——: -: Adams, 1, dissenting, held, that if the evidence to establish an alibi was sueli ¡is to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, the jury would be justified in acquitting. Day, J., concurring.</p>

<p>1. Board of Supervisors: claim for unliquidated damages: proof. The presentation of a claim for unliquidated damages against a county, to the board of supervisors, and demand for payment, may be proved by the person presenting it.</p> <p>2. County Bridges: expert testimony. The evidence of an expert, a bridge-builder, as to the average length of time white-oak timber would last in a bridge was properly admitted. Such facts should not be left to be inferred by the jury without proof.</p> <p>3. Evidence: expert: competency op witness. It is not necessary that a person be a medical expert before he can testify that his ribs were fractured. Any person who knows a fact may testify in regard to it.</p> <p>4. -: declarations op person injured. In an action for personal injuries the declarations of the person injured, made after convalescence, as to the condition of his health and the pain he experienced, are not . admissible.</p> <p>5. County Bridges: adoption op plan: negligence. A county cannot carelessly and negligently adopt an insufficient plan for a bridge, and escape liability for damages resulting from the insufficiency of the plan. The comity should exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a plan for a public bridge.</p> <p>6. Compensatory Damages: mental suffering. In an action for personal injuries mental suffering, arising from actual physical injury inflicted, may properly be considered in estimating compensatory damages.</p> <p>7. Bridges: defective: notice: liability. Where a county was not negligent in. the construction of a bridge, it will not be liable for an injury resulting- from the same becoming defective and out of repair, unless it had notice or knowledge thereof, or unless the defect was so notorious that not to know of it was negligence.</p> <p>8. —-: failure to repair. Where the county had knowledge, or, in the exercise of reasonable prudence, had reason to know thát a bridge was defective, and failed to repair it, or to prevent the public from using it, it is liable for any injury resulting therefrom.</p> <p>9. -: inspection of: negligence. The failures of the board of supervisors to inspect bridges, or to appoint some competent person to do so, as frequently as men of ordinary prudence would deem necessary, was negligence that would render the county lial '«for any injury caused by a defective bridge.</p> <p>10.--: board of supervisors : notice of dei Where the board of supervisors had been informed of the danj condition of the bridge, and had failed to examine or repair it, itv.-s negligence although the bridge had been examined two and one-half years before, and reported reasonably safe for about four years.</p> <p>11. -: -: knowledge of defect. The facts that the bridge had been out of repair for seven or eight months, and was old, and that the county took no measures to examine or repair it, will not constitute negligence, unless some member of the board knew, or had reason to know, that it was unsafe.</p>

On the 5th day of July, 1880, the plaintiff commenced her action against the defendant, on a promissory note for $1,200, executed hy the defendant to Oivilla Jones, now Civilla J. Searcy, the plaintiff, dated February 23, 1874, due twelve months after date.

Action to recover damages sustained from personal injuries received by plaintiff while employed as a bralcemau upon defendant’s railroad, which were caused by negligence of defendant. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

Action in equity to have declared void, as to the plaintiff, certain taxes, and have the same canceled of record as a hen on certain real estate. A demurrer to the petition was overruled, and the relief asked granted. The defendants appeal.

<p> Appeal from Cherokee Circuit Court. </p> <p>The plaintiffs presented their petition to the Hon. J. E. Znver for an injunction, and thereupon a temporary injunction issued as prayed. Afterward the plaintiffs filed an amended and substituted petition, alleging in substance that plaintiffs own in severalty separate and distinct parcels of land, situated within .the corporate limits of the incorporated town of Cherokee; that all of said lands are held and used exclusively for agricultural purposes; that they are remote from the town proper; have no additions or town improvements near them; are not benefited in any manner by the current expenditure of said town; and are not held by the owners for the purpose of laying them off -into town lots and putting them in market as town property; that ever since said town was incorporated it has levied on said lands a tax for corporation purposes, and collected the same from the plaintiffs; that the plaintiff Lewis has refused to pay the tax levied on his lands for 1879, and the defendant Eli Eshleman has advertised the lands, and will sell them unless restrained; that the town of Cherokee has levied for the year 1880 municipal taxes on said lands, and the defendant Chick will, unless restrained, extend the same on the tax books of the county. Plaintiffs pray that Eshleman be restrained from selling any part of said lands, and that Chick be restrained from extending on the tax books of Cherokee county any municipal tax levied on the lands described in the petition, and that, upon the final hearing the levy of said taxes be declared illegal. The defendant filed a motion to■ dismiss the action, because the petition shows there is a misjoinder of parties; also to strike out of the petition all causes of action but one, and cause plaintiffs to elect which cause of action will be presented, for the reason that there is a misjonder of causes of action. Afterward the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, for the reason that plaintiff's are misjoined in the action. Afterward the court made a ruling upon said motions as follows: “Plaintiffs having been given time heretofore to elect whether they would strike out all parties plaintiffs but one, they now elect to stand upon their amended and substituted petition. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is sustained and case dismissed, injunction dissolved at plaintiff’s costs, and thereupon plaintiff excepts.” The plaintiffs appeal.</p>

This is a proceeding to condemn a right of way for the defendant’s railroad across certain improved land owned by tbe plaintiff. It appears from the assessment of the commissioners appointed by tbe sheriff that one Ozias was tbe owner of a mortgage upon tbe farm, and the damage occasioned by tbe taking of a right of way, was assessed to tbe plaintiff and Ozias jointly.

This is an action to recover damages upon an injunction bond. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict and 'judgment for the defendants. The palintiff appeals,

Defendant was indicted and convicted of larceny of a steer, the property of Peter Mathews, and sentenced to the penitentiary for the term of eighteen months. He now appeals to this court.

The plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of Moses Leonard, deceased, instituted this proceeding, praying an order barring the defendant, Mary Lining, from any right in said estate, and directing. distribution to the representatives of Wilson Leonard, a deceased son of Moses Leonard, former husband of Mary Lining.

Action for malicious prosecution. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and j; tdgment were rendered for the plaintiff again s t the defendant Eose. He appeals.

<p> Appeal from Black Hawk District Court. </p> <p>The plaintiff alleges in liis petition that permission to buy and sell intoxicating liquors for the term of twelve months> within Blade, Ilawlc county, as provided by chapter 6, title XI of the Code, was by the board of supervisors of said county, on the 9th day of January, 1879, granted, and on the SGth day of January, 1879, issued to the defendant Anton Sartori, and that he as principal, with other parties named, as sureties, executed a bond; to said county for the use of the school fund, in compliance with the requiremerts of the statute, for the sum of three thousand dollars.</p> <p>Counts one to seven of the petition allege that in the month of February, and that in each of the succeeding months, the defendant made sales of intoxicating liquors to various persons, and that he did not, on the last Saturday of any of the months make to the auditor of said county any report in writing of said Bales, nor any report showing the kinds and quantity of liquors sold, nor to whom sold, nor showing any of his doings as a purchaser, or sales of intoxicating liquors during said time.</p> <p>The defendant, “for answer denies each and every allegation made and contained in plaintiff’s petition, except such ás are hereinafter specifically admitted. The defendant further answering, states:</p> <p>“ 1. That he admits that he made the sales of intoxicating liquors, substantially as stated in the first count of the petition, and admits that he did not file a report thereof on the last Saturday of the month of February, A. I). 1879, but the defendant avers that he did file a report thereof fully compljdng with the statute, on the loth day of March, A. D. 1879, which said report shows all sales and purchases for the month of February, A. D. 1879, and including the sales mentioned in the said count of the petition.”</p> <p>In the other divisions of the answer, numbered from two to seven, the defendant admits that he made the sales substantially as stated in counts two to seven of the petition respectively, and that he did not file a report thereof on the last Saturday of each month, but that he did file reports, fully complying with the statute, for the month of March, on the 17th day of April; for the month of April, on the 21st day of May; for the month of May, on the 14th day of July; for the month of June, on the 14th day of July; for the month of July, on the 12th day of September; for the month of August, on the 12th day of September.</p> <p>The plaintiff demurred to this answer. The demurrer was overruled. The plaintiff elected to stand upon the demurrer, and judgment was entered against her for costs. The plaintiff appeals.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgage: upon crops to be grown: validity of. Whether a chattel mortgage, upon crops to be planted or grown by the mortgagor in the future, is valid, as against the creditors of the mortgagor, qucere.</p> <p>2. ---. -: indefinite description of mortgaged property. Where the description of the property mortgaged was “ all the crops raised by me in any part of Jones county for the term of three years,” it is too indefinite and uncertain to charge third persons with notice of the mortgage.</p>

<p>1. Voluntary Conveyance: by insolvent: evidence. 'Where an insolvent paid the consideration for certain real estate, and procured the conveyance of the same to his wife, it was held not to differ from a voluntary conveyance made by a husband, while insolvent, to his wife; and that the property was properly subjected to the payment of the husband’s debts.</p> <p>2. Chattel Mortgage: foreclosure of: good faith. Evidence of the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage and sale of the property considered; held, that no want of good faith or diligence on the part of the mortgagees was shown.</p>

<p> Appeal from Poweshiek District Court. </p> <p>An information was filed before a justice of the peace charging that the defendant sold to W. Cullison intoxicating liquor. The.defendant was convicted by the justice and appealed to the District Court, where he was again convicted, and appeals to this court.</p>

Action to recover the value of certain cattle killed by trains upon defendant’s railway at the crossing of a public road. There was a judgment upon a verdict for plaintiff; defendant appeals.

On the 19 th day of June, 1880, the plain tiff filed her petition alleging that she is the owner of a tract of land containing two and 10-100 acres, and that the B. & M. R. R’y Go and its successors, the O., B. & Q. R’y Co., have operated a railway adjacent to said premises for the past twenty-five years; and that the defendant, the C., B. & Q. R’y Co., has entered upon and threatens to use for railway purposes a strip of said premises of the width of about twenty-one feet,…

<p>1. WillS: ACCEPTANCE OF BY WIDOW: ENTERED OF RECORD: EVIDENCE of. The acceptance by a widow of the provisions of a will, in lieu of dower, in order to be binding upon her, under section 2452 of the Code, must be made within six months from the time she received notice of its provisions; and such acceptance must be entered in the proper records of the Circuit Court and be evidenced by such record, and no other evidence thereof is sufficient or competent. A written notice of acceptance, not entered of record, is not sufficient.</p> <p>2.--: -: estoppel: distributive share. Where the widow filed a written notice of her acceptance of the provisions of the will, but her consent was not entered of record, she would not be estopped thereby from claiming her distributive share in her husband’s estate.</p>

<p> Appeals from Des Moines District Court. </p> <p>These causes are submitted together as arising upon substantially the same state of facts and involving the same questions of law.</p> <p>The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the defendant from changing the course of a certain stream of water known as Hawkeye Creek. The defendant claims the right to change the course of the creek under chapter 191 of the laws of 1880, Miller’s Code, page 357. The'court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petitions and they appeal.</p>

<p>1. Rape: assault with intent: evidence: competency of. Where the defendant was charged with having unlawfully camal knowledge of one O., a female, by administering to her- a drug producing stupor, and was convicted of an assault with such intent, it was immaterial, under the verdict, whether the prosecutrix knew the bad reputation of the defendant in respect to women prior to the alleged offense, and testimony of such knowledge was properly excluded.</p> <p>2. -: - — :--—: belief of witness. In such case, the fact that a witness may have believed the prosecutrix unchaste would not be competent testimony. The prosecutrix could not be proven unchaste by proving that the witness believed her to be so.</p> <p>3. —-: corroborative testimony. If it be necessary that the prosecutrix should be corroborated, to sustain a conviction for administering a drug with intent, etc, of which there is doubt, and the question is not determined, such corroborative testimony exists in this case.</p> <p>4. -: degrees of orime: instruction: verdict. Under the evidence in this case the jury should have been allowed, if they saw fit, to find the defendant guilty of an assault and battery or a simple assault; and an instruction that they must find the defendant guilty as charged, or guilty of an assault with intent, etc., or not guilty, was erroneous.</p>

The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant for divorce and for alimony. Afterwards she filed her petition for an injunction, restraining the defendant from disposingof his real estate and personal property, until tlie final disposition of the action for divorce and alimony. The petition described the property, the sale of which was sought to be enjoined. A temporary injunction was granted. Afterwards a motion was made to dissolve the injunction.

Action upon a bond conditioned for tbe payment of money and the delivery of a land warrant. There was a verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

The plaintiff brings this action upon a promissory note executed to the Grinnell & Montezuma Eailroad Company, or bearer. The petition and amended petition allege that the railroad was completed as stipulated in the note, and that certificates of stock have been issued and tendered to the defendant. The answer to the petition and amended petition admits the execution of the note and the tender of the stock as alleged.

Action to recover double the value of a cow which, it is alleged, was killed on the track of defendant’s road by an engine and train, by reason of the want of a sufficient fence upon the line of the railroad. There was a trial by jury and a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

. This is an application for the allowance of a claim against the estate of Eranz Mally, deceased. The claim is based upon an alleged contract in writing, by which the decedent bound-himself to give the plaintiff a lease for life, or a life estate, in certain land, and a lease for ten years upon certain other land. Upon a trial in the Circuit Court the claim was allowed to the extent of $2,000, and the administrator appeals.

The plaintiffs commenced suit by attachment against the defendant, JD. A. Holt, and garnished the German Savings Bank of Davenport. Subsequently the plaintiffs recovered judgment against the defendant in the main action. The cause was tried, as to the garnishee, by the court, and judgment was rendered against the garnishee for $300. The defendant and the garnishee appeal. u The facts are stated in the opinion.

Action to recover double damages for injury to two horses done by one of the defendant’s trains; also to recover the amount of a veterinary surgeon’s bill paid for doctoring one of the horses. There was a trial by jury, and verdict and judgment were rendered for' the plaintiff. The defendant appeals.

The plaintiff commenced this action on the 2d day of October, 1879, claiming of the defendants the sum of one hundred and sixty dollars, with interest at ten per cent, from January 1st, 1879, on a bond, a copy of which is as follows: “This indenture witnesseth that John Bright, his heirs, executors and assigns, are held and firmly bound unto the county of Decatur, and State of Iowa, in the penal sum of five hundred dollars, that he will on the 1st day of January, 1879, pay…

The defendant was jointly indicted with S. T. Horine for tbe murder of George W. Learned, and upon a separate trial was convicted of manslaughter. He now appeals to this court. Tbe facts of tbe case, so far as tbey are involved in tbe questions decided, appear in tbe opinion.

This is a proceeding under section 2272 of tbe Code, for the appointment of a guardian of the property of the defendant, Joseph Hiekenbottom. ■ The plaintiff is a son-in-law of the defendant. He bases his application upon the ground that the defendant is of unsound mind. The defendant for answer denies that he is of unsound mind. There was a trial to a jury, which found that the defendant was of unsound mind, and the court appointed a guardian accordingly.

Action on a policy agaiust loss or damage by fire. The answer consisted of a general denial and certain special defenses, which are sufficiently indicated in the opinion. Trial by j ury; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

The petition states the plaintiff is administrator of the estate of L. Hurst, and that the personal property is insufficient to pay the indebtedness. The relief asked is an order empowering the plaintiff to sell certain real estate, which it is claimed belonged to the said Hurst at his death. The defendants are heirs at law of the deceased and state in the answer that Margaret Hurst was the wife of L. Hurst.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, on account of an obstruction in a street of the city, which caused plaintiff to be thrown from a sleigh in which he was riding. There was a verdict and judgment for plaint iff in the sum of $5,500. Defendant appeals.

Action in chancery. There was a decree in effect dismissing plaintiff’s petition and granting the relief prayed for in a cross-bill filed by defendants. Plaintiff appeals,