57 Md. App. 303 - Litzenberg v. Litzenberg’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In contending that the settlement agreement does not comply with the statute of frauds and, therefore, is unenforceable, appellant correctly notes that the agreement contemplates the transfers of two interests in land.... Admissions of a party in testifying, though in form evidence, are in essence not mere evidence, but make evidence against him unnecessary.... We think the Statute of Frauds requires no more. Furthermore, admissions of a party in the form of testimony would constitute sufficient “memoranda” under Section 4 or Section 17, or “writings” under Section 7, of the statute. For this purpose we think recorded testimony should be regarded as equivalent to signed depositions. Such statements would be sufficient to constitute admissions for the purpose of satisfying the statute of frauds if, in fact, Mr. Lockhart was authorized to enter into the agreement. If he had such authority, any document that he would have signed for appellant would have satisfied the Statute of Frauds. It follows then ... that if Mr. Lockhart’s signing of a document would satisfy the statute, then the admissions in his testimony would also satisfy the statute. Thus, we hold that Mr. Lockhart’s testimony may satisfy the signed writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds. While having trial counsel testify in the proceeding “is looked on with disfavor except in unusual circumstances, ... such testimony is not inadmissible....” Such testimony is particularly relevant on issues concerning the valid”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Litzenberg v. Litzenberg · 86 Md. App. 306 - David v. Warwell

2. “It is now well established that the trial court has power to summarily enforce on motion a settlement agreement entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it. Quite obviously, so simple and speedy a remedy serves well the policy favoring compromise, which in turn has made a major contribution to its popularity. Yet it is apparent that the summary procedure for enforcement of unperformed settlement contracts is not a panacea for the myriad types of problems that may arise. The summary procedure is admirably suited to situations where, for example, a binding settlement bargain is con ceded or shown, and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is ill-suited to situations presenting complex factual issues related either to the formation or the consummation of the contract, which only testimonial exploration in a more plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily resolve. We commend the summary practice for use in connection with problems capable of precise resolution without attendant hazard to the interests of the parties. At the same time, it is evident that beyond that point the convenience of the summary procedure must yield to the exigences of safeguarding all legally protected rights that are involved. [S]ummary enforcement of settlement agreements is most appropriate ‘where there is no factual dispute and no legal defense to enforcement.’ (citations omitted).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 78 Md. App. 8 - Pearlstein v. Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund