57 Md. App. 489 - Hayes v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The Court of Appeals of Maryland has consistently applied th[e] [missing witness] rule in civil cases and held that where a party fails to take the stand to testify as to facts peculiarly within his knowledge, or fails to produce evidence (e.g., testimony by certain witnesses) the fact finder may infer that the testimony not produced would have been unfavorable to that party.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 284 - Hosain v. Malik · 174 Md. App. 146 - Bereano v. State Ethics Commission

2. “First, in this case, the main issue before the jury was who to believe — the State’s witnesses, including Bentley, who claimed Hayes knew the property had been stolen, or Hayes, who testified that he had no reason to suspect that the property had been stolen, and that he believed he was engaging in a legitimate business transaction. As this Court noted in Christensen [v. State, 21 Md.App. 428, 437 , 320 A.2d 276 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 274 Md. 133 , 333 A.2d 45 (1975) ]: In a case determined by little more than which of two persons is to be believed possible inferences, whether naturally or legally raised, become crucial. Since Giordano’s testimony could well have reinforced the credibility of Hayes, the “highlighting” by the court of the inference that Giordano would testify unfavorably was crucial and prejudicial. Secondly, the giving of the instruction by the court in and of itself unfairly emphasizes the fact that Hayes did not call a particular witness. A reasonable person, upon hearing the instruction, would most likely give credence to it and infer that the missing witness’ testimony would be unfavorable. Thirdly, since the instruction was couched in very general terms and no factual predicate was laid upon which the jury could intelligently decide whether to apply the rule, the instruction could have tended to mislead the jury. In light of the above, we cannot find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 193 Md. App. 718 - DANSBURY v. State

3. ““The failure to call a material witness raises a presumption or inference that the testimony of such person would be unfavorable to the party failing to call him, but there is no such presumption or inference where the witness is not available, or where his testimony is unimportant or cumulative, or where he is equally available to both sides. The presumption or inference that the testimony of a missing witness would be unfavorable is applied most frequently when there is a relationship between the party and the witness, such as a family relationship, an employer-employee relationship, and, sometimes, a professional relationship.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 174 Md. App. 146 - Bereano v. State Ethics Commission