Volume 57 — New Hampshire Reports

From Grafton Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover the sum of $300. The counts are general. Plea, the general issue. The plaintiff filed a specification in which he claimed to recover the following items of account:— 1872. Sept. 4, To three saws. .............. $12.00 lot of floor and other boards 8.00 “ old iron............ 5.00 3,000 feet of lumber....... 30.00 lot of wood............... 9.00 1873.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover for the use and occupation of certain premises .in Grafton, in said county. Plea, the general issue. The action was sent to a referee, who, at the request of the parties, reported the following facts proved before him : “ In 1859 plaintiff bargained for the premises, leased to this defendant, with one Isaac Bullock who then owned said premises, for two hundred and twenty dollars.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Case, to recover damages caused by a defect in the highway. The case has been to a referee, who reports the following statement of facts : “ On October 20, 1871, plaintiff and his son were at the house of Thomas Webber, in Center Harbor.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Motion to set aside the report of referees agreed upon by the parties, and acting under a rule of court, upon the ground that spirituous liquors were furnished them by the defendants, or those in their interests.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Case, for damages to the plaintiff’s yearling or two-year-old colt, by reason of a defect in a highway of the defendant town. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was driving said colt, with two other colts, loose, in 'the road from his pasture to his barn, a distance of two or three miles.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Bill in Equity, praying that a homestead may be set out to the plaintiff. March 13, 1862, John Dickinson, the plaintiff’s husband, mortgaged the premises to Z. K. Dickinson, releasing all his right to a homestead therein ; but the plaintiff did not sign the deed. This mortgage was foreclosed December 16, 1864, and the defendant holds the title.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Trover, for a horse. The action was sent to a referee, who reported that he found the defendant not guilty, &c., and that he recover against the plaintiff his costs.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Trespass, quare clausum, for breaking and entering lot No. 7, in Range 5, in Littleton, and carrrying away wood and timber, &c. The plaintiff asked leave to amend by filing a new count in trespass de bonis, for taking and carrying away the wood and timber described in the original declaration. Amendment allowed subject to the defendant’s exception, and the questions of law arising thereon were transferred to this court by Foster, O. J., C. C.

. Grafton County. Bill in Equity, in which Sarah A. Packard, wife of Sylvanus W. Packard, complains against said Sylvanus, Amie Putnam, widow of the late Amos Putnam, Willie Putnam, and David Putnam, minor children and heirs of said Putnam, and David Eaton, administrator upon the estate of Putnam, situate in the state of New Hampshire.

From the Grafton Probate Court. Appeal, from a decree of the court of probate, appointing a guardian over the appellant as a spendthrift. An auditor was appointed to report the facts in the case.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Assumpsit. Plea, the general issue with a set-off. The action was referred to an auditor, who heard the parties and made a report in favor of the plaintiff. Upon the return of the report, the defendant moved to set the same aside for the reasons stated in certain affidavits. The court denied the motion, and the defendant excepted. The defendant then elected a trial by jury.

From Coos Circuit Court. Trespass qu. cl., for cutting and carrying away timber from lot 9, range 11, in Berlin, during the winter following December 23, 1870. Pica, the general issue, with a brief statement that the acts complained of were done by the defendant under a license from Simon Cole, who had title to the lot. Trial before Ladd, J., and a jury.

From Coos Circuit Court. Case, for damages by reason of injuries to the plaintiffs horse and wagon on a highway.

From Coos Circuit Court. Bile in Equity. The substance of the bill, so far as the present case is concerned, was as follows: That the plaintiff, John W. Free, in April, 1867, was the owner of the township of Dixville in the county of Coos; that he had employed the defendant, Buckingham, as his agent to take care of his property there, and to negotiate sales under special instructions ; that the agent, in violation of his authority, sold and conveyed, as the pretended…

<p>From Coos Circuit Court.</p> <p>Bill in Equity,’by Stephen A. Cole against James D. Colby, EL T. Blakeslee, Emily S. Blakeslee, Frank P. Brown, Jacob Benton, The Savings Bank of the County of Coos, and Lewis Barter, substantially as follows: On August 7, 1874, James D. Colby and IE. T. Blakeslee were the owners of a certain tract of land in Lancaster, situated on Railroad street, subject to a mortgage to the savings bank to secure the payment of the note of said Colby and Blakeslee to said bank, of even date with the mortgage, for one thousand dollars and interest annually. Said mortgage was given by said Colby and Blakeslee to said bank, and is dated July 24, 1874.</p> <p>Said tract of land, on said August 7, 1874, had been divided by said Colby and Blakeslee into five building lots, the first of which lots is described as follows: Commencing on the southerly side of said Railroad street, ten rods easterly of said railroad land, and nearly opposite J. E. Bimick’s house ; thence running at right angles with said Railroad street, eight rods to a stake ; thence parallel with said street 56 feet'; thence at right angles with the last named line to the said street; thence on said street to the first bound.</p> <p>Before said August 7, 1874, Colby and Blakeslee had erected a house upon said lot No 1. Said house and lot were and are of the value of about one thousand dollars. Said lots, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, lie in succession easterly of said lot No. 1, and are 56 feet front on Railroad street, and running back therefrom in right lines to the back line of said tract. Said lot No. 5 comprised the easterly end of said tract, being 56i feet front on said Railroad street, and running back in right lines therefrom to the back line of said tract. At said date Colby and Blakeslee had commenced to build houses upon each of the other four of said lots. On August 7,1874, the plaintiff made a contract with said Colby and Blakeslee that he would finish said houses for them for the sum of $699.65, to be paid him by them. They, by the terms of said contract, were to furnish the plaintiff all necessary materials to do said work, as fast as wanted by him therefor.</p> <p>The plaintiff immediately entered upon the execution of said contract, and would have completed the same, had the said Colby and Blakeslee furnished material therefor, as by the terms of their said contract they agreed to do, which they now refuse to do.</p> <p>The plaintiff has expended in labor in the building of said houses said sum of $699.65, and has a lien upon said property to that amount, superior to said mortgage to said savings bank. Said lot No. 2, and the house thereon, are of the value of $800. Said lot No. 3, and the house thereon, are of the value of $900. Said lot No. 4, and the house thereon, are of the value of $800. Said lot No. 5, and the house thereon, are of the value of $600.</p> <p>The plaintiff has expended upon the house upon lot No. 1 about the sum of $5 ; he has thus expended upon the house upon lot No. 2 the sum of $145 ; upon the house erected upon lot No. 3 the sum of $145 ; upon the house erected upon lot No. 4 the sum of $170 ; and upon the house erected upon lot No. 5 the balance of said contract price, being $234.65. The said Colby and Blakeslee, on or about September 19, 1874, conveyed the third of the said building lots to the said Frank P. Brown, by deed of that date. Said Colby and Blakeslee, on August 25, 1874, conveyed lot No. 2 to said Emily S. Blakeslee, in mortgage, to secure the payment of the sum of $456 ; and said Colby, on September 14, 1874, conveyed the whole of said tract of land to said Jacob Benton, in mortgage, to secure the payment of two notes, amounting in all to $605. The plaintiff is informed and believes that there is in fact due to said Benton upon said notes about the sum of $125, and no more. Said Colby and Blakeslee, on October 5, conveyed the whole of said tract of land to the said Lewis Barter, in mortgage, to secure the payment of the sum of $1,707.34. The said conveyances to said Blakeslee, Benton, Barter, and Brown, and said savings bank, are all subject to the lien of the plaintiff upon said premises to secure payment to him for his labor in the erection of said houses.</p> <p>Wherefore the plaintiff prays that an attachment may be issued against said property, that the plaintiff may secure his lien thereon; that the amount due upon said several mortgages may be ascertained, and the same be apportioned to said several parts of said premises ; and that the plaintiff’s lien upon said premises may be apportioned to said several parts thereof. Upon this bill a writ of attachment was issued by order of Mr. Justice Ladd, for the purpose of securing and preserving the lien mentioned in the bill. Brown filed a general demurrer denying that the bill showed any title to equitable relief.</p> <p>The savings bank demurred, assigning for cause, (1) that the plaintiff had a plain and adequate remedy at law ; (2) that the bill is multifarious ; (3) want of equity in bill. Colby demurred, assigning want of equity, and that the plaintiff has plain and adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff moved to amend his bill by inserting in the prayer for relief the following: “ And for such further and other relief as may be just.”</p> <p>The questions hereon arising were transferred by Ladd, J.</p>

From Cobs Circuit Court. Trover, to recover the value of a buggy wagon, alleged to have been converted by the defendant.

From Coos Circuit Court. Motion, by the defendant, to bring forward and vacate a judgment entered up in the supreme judicial court. The action was entered at the February term, 1870, of the supreme judicial court, and continued from term to term until August term, 1871, when a trial was had, a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff by direction of the court, and the questions of law arising upon it were reserved.

From Coos Circuit Court. Petition, for abatement of taxes, under sec. 13 of cli. 53 of the General Statutes. The petitioner alleges that he was assessed, by way of doomage, upon $700, money at interest, in 1874; that he has complied with the provisions of sec. 4 of cli. 51 of the Gen. Stats.; that he applied to the selectmen of said town to abate said tax, and that they have refuse so to do.

From Cobs Circuit Court. Petition, setting forth that,[by an act of the legislature of this state, approved July 1,1863, James M. Hilliard and others were made a body corporate by the name of the Upper Connecticut River and Lake Improvement Company, with the right to erect and maintain across said river and upon said lake such dams, piers, and other arrangements for holding and distributing water as might facilitate the rafting, driving, and securing lumber upon said river…

From Cobs Circuit Court. Writ op Entry, on a mortgage. The plaintiffs introduced a mortgage to them, dated December 29, 1870, duly executed and recorded.

From Coos Circuit Court. Indictment, charging that the respondent, with force and arms, did commit the crime of adultery with one William Cameron by his, the said William Cameron, having carnal knowledge of the body of her, the said Lucy E. Parker, she, the said Lucy E. Parker, being then and there a married woman, and the lawful wife of one Stephen Parker, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and.provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. This was an action founded upon the provisions of the statute, making railroad corporations liable for damages occasioned by fire communicated by their locomotives. Tried before Eoster, O. J., C. C., and a jury. The plaintiff’s saw-mill, machinery, and lumber were consumed by fire, August 8, 1878. The mill was situated about eighty feet easterly from the tracks of the railroad.

From Bockingham Circuit Court. Trespass. The plaintiff, a deputy sheriff, having a writ of attachment in favor of the town of Nottingham against the defendant and two others, on September 27, 1873, attached the real estate of the defendants, and also a quantity of boards.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered, and an account annexed to the writ for hay, and interest.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Petition, for divorce and alimony, filed April 8,1874. At the January term of said court, 1876, it was referred generally by order of court. At the April term, 1876, the libelee moved to discharge the rule of reference, and that tbe case be tried by the court. The court overruled the motion, and ordered the case to be continued and the rule enlarged.

Rockingham County. Petition, for a writ of habeas corpus, presented to Smith, J., August 3,1876. The hearing thereon was adjourned into court to August 10. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. Mr. Lewis G. Hoyt submitted the following argument in writing in opposition to granting the writ.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Exceptions from the circuit court. At the April term, 1875, the suggestion of the plaintiff’s bankruptcy was entered upon the docket, and thereupon the defendant moved that tXie action be dismissed. No order was made upon that motion.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. In Equity. This case was referred, and it appeared from the report of the referee, that at the time of the alleged trespass the plaintiff was in possession of the locus in quo claiming title; it being a field, a part of which had been redeemed from the sea, and bounded on the east by the Atlantic ocean.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. In Equity. The principal question in this case is whether under the will of James Smith (a copy of which makes a part of this case) the accumulations upon the personal estate will go to the remainder men, or to the heirs of Sally Smith ; but either party may refer to the bill and answer. James Smith was a farmer in good circumstances, living in Candia in said county. His will was written by himself.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Action or Covenant. The defendants’ intestate had conveyed, by deed of warranty, a parcel of land to the plaintiff.

From Kockingham Circuit Court. Assumpsit, upon a policy of insurance, dated March 6, 1873. The insurance was upon the plaintiff’s dwelling-house and L, $1,666.00 Upon his barn, 333.00 And upon his hay, 132.00 $2,131.00 The constitution and by-laws, the application and policy, constituted the contract.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Review. The above action is brought forward from the docket of October term, 1874, upon notice, by Chesley, of review, under the provisions of Gen. Stats., ch. 215, secs. 3, 9. The original'action was entered in the supreme judicial court against Chesley and one Alexander, at the April trial term, 1872, and was continued. The defendant filed the general issue, with a brief statement, June 7, 1872.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. Assumpsit on a promissory note, of which the following is a copy : Haverhill, July 7th, 1857. Two months after date, I promise to pay to the order of Joseph Pitts eleven hundred dollars. Value received.

From Rockingham Circuit Court. This action was entered at the January term, 1873, and continued from term to term until the January term, 1875, when, the case being in order for trial, the defendants, not being ready for trial, nor having a sufficient cause for a continuance of the case, moved that it be referred under the judiciary act of 1874, and, as a condition of such reference and continuance, agreed to waive the right of a trial by jury ; and the entry was made upon…

From Kockingham Circuit Court. Indictment, charging that the defendant, “ on the twenty-fourth day ■of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, at Seabrook, in tlie county of Rockingham aforesaid, with force and arms, feloniously, wilfully, and maliciously did place upon the track of the railroad of the Eastern Railroad in New Hampshire, in Seabrook aforesaid, two large pieces of wood called railroad sleepers, and one large piece of wood…

<p> Prolate appeal&emdash;Cfuardian&emdash;Husband and wife. </p> <p>When the wife stands in need of a guardian, and the husband is otherwise a suitable person for that trust, the intimate and confidential nature of the marriage relation requires that he should be preferred to a third person.</p>

From Strafford Circuit Court. Bill in Equity. Tried before Band, J., who reported the following facts for the opinion of this court: The plaintiff is the wife of Stephen' E. Moulton, and the defendant, when the suit was commenced, was a creditor of said Moulton by a judgment recovered in the supreme judicial court of Maine for the sum of $108.60 damages, and $11.63 costs.

From Strafford Circuit Court. Indictments, found at the February term, 1876, against the respondents, severally, for selling spirituous liquors in violation of the statute. The venires were not under the seal of the court, and did not bear teste of the chief, or of any other justice of said court. They were signed by the clerk, who certified that they were issued by order of the court.

From Strafford Circuit Court. Bill in Equity, praying for an injunction, transferred from the circuit court by Rand, J. The facts upon which the application is based sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

<p> Attorney’s authority&emdash;Referee’s report. </p> <p>If an attorney of the court enter an appearance for a party without authority, such party is not defaulted so long as he is so represented in court, and does not repudiate the attorney’s action.</p> <p>One of several defendants neglecting to appear before the referee, the referee assessed damages against him, and found a verdict in favor of another defendant. The plaintiff elected a trial by jury. Held, that the defendant, against whom damages has been so assessed, had a right to a jury trial.</p>

From Belknap Circuit Court. Case, for flowage of the plaintiff’s land by a certain dam maintained by the defendants at the outlet of Wickwas pond in Meredith. Plea, the general issue. Trial before Rand, J., and a jury. A controversy arose as to certain drill-holes on a stone called the Lawrence stone, and which holes one Smith M. Lawrence testified that he made many years ago, to indicate the high-water mark of a former owner of the dam.

From Belknap Circuit Court. Appeal, from the report of the commissioner of insolvency upon the estate of Eunice Yarrell, deceased, allowing the claim of said Eunice B. Yarrell against said estate. Said Elbridge G. Yarrell appealed from said allowance, as son and heir of said deceased, and said appeal was duly filed in the probate office at the June term of the probate court for said county.

From Belknap Circuit Court. Foreign Attachment. The trustee disclosed the following facts: At the time of the service of the writ upon him in this action he was and still is one of the fish commissioners of this state; that, in the exercise of the supposed functions of his office, he, as one of said commissioners, engaged the services of said principal defendant as counsel in cases of violation of the fish laws, and also appointed several fish wardens.

From Belknap Circuit Court. Case, for injuries to the plaintiff’s land and wharf on the Winnipiseogee river, below and adjoining the defendants’ railroad. Trial before Stanley, J., and a jury.

From Carroll Circuit Court. At the April term, 1875, this action was referred by agreement of parties. Beport was made at the October term, 1875, and judgment entered upon the report. At the April term, 1876, the plaintiff moved that the action be brought forward for review. The defendant objected, on the ground that review does not lie. The motion was granted, and the defendant excepted.

From Carroll Circuit Court. Replevin, for a bear claimed by the plaintiffs, and alleged to have been wrongfully taken and detained by the defendant. The writ is dated November 16,1874. The plea was the general issue, and a brief statement setting forth,— 1st, that the bear was the property of the defendant; 2d, that it was the property of the plaintiffs and the defendant jointly; 3d, that it was the property of the plaintiffs, defendant, and others jointly.

From Merrimack Circuit Court. Trespass, quare clausum. The premises on which the trespasses were committed are described in the writ as follows: “ Containing about three acres, bounded on the north by a certain brook and land of the plaintiff and defendant, on the east by land of the plaintiff, on the south by land of the defendant and the Merrimack county farm, and on the west by land of the defendant.” The action was referred under the act of 1874.

From Merrimack Circuit Court. Trespass for an assault upon one of the plaintiffs, who is described in the writ and declaration as the wife of Alfred E. Emerson, the other plaintiff, when, in fact, she is not the wife of said Alfred, but is the wife of George W. Pillsbury, and was such at the time of the alleged assault. On motion of counsel for the plaintiffs, leave was granted to amend the writ and declaration by striking out the name of Alfred E. Emerson.

From Merrimack Circuit Court. Petition, for injunction to restrain the defendant from taking the child of the parties, brought under secs. 5, 8, and 9 of ch. 164 of the Gen. Stats. The facts are sufficiently shown in the opinions of the court.

From Merrimack Probate Court. Appeal from the decree of the probate court for this county, made September 14,1875. The case was submitted upon the following statement of facts : Richard Pinkham, of Concord, made his will August 18, 1851, died December 18, 1853, and his will was duly proved February 28, 1854. In 1857 Sylvester Dana was appointed administrator with the will annexed, in place of the former administrator, who had resigned.

From Merrimack Circuit Court. _ Indictment, charging the respondent with the murder of Josie A. Langmaid, who was killed October 4, 1875, about nine o’clock in the morning, while passing over the Academy road, in Pembroke, on her way to school. Her head was severed from her body, and removed a distance of a quarter .of a mile. Another part of her body, including one half or two thirds of the vagina, was cut out and carried away, and was never recovered.

From Merrimack Circuit Court. Foreign Attachment, against the Concord Granite Company as trustee of Sylvanus Smith. The question is as to the liability of the trustee. It appeared that there was due from the trustee for the labor of the principal defendant, between April 1, 1875, and May 10, 1875, when service of the plaintiff’s writ was made upon the trustee, the sum of $83.74, and that said sum is still in its hands, awaiting the decision of this case.

From Hilisborough Circuit Court. Petition, for abatement of taxes, representing that the assessors of Manchester, in April, 1874, assessed a tax upon the petitioners’ property in said city, under the name of the Manchester Print Works and Mills, rating the land and buildings of the corporation at $400,000, and the factories and machinery at $950,000, and assessing a tax upon that valuation.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Both actions are assumpsit, and were tried together. In thg first, the declaration contained the common counts for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered, etc. The specification is as follows: W. H. ELLIOTT, To T. A. WILSON & 00., Dr. June 18, 1873, to 2f dozen steel specs, $66.00 July 8, “ “ i “ eye-glasses, 4.50 Aug 2, “ “ rep., t 1.50 5-12 dozen steel specs, 7.50 $ “ eye-glasses, 3.00 $82.50 Plea the general issue.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover an account for labor and materials. The action was referred under the act of 1874 to a referee, who for the purpose of assessing damages found for the plaintiff, and at the request of the defendant reported the facts found proved by him as follows : “ The defendant now is, and at the commencement of this suit was, the widow of Herman Dane.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover the sum of $50 and interest thereon from the date of the writ, being one half of a fine paid by one Lovering into the county treasury, on an indictment for keeping liquors for sale in violation of law, the plaintiff claiming to be the complainant.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, on a sheriff’s receipt, by Moses Clark against Joel H. Tarbell and John H. Tripp.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Case, for flowing the plaintiff’s land. Verdict for the defendant. The case was referred by order of the court, at a previous term, to a referee, under the statute of 1874, whose report, in the defendant’s favor, was offered in evidence by the defendant, and admitted against the plaintiff’s objection.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, for goods sold and delivered. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement that the defendant is the wife of E. P. Hall, and was at the time she purchased the goods. Trial before Stanley, J., without a jury.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Bill in Equity, alleging that on the second day of August, 1873, the plaintiff was the owner of a certain tract of land in her own right in fee simple; that at the time sire purchased it she was the wife of Geo.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Tliis action was referred under the act of 1874. The referee gave notice, heard the parties, and made a report. The plaintiff elected trial by jury. The defendant moved that the plaintiff be ordered to file the report, which motion the court granted, and ordered the plaintiff to file the report during the term or be nonsuit.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, for groceries sold and delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendant. The action was referred to a referee, who found for the defendant, and at the request of the plaintiffs reported the following facts found proved: “ The plaintiffs are grocery dealers, and the defendant is a married woman.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover of the defendant the taxes assessed on the Copeland farm, so called, in Stoddard, in the year 1870. There was evidence tending to show that the defendant bought the farm in May, 1870, and agreed to pay the plaintiff $2,000 for it, and the taxes of that year. She paid the $2,000, but did not pay the taxes. The books of the town-clerk and selectmen were introduced in evidence.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. In Equity. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. Held: not as property for the use and benefit of the town as a municipality, but as an attribute of sovereignty under the legislative power for public purposes, and according to the policy of the state, adopted, regulated, and controlled by the legislative power.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. In Equity. The bill was filed August 30, 1872. This is the same case that is reported in 52 N. H. 387. Held: nor did Elliot render any service as clerk or treasurer after the year 1861.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. Replevin, for three horses. The plaintiff claimed title by a purchase of the property from one Welcome O. Bates, made about June 10, 1878. The defendants pleaded and claimed title in the defendant, Simpson E. Bates, as a conditional vendor to the said Welcome O. Bates, prior to the plaintiff’s purchase, and introduced as evidence of such conditional sale the following paper: “ $1,250. Barre, March 3, 1873.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. Debt, upon a guardian’s bond. The defendants were Martin Cook, the principal in the bond, and Wm. W. Strickland and Samuel Thompson, his sureties.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. Trover, for 60 M pine shingles, May 16, 1874. The plaintiffs, who were engaged in the lumber business at Port Huron, Mich., sold the shingles in question upon credit to G. W. Barnes & Co., of Keene, and on the same day shipped them by railroad to the above named firm.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. Assumpsit. The writ was served by arresting the body of the defendant, the affidavit required by law having been made thereon. It was admitted that within sixty days after the service of the writ, as aforesaid, the defendant was adjudged a bankrupt. Upon the entry of the action at this term, the defendant moved that he be discharged from said arrest, and that his bail be discharged.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. This is a bill in equity, in which the plaintiff prays to be permitted to redeem certain premises from a sale on execution, the time for their redemption, under the statute, having expired. The bill was filed March 22,1875. The bill sets out at length the reasons why such a decree should be made; but there was no allegation of a tender of the amount due upon the sale of the equity of redemption.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. This is a bill in equity, brought by the plaintiffs Orson S. Taylor and Semantha Taylor against Lenzie B. Sayles, Keziah Sayles, and Smith EL Brockway, to compel the defendants Sayles to convey to the plaintiff, said Semantha, a certain farm in Marlow, in this county.

From Cheshire Circuit Court. Assumpsit. The declaration alleged, in substance, that the defendant, in consideration that the plaintiff would buy of the defendant’s minor daughter, Eliza, her interest and share in the estate of one Abel Hunt, deceased, by virtue of the will of said Abel, and pay her therefor the sum of $150, promised that the said Eliza should not revoke any contract for the sale of her said interest which she might make with the plaintiff; that he would…

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit to recover an account for goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered. Plea, the general issue. The action was referred under the act of 1874. The referee heard the parties, and reported in favor of the plaintiffs, and, at the request of the defendant, reported the following facts: “ The goods consisted of what is known as prize-package candy.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Case, for personal injuries occasioned by defect in a highway in said town.

From Hillsborough Circuit Court. Assumpsit, to recover $65.07, being the amount due the plaintiffs for a carpet and rug sold by them to the defendant. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement alleging that the defendant is the wife of R. P. Hall, and was at the time of the purchase of said goods.

From Sullivan Probate Court. Appeal from the decree of the judge of probate by Amos Woodbury, one of the heirs at law of William O. O. Woodbury, late of Claremont, deceased, making an allowance of one thousand dollars to Polly M. Woodbury, widow of the deceased, out of the personal estate, for her present support. The reasons for the appeal set forth ai’e,— 1. Because no allowance should have been decreed. 2. Because the allowance decreed is unreasonably large.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Assumpsit. The writ contains the general counts for money had and received,, lands bargained, sold, and conveyed, etc., and is dated November 22, 1873. The plaintiff seeks to recover the amount of two notes of $500 each, dated December 29, 1871, due April 1, 1872, and April 1,1873, respectively, given by the defendant to the plaintiff in part payment for a farm, as hereinafter set forth. The plea is the general issue.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Writ op Entry, to recover about one acre of land in Wentworth, in this county, described by metes and bounds. The following facts were agreed to for the purpose of raising questions of law in this case. The title of William Tilton, the plaintiff, to the land, is a quitclaim deed of the same, properly described, from Amos Tilton and Hannah Tilton his wife, dated August 20, 1874.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Motion for judgment on the report of a referee, agreed upon under the statute and returned to the circuit court.

<p>From Grafton Circuit Court.</p> <p>Information in the nature of a quo warranto, alleging that on the first day of July, 1872, and ever since, the defendants, Asa T. Barron and Oscar F. Barron, have usurped upon the state, and now usurp upon said state, the right, privilege, and franchise to demand and take toll of the good people of said state for passing and repassing over and across the Connecticut river upon a certain bridge, in Lebanon in said county, formerly known as the Lyman bridge, maintained by them across said river without warrant or authority of law therefor, but in the exercise of such usurpation.</p> <p>The defendants, in their answer, say that the legislature, in 1836, passed an act to incorporate the Lyman Bridge Company, whereby Francis Lyman, Thomas Belknap, their associates, etc., were made a body politic and corporate under the name of Lyman Bridge Company, and were thereby vested with all the powers and were made subject to all liabilities pertaining to corporations of a similar natui’e; and by the second section of said act were further invested with the exclusive right and privilege to build or purchase and forever to have and maintain a bridge over and across Connecticut river, between the town of Lebanon, in the county of Grafton in the state of New Hampshire, and the town of Hartford, in the county of Windsor and state of Vermont, at any place between the lower bar in White River falls on said Connecticut river and the south line of the town of Lebanon ; and by the fifth section of said act it was provided that the capital stock of said corporation should consist of 200 shares, which might be transferred; and by the sixth section of said act it was enacted that a toll be granted and established for the sole benefit of said corporation, the subjects and rates of which the justices of the superior court should settle and determine, providing that the net proceeds of said toll should not exceed ten per cent, per annum on the costs and expenditures of said corporation for and on account of said bridge; and said corporation was thereby authorized to demand and recover the rate of toll thus established, and to prevent the passage thereon of any person and any property made the subject of toll until such toll should be paid therefor. And it was further provided, that said corporation, by their directors, should, at the next term of said court in Grafton county, and once in five years thereafter, cause an exhibit to be made under oath, to said court, of the costs and expenses incurred by said corporation, for and on account of said bridge, together with an account of all tolls received therefrom down to the time of making such exhibit; and upon the omission or neglect to make such exhibit, all the rights and privileges granted by said act should be subject to forfeiture. That a report and exhibit were made and accepted at the December term, 1837, of said court, and the rates and subjects of toll fixed and determined. And that an exhibit was made and filed in said court July 19,1842, and since that time no exhibit has been filed, so far as the records show. And they say that they were not aware of such omission and neglect to file said exhibits until the commencement of these proceedings. That they fully believed that all the requirements of the charter had been complied with, and that they did not know that such exhibit was required until very recently. And they have ever intended to comply with the requirements of said charter in good faith, and are ready and desirous to make to said court as full an exhibit as is possible. And they pray for leave to file the same, as the omission and neglect have been through accident, misfortune, and mistake. That, to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief, the receipts for toll have averaged less since the five years reported in 1842 than during those five years, especially the net receipts. That by said act said corporation was made answerable for all damages that should be sustained through the insufficiency of said bridge, and for any defect or want of repair in the same. Said act was approved December 8, 1836, and by virtue of it the grantees purchased and built a bridge within the prescribed limits, and have since maintained it in suitable repair. The subjects and rates of toll were determined by said court as provided by the charter, and the net proceeds from said toll have never exceeded ten per cent, per annum on the costs and expenditures incurred for and on account of said bridge, but have in fact fallen very much short of the same. That said corporators sold and assigned all the shares and stock in said company to the defendants, as they lawfully might, whereby they became entitled to and possessed of all the rights, franchises, and privileges granted in said charter, and by reason thereof they have taken toll of those passing over said bridge, at a rate never exceeding that prescribed by said court, and never exceeding ten per cent, on the cost and expenditures incurred by said corporation for and on account of said bridge. They deny that they have usurped upon the state, or that they now usurp upon the state, the right, privilege, and franchise to demand and take toll of the good people of said state for passing over and across said river; and they deny that they have maintained a bridge across said river without warrant or authority of law' therefor, in the exercise of any usurpation, but only in the proper exercise of their rights and privileges by reason of said charter. They say that they and their assignors and grantors have held, enjoyed, and exercised the aforesaid rights, privileges, and franchises, and maintained said bridge, and demanded and received toll as aforesaid, adversely, and without interruption, for more than twenty years prior to the filing of the information in this proceeding.</p> <p>To this answer the attorney-general, in behalf of the state, filed a general demurrer, which the court pro forma sustained; and the defendants excepted.</p> <p>The information, answer, and demurrer may be referred to in the argument, but are not to be printed.</p> <p>Transferred by Stanley, J., C. C.</p> <p>cited Building Association v. Stevens, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 676; Boston Class Manufactory v. Langdon, 24 Pick. 52; King v. Amery, 2 Term 515; Colchester v. Seaber, 3 Burr. 1866 ; People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 351; 8 Wend. 645; Company v. Woodman, 2 Greenl. 404; State v. Fourth N. S. Turnpike, 15 N. H. 162; Angel & Ames on Corp. 624, 665, 659 ; Russell v. McClellan, 14 Pick. 63 ; Winchelsea Causes, 4 Burr. 1962, 2022, 2021, 2523.</p> <p>Carpenter, on the same side, orally :</p> <p>1. The information does not ask to have the charter forfeited.</p> <p>2. The corporation is not made a party. Its franchise cannot be taken away unless it is made a party.</p> <p>3. The information asks by what authority the defendants take toll, and they answer, by virtue of a charter. 5 Johns. Ch. 382, 389; Commonwealth v. Inslow, 5 Mass. 230 ; State v. Fourth K. K. Turnpike, 15 N. H. 166, 167; Commonwealth v. Turnpike, 5 Cush. 509; People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. 282 ; State v. Olcott, 6 N. II. 74. In the last case the charter had expired.</p> <p>4. A quo warranto does not lie against the officers of a private corporation. Gen. Stats., ch. 235; Commonwealth v. Dearborn, 15 Mass. 125 ; Coddard v. Smithett, 3 Gray 116-122; Rex v. Mosely, 8 Q. B. 946; Rex v. Danbury, 2 Strange 1196; Rex v. Bingham, 2 East 108 ; Rex v. -, 4 Term R. 384 ; Rex v. Marsden, 3 Burr. 1812.</p>

<p>Practice — Certificate of wilful and malicious act on execution.</p> <p>The court, by which an action is referred under the statute and afterwards finally disposed of, is “ the court before whom the action is tried,” under Gen. Stats., ch. 222, sec. 12.</p> <p>When the gist of the declaration is the defendant’s false and fraudulent deceit, and he is found guilty by the referee, the defendant, on the question of placing the certificate under that section on the execution, is bound by the judgment.</p> <p>In such case, the court having found, as matter of law, that the false and fraudulent act was the wilful and malicious act contemplated by the statute — jHeld, correct.</p>

From Grafton Circuit Court. Case, for an excessive and illegal distress.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Appeal, by the plaintiffs, in the ordinary form, from the decision of the selectmen of Enfield in laying out a highway. In 1874 a petition was presented to the selectmen for a highway between the same termini as those stated in this petition.

From Grafton Circuit Court. Trespass, for assault and battery. Plea, the general issue, with a brief statement of accord and satisfaction.

From Grafton Supreme Judicial Court, Trial Term. Held: cannot claim the chattels thus annexed, and must seek his remedy for their removal, by virtue of such an agreement, upon the covenants in his conveyance of the lands (citing Mott v. Palmer, 1 N. Y. 564, and Ford v. Cobh, 20 N. Y. 344). “A prior mortgagee, who certainly has not been induced to enter into his relation to the land, by…

From Coos Circuit Court. The respondents were indicted for making a riot, and for a riotous assault upon one William H. Potter, of Berlin, N. ÍL, July 12, 1875. Plea, not guilty, and trial before Stanley, J., and a jury.

From Coos Circuit Court. Action on the Case, to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by a defective highway. The case was referred to Hon. Jonathan Ross, by order of court, at the February term, 1875.

From Coos Supreme Judicial Court. Writ ok Entry, to recover the grant of land called Wentworth’s Location. Plea, nul disseizen. The cause was tried at Feb. trial term, 1874. Held: that we are aware, that a stage office, like that described in the case, is a public place within the statute regulating town-meetings; nor is it necessary now to decide -it.

From Cobs Circuit Court. On the plaintiff’s motion at the April term, 1875, this cause was referred by order of court. The referee made a general report in favor of the defendant. Held: upon the statutes, that after an action has been committed to an auditor, and after, on a trial, he has found for the defendant, the plaintiff cannot then become nonsuit.

From Coos Circuit Court. Writ op Entry, upon a mortgage. Plea, the general issue. The action was tried by the court, and the court found that said mortgage was given to secure five notes payable in one, two, three, four, and five years, from January 1,1873. The first note has been paid, and the plaintiff is the holder of the two notes due on January 1,1874-75 respectively, and the two remaining notes are held by a third party. There was no formal assignment of the mortgage.

From Coos Circuit Court. Case, to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff’s cow, done by a dog owned or in the possession of the defendant.

From Coos Circuit Court. Assumpsit. The plaintiff made the usual affidavit for the arrest of the defendant, on the back of the writ, and the officer’s return showed that tlie writ was served by arresting the body of the defendant and taking bail, and in no other way.

<p> Evidence. </p> <p>In an action against selectmen for a malicious and fraudulent over-valuation and taxation of property, the defendants were permitted to prove the discussions which they had at the time of the appraisal, as tending to show that their action was honest.</p> <p>Where the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the first count, and disagreed on the second, the two counts being for distinct matters&emdash;Held, that another trial might be had on the other count, and such final judgment rendered as the case required.</p> <p>Hearsay, in regard to the birthplace of a deceased person, is not admissible, unless it comes from the relatives of such person.</p> <p>Evidence of what a deceased person had said having been offered, evidence of different declarations at other times was held to be admissible.</p>

From Coos Circuit Court. Case, for carelessly leaving the plaintiff’s bars down, whereby his cattle and sheep escaped, and he was compelled to expend, and did expend, time and money in hunting for the same, and his sheep were wholly lost. i The evidence tended to show that the defendant, in looking after his own cattle, left the plaintiff’s bars down, and that his cattle, and three sheep belonging to one Marshall, and which the plaintiff was pasturing, were wholly lost.