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57 Pa. Commw. 70

Elliott v. Commonwealth

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Decided February 24, 1981

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania · decided 1981-02-24

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently November 1984

11 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The terms ‘injury,’ ‘personal injury,’ and ‘injury arising in the course of his employment,’ as used in this act, shall include, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 of this act. Provided, That whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease: And provided further, That if the employe’s compensable disability has occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable. The provisions of this paragraph (2) shall apply only with respect to the disability or death of an employe which results in whole or in part from the employe’s exposure to the hazard of occupational disease after June 30, 1973 in employment covered by the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. (emphasis added).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp.

“In .these cases, the court, fixing on Consolidation Coal, made declarations to the effect that conditions which contribute to death but are not related to the immediate cause of death are insufficient to support an award and that a claimant is required to show that the occupational disease “in and of itself could have resulted in the death.” We today disapprove such statements insofar as they are inconsistent with the true test in this class of case which is as follows: Neither .Section 301(c) (.2) nor any other provision of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act requires that the death or disability be solely caused iby the occupational disease, or that the occupational disease itself must be the active agency which terminates life or brings about disability. Likewise the statutes do not exclude death as compensable where the occupational disease is the contributory or accelerating .cause. The important factor is that there shall be a causal relationship between the disease and the death or disability.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Standard Steel Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board

Relies on Consolidation Coal Co. v. Commonwealth · Breen v. Commonwealth · Hauck v. Commonwealth

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1981-02-24

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Opinion by

Judge Palladino,

¶2This is the first of three cases consolidated on appeal, which concern the intendment of Section 301(c)-(2) of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §411(2). Petitioner, the widow of a coal miner, appeals from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board), which denied her entitlement to death benefits under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act. We affirm the Board’s order.

¶3Section 301(c)(2) of the Act provides “/t/hat whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, ... it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease. ...” (Emphasis added.) “/T/he language of Section 301(c)(2) requires more than a finding that the occupational disease was a contributing factor. ...” (Emphasis added.) (Footnote deleted.) Consolidation Coal Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 37 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 412, 419, 391 A.2d 14, 18 (1978).

¶4Under Section 301(c)(2) of the Act, the death of a worker afflicted with concurrent illnesses, is compensable only if caused by an occupational disease. Mere presence of an occupational disease does not fulfill the causation requirement. A worker’s fatal heart attack was not compensated in Manuel v. N. L. Industries, 50 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 280, 412 A.2d 912 (1980), because the worker’s susceptibility to coronary disease was occasioned by his suffering from diabetes and tuberculosis as well as work-related lead poisoning. In Hauck v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 47 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 554, 408 A.2d 585 (1979), a death certificate listed anthracosilicosis and pulmonary emphysema as “other significant conditions contributing to/a worker’s /death but not related to the immediate cause.” (Emphasis in *73original.) Id. at 558, 408 A.2d at 587. After considering the wording of the death certificate and Section 301(c) (2) of the Act, this Court reasoned that occupational disease had contributed to, but not induced, the worker’s death. Therefore, death benefits were denied.

¶5While the presence of an occupational disease does not guarantee an award of benefits, the existence of multiple illnesses does not compel a denial of benefits. Where there is not an independent, supervening cause of disability, “/t/estimony that establishes a disease process as a ‘substantial contributing factor’ in claimant’s disability does not logically preclude a . . . finding that the disability ‘resulted from’ such cause. . . .” Crucible Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 165, 169, 415 A.2d 458, 461 (1980). In Duquesne Light Co. v. Gurick, 46 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 150, 405 A.2d 1358 (1979), medical testimony established that “the causes of/an employee’s/death were occlusive coronary arteriosclerosis, cardiac hypertrophy, cardiac arrest, coal miner’s pneumoconiosis, with emphysema, and, cor pulmonale, severe.” Id. at 152, 405 A.2d at 1359. Nevertheless, this Court awarded death benefits because the testifying physician “believed all of the named conditions were equally responsible for/the worker’s/death.” (Emphasis added.) (Footnote deleted.) Id. at 152, 405 A.2d at 1359.

¶6When causality is not obvious, it must be proven by unequivocal medical testimony. Breen v. Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 41, 415 A.2d 148 (1980).

[I]n cases in which the deceased suffered from a number of interrelated diseases, we [the Court] believe that the Act requires medical evidence to be preseneted which establishes that *74a claimant’s death resulted from an occupational disease, not simply that the disease was a contributing factor. (Emphasis in original.)

¶7Consolidation Coal Co., supra, at 422, 391 A.2d at 19.

¶8In the instant case the autopsy report upon which the Referee relied, listed pneumoconiosis (an occupational disease), arteriosclerotic heart disease, cardiac hypertrophy, acute congestive heart failure, and cor pulmonale as the causes of the death of petitioner’s husband. Despite the Referee’s findings that pneumoconiosis was among the causes of death and that pneumoconiosis was a “major contributing factor” in the death, the Referee failed to find that pneumoconiosis, in and of itself, could have resulted in the death of petitioner’s husband.

¶9Therefore, we affirm the Board’s order denying benefits to petitioner, and we will enter the following

¶10Order

¶11And Now, February 24, 1981, the order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, Docket No. A-77194, dated September 27, 1979, is affirmed.

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