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57 So. 3d 299

State v. Ingram

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Decided March 25, 2011

Supreme Court of Louisiana · decided 2011-03-25

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently December 2016

7 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, and, in criminal cases only, whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including 82 So. 3d 497 - State v. Ruffin, 140 So. 3d 153 - State v. Bibbins

Relies on Brooks v. Dretke

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2011-03-25

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

WEIMER, J.,

¶1dissents.

¶2|,I respectfully dissent believing the court of appeal was correct in ordering a hearing in this unique and unprecedented case, which involves a juror advising fellow jurors about engaging in allegedly criminal conduct during the trial. The “jury shield statute,” LSA-C.E. art. 606(B), provides for an exception in criminal cases when “extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention.”

¶3The juror in this case was caught in a conflict between her duty as a juror and her self-interest which potentially compromised her ability to render a fair and impartial verdict in a proceeding brought by the district attorney, who could evaluate whether to charge her with one or more offenses. See Brooks v. Dretke, 418 F.3d 430 (5th Cir.2005).1 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeal to grant a hearing.

¶4. In Brooks, a juror in a capital case, just as the penalty phase was about to begin, was arrested for entering the courthouse with a handgun. The juror’s arrest was not revealed to the other jurors but was revealed to the trial judge, who questioned the juror and obtained his assurances that the arrest would in no way impair his ability to render a fair and impartial sentencing verdict. On the defendant’s subsequent application for federal ha-beas corpus relief from his conviction and sentence to death, the appellate court ultimately granted him relief on grounds that the compromising position the juror found himself in for the remainder of the trial supported a finding of implied bias and required setting aside the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Brooks, 418 F.3d at 435.

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