57 Wis. 2d 611 - State v. Gerard’s Empirical Analysis
1973
Citation profile
69 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently June 2008 · most notably 74 Wis. 2d 647 - State v. Tarrell (1976), 76 Wis. 2d 286 - In INTEREST OF DH v. State (1977)
69 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Gideon v. Wainwright · Pointer v. Texas · 3 Cal. 3d 100 - In Re Antazo · 50 Wis. 2d 540 - State Ex Rel. Johnson v. Cady
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““ ‘ . . . we do not hold that the imposition upon an indigent offender of a fine and penalty assessment, either as a sentence or as a condition of probation, constitutes of necessity in all instances a violation of the equal protection clause. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case and the condition of the individual offender, there are a variety of ways in which the state may fine the indigent offender, as alternatives to imprisonment, without offending the command of equal protection Rather, our holding is simply that an indigent who would pay his fine if he could, must be given an option comparable to an offender who is not indigent. When the indigent offender refuses to avail himself of such alternatives at the inception, or defaults or otherwise fails to meet the conditions of the particular alternative which is offered him without a showing of reasonable excuse, the indigent offender becomes in the eyes of the court exactly the same as the contumacious offender who is not indigent. When either of these conditions obtain the offender’s indigency ceases to be dis-positive and he may, consistently with the mandate of the equal protection clause, be relegated to “working out” his fine by imprisonment.’ ” (Emphasis original)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“The defendant’s right under the thirteenth amendment was not violated. Probation was revoked for failure to comply with its terms and not for failure to pay a debt. Revocation of probation is a matter of judicial discretion and the court had a substantial basis in fact to support its determination—that is, the conditions of probation had been violated. . . . . . . Violating one’s probation does not constitute involuntary servitude. Defendant is simply now serving out a sentence that was previously imposed and stayed upon conditions which he violated.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.