¶2This case is before the Court on appellees' motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Two judgments were entered by the trial court; one on March 9, 1977, and the other on July 28, 1977. Appellants have appealed to this Court from the July judgment. Appellees Leonard Hanes and the Rio Grande Bible Institute, and the respondents cited by publication, filed their motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction alleging that the appeal was not timely because the March judgment was the final judgment disposing of all issues and all parties. The question before the Court is whether these two judgments combine to make one final judgment.
¶3The record shows that the judgment entered March 9, 1977, granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the respondents cited by publication, and ordered that petitioners Billy Walker, Sr., and Billy Walker, Jr., take nothing as against the respondents cited by publication. The judgment entered July 28, 1977, dismissed the suit as to the remaining respondents, Leonard C. Hanes and Rio Grande Bible Institute, Inc.
¶4All parties filed briefs in this Court concerning appellees' motion to dismiss. Oral arguments on the motion were presented February 10, 1978.
¶5After careful consideration of the record, we are of the opinion that the March judgment was interlocutory and nonappealable. A summary judgment which does not dispose of all the issues and parties in a suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a valid severance of that phase of the case has been ordered. Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pacific Coal Oil Co., 159 Tex. 550, 324 S.W.2d 200 (1959). Although appellees urge that the March judgment was final as to all parties under the rule of Northeast Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Sup. 1966), it was not. The Aldridge case states a test for determining when a judgment "not intrinsically interlocutory" may be presumed to have disposed of parties or issues not explicitly mentioned. In this case, the March judgment is intrinsically interlocutory in character and the case does not fall within any of the applicable categories enumerated in the Aldridge case.
¶6The "final judgment" entered by the trial court on July 28, 1977, on its face disposes of the remaining parties in the lawsuit. In addition, this judgment expressly disposes of any outstanding pleadings and motions. When a prior interlocutory judgment has been entered, the judgment is final as to all parties and issues when the order is finally entered disposing of the last remaining part of the case. H. B. Zachary Co. v. Thibodeaux, 364 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex.Sup. 1963); Lubell v. Sutton, 164 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1942, writ ref'd).
¶7In determining that we have jurisdiction over the appeal from the July judgment we express no opinion on whether the September will of Letha L. Bourland is entitled to probate, nor do we express an opinion on the validity of any of the trial court's actions in this case. *542
¶8Appellees' motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction is DENIED because of the foregoing actions of the trial court. The appellants' brief is to be filed on the merits of the appeal from the July judgment on or before May 23, 1978. Appellees' reply brief is to be filed no later than 25 days after appellants' brief is filed. The case is hereby set for submission and oral argument on the merits for Thursday, June 22, 1978, at 2:00 p. m.
¶9Pending before our Court is a motion seeking leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus in the event that we found neither the March nor the July judgment to be final. This petition seeks to compel the trial court to proceed on trial on the merits of this case. This motion is rendered moot by our finding that we have jurisdiction based on the finality of the July judgment. Motion number M277 is dismissed as moot.