¶1Charlene R. Bohl, Post-Conviction Defense Project, Madison, Wise., on brief, for appellant.
¶2John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., and Paul R. Otto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., on brief, for appellees.
¶3Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Circuit Judge, and ALSOP, District Judge.*
¶6Petitioner Dorsey appeals from the District Court’s1 denial of habeas corpus relief. *1003He is now incarcerated in the Wisconsin State Prison at Waupun, Wisconsin, as a result of two felony convictions, but is challenging “constructive custody” allegedly imposed by the respondent Missouri officials by way of a capias warrant for parole violation.
¶7On April 3,1970, Dorsey was convicted of burglary in Franklin County, Missouri, and was placed on probation for five years. While on probation, on November 21, 1974, he was convicted of two counts of armed robbery in Wisconsin and began serving the sentence imposed there.
¶8Respondent Joseph Tate, Judge of the Circuit Court of Franklin County, Missouri, issued a capias warrant for probation violation on March 17, 1975. This warrant, which tolled the running of the probation term, was allegedly served on Dorsey on May 9, 1975. He argues that the failure of the warrant to state “what the State of Missouri feels Mr. Dorsey did to violate the conditions of his probation” violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Dorsey makes this claim by alleging that he is thereby deprived of information needed to make an intelligent decision whether to demand an immediate hearing.
¶9The District Court dismissed this habeas corpus proceeding and held that Dorsey had failed to exhaust state remedies. We have examined the record and the briefs of the parties and find it evident that the District Court applied correct principles of law.3 This case appears to be a hyper-technical attempt to secure a statement of the alleged violation which was obvious from the Wisconsin conviction. If Dorsey, in fact, has any doubt which probation rule he is alleged to have violated, he can resolve this doubt by a letter to the Missouri probation officer assigned to his case or by a motion filed in the Franklin County Circuit Court. In any event, the Franklin County respondents in this action state, “[t]he cause for revocation is violation of condition 14 of the conditions of probation, by being convicted of two new offenses while on probation.”
¶10This appellant assists neither his cause nor the administration of justice by this specious complaint, which appears to be an attempt to play games with the court.
¶11The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.