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571 So. 2d 554

571 So.2d 554

16 Fla.L.Weekly 3

Docket No. 89-3026.

Pray v. State

Jennifer PRAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided December 19, 1990.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1990-12-19

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“We agree with [appellant] that without a conviction for an underlying felony she could not be convicted of third degree felony murder.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 705 So. 2d 648 - Noel v. State

Relies on Mahaun v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1990-12-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 2017

7 state decisions

50199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Allen J. DeWeese, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Miles Ferris, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4This is an appeal from convictions for third degree felony murder and simple battery. The defendant/appellant, Jennifer Pray, raises several arguments on appeal but we find that only one has merit.

¶5Pray was convicted of third degree felony murder on count I and simple battery on count II. Pray argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal on the count for third degree felony murder because she was not convicted of any underlying felony to support the conviction. Section 782.04, Florida Statute (1987) defines third degree felony murder as:

The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate any felony other than any . .. aggravated child abuse. (emphasis added).

¶6The jury acquitted Pray of the underlying felony in count II when it failed to find *555 her guilty of aggravated assault, child abuse or aggravated battery and found her guilty of the lesser included offense of simple battery (a misdemeanor, not a felony). We agree with Pray that without a conviction for an underlying felony she could not be convicted of third degree felony murder. See Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 1979.)

¶7The state argues that aggravated assault could have formed the basis of the felony murder since it was not included in the elements of count II and therefore Pray was not acquitted of this charge. We reject this argument, however, because there was no proof to support a conviction of aggravated assault. Assault is defined in section 784.011 as:

[A]n intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.

¶8There was no evidence of the five month old infant victim's perceptions or feelings and thus there was inadequate proof of an assault.

¶9Accordingly, we reverse the conviction for third degree felony murder and affirm the conviction for simple battery.

¶10AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

¶11GLICKSTEIN, WALDEN and WARNER, JJ., concur.

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