Brem v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
97 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 97 later decisions — most recently June 2015 · most notably Quinones v. State (1980), Nethery v. State (1985)
97 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Terry v. Ohio · Brady v. State of Maryland · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · United States v. Agurs
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“`Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.' Brem v. State, 571 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex.Cr.App.).”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. May v. State · Nastu v. State““Contrary to appellant’s assertion, an indictment for aggravated rape need not set out or describe the specific actions or deeds of the defendant which communicated the threat of serious bodily injury to the prosecutrix. See Watson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Childs v. State, 547 S.W.2d 613 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977). The indictment sufficiently alleged the act committed by appellant which ‘aggravated’ the rape under Sec. 21.03(a)(2), and therefore was not subject to a motion to quash on this ground. “Appellant’s contention that the indictment should have been quashed because it failed to allege the circumstances which made the act of intercourse non-consensual is likewise without merit. The indictment alleged that appellant had sexual intercourse with the complainant ‘without the consent of the Complainant, by means of force and threats.’ It is not necessary that the indictment allege the facts and circumstances of the offense which made the act of sexual intercourse non-consensual. The allegations of ‘force’ and ‘threats’ were sufficient to place appellant on notice of the kind of lack of consent upon which the State would base its case. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 21.02(b)(1), (2). See Watson v. State, supra; Childs v. State, supra; cf. Rogers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Cr. App.1977). This being true, no further factual allegations were necessary and the indictment was not subject to a motion to quash on this ground.” Id. at 317.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Cavazos v. State · Johnson v. State““knowingly and intentionally, by force and threats, have sexual intercourse with [the prosecutrix], a female not his wife, without the consent of [the prosecutrix], and did then and there compel [the prose-cutrix] to submit to such act of sexual intercourse by threatening the imminent infliction of death.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. Goss v. State · Sifford v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.