Lopez v. Thurmer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Mr. Lopez might have tried to escape, perhaps with the assistance of his drug associates. Mr. Lopez or a confederate might have attempted to harm the judge or the jurors. Or some interested party might have attempted to harm Mr. Lopez himself — a member of the victim’s family, perhaps, or an alleged co-conspirator seeking to silence him. At least one of the jury view locations was outdoors and, therefore, particularly difficult to secure. In light of all this,- it was reasonable to expect that violence at the jury view was a real possibility. Accordingly, it was reasonable to take precautions to protect against such risks. The precautions taken here were undoubtedly extreme, but so were the circumstances justifying them. Not only was the danger posed to the court, the jurors and the general public significant, but the risk of prejudice to Mr. Lopez was not the same as it would have been in a courtroom setting. The purpose behind ■the presence of the SWAT officers at a jury view outside the courtroom was somewhat ambiguous. The officers’ presence could have been for any of the purposes that we have enumerated or for all of them. Jurors well could appreciate this distinction and, consequently, be less likely to draw conclusions about the defendant’s guilt upon seeing heightened security measures in effect at a venue outside the courtroom. Armed guards surrounding a defendant in a courtroom might well send the message to the jurors that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworth”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fontaine v. People

2. “[tjrial courts should have, in any event, significantly more latitude in gauging the appropriate security measures for a jury view outside the courtroom. Although there is a significant amount of case law and professional material on the proper maintenance of security in the courtroom environment, jury views outside the courtroom necessarily require a significant recalibration of the security/prejudice balance. The trial judge is faced with an unfamiliar locale and with a multifaceted security problem that bears little resemblance to the more contained situation presented by the conventional courtroom. Jurors generally will understand and appreciate this distinction, and, therefore, will be less likely to draw conclusions about the defendant’s guilt upon seeing heightened security measures in effect. Thus, the decision to impose this kind of extra security might well be constitutionally reasonable for a proceeding outside the courtroom, even though the principles enunciated in [Supreme Court precedents] rarely would permit such restraints in the courtroom.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fontaine v. People

3. “It is that judicial reconciliation of the competing interests of the person standing trial and of the state providing for the security of the community that, according to [Supreme Court precedent], provides the appropriate guarantee of fundamental fairness.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 47 Cal. 4th 625 - People v. Stevens