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← 573 NW2D 677 - W.J.L. v. Bugge

W.J.L. v. Bugge’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
states following
October 2016
most recently cited

2 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently October 2016

2 district · 13 state decisions

60199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Fabio v. Bellomo · Lubbers v. Anderson · Wittmer v. Ruegemer · Britton v. Koep · Blackowiak v. Kemp

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he underlying rationale for the limitations period contained in Minn.Stat. § 541.073 is that many sexual abuse victims, especially young children, are psychologically and emotionally unable to recognize that they have been abused. As a result, these victims are often incapable of bringing their claims within the limitations period of Minn.Stat. §§ 541.07 and 541.15(a)(1). In enacting Minn.Stat. § 541.073, the legislature sought to address this phenomenon by giving sexual abuse victims additional time to recognize the abuse they suffered while placing a limit on when such claims may be brought.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[I]n Blackowiak , we said nothing more than that implicit in the act of sexual abuse is personal injury, and, because the two are intertwined, the victim is immediately put on notice of the causal connection between the abuse and injury. Accordingly, the statute of limitations begins to run once a victim is abused unless there is some legal disability, such as the victim’s age, or mental disability, such as repressed memory of the abuse, which would make a reasonable person incapable of recognizing or understanding that he or she had been sexually abused.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “Here, absent a disability which serves to delay the running of the statute of limitations, the limitations period under the delayed discovery statute would have begun to run one year after W.J.L. reached the age of majority and expired when she turned 25. Minn.Stat. § 541.15(a)(1). W.J.L. does not allege any disability which would have prevented her from pursuing her sexual abuse claims against Bugge within six years of the time she turned 19 years of age.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.