Commonwealth v. Freeman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 213 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 227 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; or (ii) the evidence fails to support the findings of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. McCrae · Commonwealth v. Tharp

2. “A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(1). 2 . In each murder, the jury found two aggravating circumstances: 1) Appellant had a significant history of violent felony convictions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9); and 2) Appellant had been convicted of another murder, id. § 971 l(d)(l 1). The jury also found two mitigating circumstances: 1) Appellant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, id. § 9711(e)(2); and 2) other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense, id. § 9711(e)(8). The jury concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 3 . We note that the trial court never issued any orders in response to the motions filed by the public defender and Mr. Stewart seeking withdrawal from the case. 4 . Had Appellant’s counsel filed a timely post-sentence motion, Appellant’s issues would have been preserved for appeal regardless of the amount of time that elapsed between its filing and the trial court's ruling. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 811 (’’[I]n case in which a death sentence has been imposed, the post-sentence motion shall be decided promptly, but shall not be denied by operation of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Hairston

3. “that, as a general rule on capital direct appeals, claims that were not properly raised and preserved in the trial court are waived and unreviewable. Such claims may be pursued under the [Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)], as claims sounding in trial counsel’s ineffectiveness or, if applicable, a statutory exception to the PCRA’s waiver provision. This general rule ... reaffirms this Court’s general approach to the requirements of issue preservation.... [A]n assumption has arisen that all waived claims are available for review in the first instance on direct appeal. The general rule shall now be that they are not. In adopting the new rule, we do not foreclose the possibility that a capital appellant may be able to describe why a particular waived claim is of such primary constitutional magnitude that it should be reached • on appeal. Indeed, nothing ... shall ... call[ ] into question the bedrock principles ... concerning the necessity of reaching fundamental and plainly meritorious constitutional issues irrespective, even, of the litigation preferences of the parties. Consistently with our [practice], however, we leave the specific articulation of any future exception to the actual case or controversy in which that “rare” claim arises.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Baumhammers