¶1dissenting.
¶2A trial judge is more than an umpire. He is not simply a caller of balls and strikes. He is “the principal public official whose obligation it is in a criminal case to see that ‘all individuals are tried and sentenced in accordance with law.’ ” Moon v. State, 372 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (opinion of Roberts, J., on rehearing). He is assumed to know the law, both substantive and procedural.
¶3Procedural law for criminal cases is established by the Legislature so that a lawyer representing clients may go anywhere in the State and be assured that the procedure will be the same. See Bouie v. State, 565 S.W.2d 543, 554-555 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (dissenting opinion).
¶4In this case the trial judge pronounced sentence without allowing the necessary ten days to elapse for a motion for new trial or motion in arrest of judgment, and, in addition, he failed to ascertain if the appellant wished to waive his right to this ten-day period. The right to have ten days to file these motions is fundamental to our procedure. See Woods v. State, 532 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and authorities there cited.
¶5As in Woods, I would dismiss the appeal.