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← 574 F.2d 1256 - Slavin v. Curry

Slavin v. Curry’s Empirical Analysis

574 F.2d 1256 · 1978

Citation profile

228
cited by 228 later decisions
5
cited 5 times by the Supreme Court
5
states following
September 2014
most recently cited

129 federal appellate · 11 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 228 later decisions (5 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2014 · most notably Polk County v. Dodson (1981), Dennis v. Sparks (1980)

129 federal appellate · 11 district · 5 state decisions

150019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2201

Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Scheuer v. Rhodes · Haines v. Kerner · Younger v. Harris · Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 228 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “'Cases in which the underlying issue is one of motivation, intent, or some other subjective fact are particularly inappropriate for summary judgment, as are those in which the issues turn on the credibility of the affiants.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The contention that a conspiracy existed which deprived the petitioner of rights guaranteed by federal law makes each member of the conspiracy potentially liable for the effects of that deprivation. Liability arises from membership in the conspiracy and from traditional notions that a conspirator is vicariously liable for the acts of his co-conspirators. Liability does not arise solely because of the individual’s own conduct. Some personal conduct may serve as evidence of membership in the conspiracy, but the individual’s actions do not always serve as the exclusive basis for liability. It is therefore not sufficient justification to say that a claim against a particular defendant must be dismissed because that defendant would be immune from liability for his own conduct. Additional inquiry is required to determine whether the immunity extends also to participation in a conspiracy. For example, private individuals may not be held liable under section 1983 for their conduct. See, e. g., Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corporation, 513 F.2d 873 , 877-78 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 , 96 S.Ct. 433 , 46 L.Ed.2d 376 (1975); Hill v. McClellan, 490 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974). They may nevertheless be held liable if they conspired with a person who acted under color of state law. Taylor v. Gibson, supra, 529 F.2d at 715 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[F]or a claim under § 1983, a conspiracy as such is not an indispensable element as it is under § 1985. But it may be charged as the legal mechanism through which to impose liability on each and all of the Defendants without regard to the person doing the particular act. Conspiracy is asserted in that situation on more or less traditional principles of agency, partnership, joint venture, and the like.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.