Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 574 F.2d 978 - Reynolds v. Mabry

Reynolds v. Mabry’s Empirical Analysis

574 F.2d 978 · 1978

Citation profile

79
cited by 79 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
June 1989
most recently cited

39 federal appellate · 3 district · 21 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Glasser v. United States · Holloway v. Arkansas · Geders v. United States · Herring v. New York · M. Morrin & Son Co. v. Burgess Construction Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The accepted standard for effectiveness of trial counsel is now established as that degree of performance which conforms to the care and skill of a reasonably competent lawyer rendering similar services under the existing circumstances. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 , 98 S.Ct. 145 , 54 L.Ed.2d 109 (1977). Furthermore, there is a presumption that counsel is competent, Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 , 97 S.Ct. 178 , 50 L.Ed.2d 148 (1976), and the petitioner must shoulder a heavy burden to override this presumption. Id.; Crismon v. United States, 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975); McQueen v. Swenson (McQueen I), 498 F.2d 207, 214 (8th Cir. 1974). Finally, the exercise of reasonable judgment, even when hindsight reveals a mistake in that judgment, does not render a lawyer negligent or lacking in competence in rendering his services.” 574 F.2d at 979 .”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We believe a flexible approach . is called for. We ought not to intervene in the criminal process unless and until it can be shown that the alleged error itself prejudiced the petitioner in obtaining a fair trial. But this is not to say that, on remand, petitioner must prove his innocence even by so much as a preponderance of the evidence; nor should we be understood to suggest that the Court may trespass upon what properly would have been the jury’s province of weighing the truth or falsity of this evidence at the original trial. What we are saying is that, here, the petitioner must shoulder an initial burden of showing the existence of admissible evidence which could have been uncovered by reasonable investiga tion and which would have proved helpful to the defendant either on cross-examination or in his case-in-chief at the original trial. Once this showing is made, a new trial is warranted unless the court is able to declare a belief that the omission of such evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““In recent cases where the attorney’s failure to provide essential services has been challenged this circuit has followed a flexible approach in requiring a petitioner to make some initial showing that his counsel’s conduct may have prejudiced him in some way before a conviction will be reversed. . [[Image here]] “Decisions of two circuits have nevertheless questioned the need for a separate showing of prejudice in effective assistance cases. The Sixth Circuit in Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974), held that once ineffectiveness has been established, ‘(h)armless error tests do not apply . . . .’ The Ninth Circuit established a similar rule in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court held, citing Geders v. United States, [ 425 U.S. 80 , 96 S.Ct. 1330 , 47 L.Ed.2d 592 ] supra, and Herring v. New York, [ 422 U.S. 853 , 95 S.Ct. 2550 , 45 L.Ed.2d 593 ] supra, that ‘once a petitioner has carried his burden of establishing ineffectiveness of counsel, his conviction must be reversed without regard to the presence or absence of prejudice.’ Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Holloway v. Arkansas, [ 435 U.S. 475 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 ] supra, may be viewed as supportive of the results reached by the Sixth and the Ninth Circuits, the effect of the ease may be limited to conflict of interest situations. “In measuring effective assistance of counsel the question of harm or prejudice is often intertwined wit”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.