Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

576 F.2d 615

Docket No. 76-2832.

McRae v. Hogan

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided July 13, 1978.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1978-07-13

3 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“and not simply at the date the action is initiated.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Cook v. Hanberry, Cook v. Hanberry

Relies on Roe v. Wade · North Carolina v. Rice · Massachusetts v. Westcott

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1978-07-13

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently March 2017

6 federal appellate ·

7019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*616Jack McRae, pro se.

¶2Gary N. Freeman, Marietta, Ga. (Court Appointed not under Act), Nisbet S. Kendrick, III, Marietta, Ga., for petitioner-appellant.

¶3John W. Stokes, Jr., U. S. Atty., Richard A. Horder, William E. Turnipseed, Asst. U. S. Attys., Atlanta, Ga., for respondents-appellees.

¶4Before GOLDBERG, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

¶5PER CURIAM:

¶6On December 13, 1972, appellant McRae was convicted of first degree burglary in violation of 22 D.C.Code § 1801(a) and sentenced to four to twelve years imprisonment. He was initially incarcerated in the District of Columbia Correctional Facility at Lorton, Virginia, but, on order of the Attorney General, was transferred into the federal penal system. In 1975, while at the United States Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, McRae, acting pro se, filed several “motions” in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia challenging the denial of his request for transfer to another prison facility where he could be placed in the type of work-release program available to inmates at Lorton. The procedural history of these “motions” is unusually complex and need not be recited here, except to note that the district court ultimately denied relief to McRae.

¶7McRae, again acting pro se, timely appealed to this Court, but his briefs were of limited value in defining and arguing the issues on appeal. On September 6,1977, we ordered that counsel be appointed to represent McRae in his appeal. In concluding a more helpful supplemental brief on behalf of his client, counsel for McRae stated: “The only appropriate relief available in the case at bar is to order the respondent herein to show cause why the appellant should not be immediately transferred to the Lorton Reformatory and there allowed to serve the remainder of his sentence”. Supplemental Brief of Appellant at 11-12.1 After hearing oral argument in this case on January 31, 1978, we were informed by McRae’s counsel that McRae had been transferred to the Lorton Reformatory on February 11, 1978, pursuant to an order by the Warden of the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta dated January 23, 1978.2 Hence, McRae *617has received the relief he sought prior to our disposition of his appeal.

¶8The transfer of McRae to the Lorton Reformatory mooted this case.3 The governing legal principles were stated by this Court in Concerned Citizens of Vicksburg v. Sills, 567 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1978):

Because the judicial power conferred by Article III of the Constitution depends upon the existence of “Cases” or “Controversies”, federal courts lack authority “to decide moot questions or abstract propositions” or issues “that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them”. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). See also Shupack v. Groh, 498 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1974); Armendariz v. Hershey, 413 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated”. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

¶9Our jurisdiction to decide any issues arising out of McRae’s incarceration in a Federal penitentiary for violation of the District of Columbia Code ended when McRae was transferred to a District of Columbia prison.

¶10In accordance with these conclusions, we vacate the district court’s orders of September 4, 1975 and May 19, 1976, and remand with directions that the case be dismissed as moot. See National Lawyers Guild U. of Tex. Ch. v. Board of Regents, 490 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. West Gulf Maritime Association, 460 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).

¶11VACATED and REMANDED, with directions.

¶12APPENDIX

¶13

¶14*618APPENDIX — Continued

¶15

/576/f2d/615 · .json · Public domain