Uppal v. Holder’s Empirical Analysis
576 F.3d 1014 · 2009
Citation profile
1 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (§ 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1229A (§ 240 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (§ 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Skidmore v. Swift & Co. · Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez · Cano-Merida v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · Movsisian v. Ashcroft
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[S]ection 120.00(1) of the revised New York Penal Law ... provides that a person is guilty of assault in the third degree when, “[w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person.” ... [The statute] requires “intent to cause physical injury.” ... Thus, the statute under which the respondent was convicted requires the specific intent to cause physical injury, as opposed to the general intent associated with simple assault. Therefore, the inclusion of the specific intent element distinguishes third-degree assault under section 120.00(1) of the New York Penal Law from the general-intent simple assaults, which are not considered to involve moral turpitude.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Uppal v. Holder“A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or (c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Uppal v. Holder“to be classified as a CIMT, as opposed to “general intent” or “reckless[ness]”); Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693 , 698 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that an act done deliberately and with knowledge does not necessarily involve the”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. Uppal v. Holder
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.