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← 576 F.3d 1030 - Fregozo v. Holder

Fregozo v. Holder’s Empirical Analysis

576 F.3d 1030 · 2009

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
September 2021
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably Tijani v. Holder (2010), Feng Gui Lin v. Holder (2009)

19 federal appellate · 1 district ·

420200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (§ 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1229B (§ 240a of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Taylor v. United States · Shepard v. United States · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Ventura · United States v. Mead Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[1] The first inquiry requires the BIA to construe a state criminal statute. As the BIA has no statutory expertise in such state law matters, we review de novo its determination of the elements of the offense for which the petitioner was convicted. [2] The second inquiry requires the BIA to construe the INA by defining a particular removable offense and applying that definition to a petitioner’s state conviction. If, in resolving the second issue, the BIA has interpreted an ambiguous INA statutory term, and rendered its interpretation in a precedential decision intended to carry the force of law, we defer under Chevron U.S.A.[], to the BIA’s definition so long as it is reasonable.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the phrase 'a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment' in section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the Act denotes a unitary concept and [its] broad definition of child abuse [in Velazquez ] describes this entire phrase.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “conduct that creates only the bare potential for nonserious harm to a child.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.