Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 576 F.3d 258 - Nowlin v. Peake

Nowlin v. Peake’s Empirical Analysis

576 F.3d 258 · 2009

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
March 2021
most recently cited

10 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2021 · most notably Hamilton v. Lanning (2010), Hamilton v. Lanning (2010)

10 federal appellate · 1 district ·

270200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 101 (Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005) · 11 U.S.C. § 1325 · 11 U.S.C. § 1329 · 11 U.S.C. § 707

Relies on Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. · Lamie v. United States Trustee · Hibbs Director Arizona Department of Revenue v. Winn et al. · In Re Hardacre · In Re Alexander

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(b)(1) If the trustee ... objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan unless, as of the effective date of the plan— (B) the plan provides that all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “When interpreting a statute, we begin by examining its language.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “As noted, Congress changed the definition of ‘disposable income’ in § 1325(b)(2), but left unchanged the phrase ‘projected disposable income’ in § 1325(b)(1)(B). We are persuaded that the independent definition of ‘projected’ adds to the phrase’s overall meaning. The term ‘projected,’ not defined in the statute, means ‘[t]o calculate, estimate, or predict (something in the future), based on present data or trends.’ In re Jass, 340 B.R. [411] at 415 [ (Bankr.D.Utah 2006) ] (quoting the Am. Heritage College Dictionary 1115 (4th ed. 2002)). In view of this definition, with which [the debtor] agrees, we interpret the phrase ‘projected disposable income’ to embrace a forward-looking view grounded in the present via the statutory definition of ‘disposable income’ premised on historical data. The statutorily defined ‘disposable income’ is the starting point — it is presumptively correct — from which the bankruptcy court projects that income over the course of the plan. Under this interpretation, the statutory definition of ‘disposable income’ is integral to the bankruptcy court’s decision to confirm or reject a Chapter 13 debtor’s proposed plan. Additional language in § 1325(b)(1) supports this conclusion. Specifically, the statute speaks of ‘the debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period.’ This language links ‘projected disposable income’ with the debtor’s income actually received during the plan, and indicates a forward-looking orientat”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.