Volume 576 — South Western Reporter, Third Series

Carlos Eugene Moore ("Attorney") entered into a written contingent fee agreement to represent a client in a personal injury matter. The agreement, which was signed by the client, provided that if the client refused to accept any settlement offer which Attorney advised her was reasonable and should be taken, the client was responsible for the contingency fee "on the basis of that offer" unless Attorney waived the provision. When Attorney received an offer to settle the matter, he advised the client to accept the offer. She refused. Attorney filed a motion to withdraw which was granted. Attorney also sought to place a lien against the client's eventual recovery for his fees and expenses "presently owe[d]." After the client filed a complaint with the Board of Professional Responsibility ("BPR"), the BPR filed a petition for discipline. A hearing panel was appointed and, after an evidentiary hearing, the panel concluded that (1) Attorney had "made an agreement for and has sought to collect an unreasonable fee," violating Rule of Professional Conduct ("RPC" or "Rule") 1.5(a) and 1.5(c) and (2) Attorney had "violated Rule 1.8(i) because [the client] became obligated when [Attorney] advised [her] that the settlement offer . . . was 'reasonable and should be taken.'" The hearing panel imposed a sanction of public censure. Attorney sought review in chancery court, and the chancery court affirmed the hearing panel's decision. Attorney then sought review in this Court, arguing that the hearing panel's findings that he had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct were arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial and material evidence. Attorney further contends that the sanction imposed was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial and material evidence. We hold that the record supports both the findings of violations and the imposition of a public censure. Accordingly, we affirm the chancery court's ruling upholding the hearing panel's decision.

We granted this appeal to consider whether a circuit court loses continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction if a post-divorce petition seeking modification of a parenting plan adopted in a final divorce decree alleges facts that are tantamount to an unruly child claim, over which juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-103. After we granted this appeal, the General Assembly amended section 37-1-103 to expressly provide that a circuit court retains subject matter jurisdiction in these circumstances until and unless a pleading is filed or relief is sought in juvenile court and the juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction is invoked. Act of April 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 167. The General Assembly applied this amendment to all cases pending on its April 18, 2019 effective date, including this appeal. Id. § 2. Because no pleading was filed in juvenile court nor was the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction invoked in any other manner in this case, the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction of the post-divorce petition. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is reinstated.

We granted this appeal to consider whether a circuit court loses continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction if a post-divorce petition seeking modification of a parenting plan adopted in a final divorce decree alleges facts that are tantamount to claims of dependency and neglect, over which juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-103. After we granted this appeal, the General Assembly amended section 37-1-103 to expressly provide that a circuit court retains subject matter jurisdiction in these circumstances until and unless a pleading is filed or relief is sought in juvenile court and the juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction is invoked. Act of April 18, 2019, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 167. The General Assembly applied this amendment to all cases pending on its April 18, 2019 effective date, including this appeal. Id. § 2. Because no pleading was filed in juvenile court nor was the juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction invoked in any other manner in this case, the circuit court retained subject matter jurisdiction of the post-divorce petition. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is reinstated.

This is an appeal of the termination of a tenured teacher's employment pursuant to the Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 49-5-501 to – 515. The Director of Schools of the Franklin Special School District filed Charges for Dismissal of the tenured teacher on the grounds of unprofessional conduct, incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, and neglect of duty. The charging document alleged multiple incidents of unprofessional conduct based on a lack of adherence to required procedures, particularly in the area of special education laws and procedures. It further alleged that the teacher was placed on a Corrective Action Plan for the 2014-2015 school year, during which the teacher was found to be in violation of the plan on multiple occasions. Moreover, at the end of the 2014-2015 school year, the teacher was suspended for three days without pay as a result of an incident that occurred on May 11, 2015, during which the teacher improperly restrained a special education student, which violated the student's individualized education plan. The charging document also identified, inter alia, an incident that occurred on October 28, 2015, when the teacher got into a physical altercation with a special education student who refused to return the teacher's day planner and which resulted in the two falling to the floor. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Impartial Hearing Officer recommended dismissal on the grounds of unprofessional conduct. When the school board voted to sustain the Hearing Officer's decision, the teacher sought review in chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the teacher's dismissal based on the grounds of unprofessional conduct and incompetence. This appeal followed. Because the Hearing Officer did not find that the ground of incompetence had been proven, and that decision was not appealed, the ground of incompetence was not before the court. Therefore, it may not be considered as a ground for dismissal. However, we affirm the decision to dismiss the tenured teacher's employment with the school district on the ground of unprofessional conduct.

A 62-year-old former employee of the Macon County School System sued the Board of Education on the grounds of age discrimination and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. She alleged that her supervisor, the school principal, made age related discriminatory remarks and demoted her after she complained about a co worker's repeated, sexually explicit comments. In its answer, the Board of Education contended that the re-assignment was a lateral transfer and was justified by nondiscriminatory reasons. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation, and that the Board produced undisputed evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for transferring Plaintiff. We respectfully disagree, having concluded that Plaintiff identified and produced evidence to establish a prima facie case for both claims and to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Board's stated reasons are pretexts for discriminatory or retaliatory animus. For these reasons, the Board was not entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.