June v. Union Carbide Corp.’s Empirical Analysis
577 F.3d 1234 · 2009
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 2 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently October 2025
8 federal appellate · 2 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009) · 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Radiation Exposure Compensation Act) · 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (§ 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980)
Relies on Singleton v. Wulff · Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. · Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. · Greenlaw v. United States · 6 Cal. 4th 965 - Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Based on my consideration of all available data including, but not limited to, the arithmetic mean and 95% credibility interval of estimated assigned share, Plaintiffs Harriet Wilcox and Marcella Hartman were exposed to additional ionizing radiations as a consequence of Defendants’ operations. Such exposures are known to cause and/or contribute to the development of liver and bladder cancers. The arithmetic mean of ionizing radiation-related assigned share to each plaintiff from Defendants’ operations exceeds 10 percent. Assuming the medical records available to me are correct and complete and that no other parameter(s) unknown to me could, as a sole cause overwhelmingly explain each plaintiff having the cancer specified, I opine: to a reasonable medical probability exposure to ionizing radiations as a consequence of Defendants’ operations was a substantial factor contributing to each plaintiff developing cancer,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“The problem for Plaintiffs is not that their experts failed to utter some magic words, such as “but for.” ... For all we know, the data would support but-for claims of some, or even all, Plaintiffs. The problem for Plaintiffs is that they did not make a timely argument that they had produced evidence of but-for causation, and they have never (not even in this court) contended that they have produced evidence that [Defendants’] radiation was a necessary component of a causal set that probably would have caused the Plaintiffs’ ailments.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent. (2) If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.