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← 577 FSUPP 810 - Metge v. Baehler

Metge v. Baehler’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

24
cited by 24 later decisions
3
states following
March 2018
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently March 2018

6 federal appellate · 5 district · 4 state decisions

1101984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78T (§ 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)

Relies on Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder · Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States · Desist v. United States · Brewer v. United States · Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. City of Chicago

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[P]laintiffs must establish, first, that the defendant * * * `actually participated in ( i.e., exercised control over) the operations of the [violator] in general; then he must prove that the defendant possessed the power to control the specific transaction or activity upon which the primary violation is predicated, but he need not prove that this later power was exercised.'”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “A corporation’s primary lender almost always possesses a measure of influence over the corporation, and this influence or power normally increases if the corporation becomes delinquent on its loan payments, due to the lender’s ability to threaten declaration of default and acceleration of the loan. Most commercial loan agreements also give the lender the right to exercise certain powers over the borrower corporation in the event of default or upon the occurrence of other specified events. If the mere possession of such power and influence over a borrower were enough to impose on the lender the burden of proving its own good faith and non-inducement in the event of a securities law violation by the borrower, the heightened potential for liability could deter lenders from making loans to corporations involved in securities transactions. The mere making of such loans would impose on lenders an onerous duty of supervision over their borrowers’ activities relating to securities. The imposition of such a duty is not reasonable unless and until the lender exercises its power by becoming involved in the general operations of the corporate borrower.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[T]he possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person, whether through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.