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← 579 F.2d 141 - Dunkerley v. Hogan

Dunkerley v. Hogan’s Empirical Analysis

579 F.2d 141 · 1978

Citation profile

74
cited by 74 later decisions
13
states following
February 2011
most recently cited

48 federal appellate · 2 district · 15 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently February 2011 · most notably United States v. Stratton (1985), United States v. Hillard (1983)

48 federal appellate · 2 district · 15 state decisions — followed in 13 states

38019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Benton v. Maryland · Green v. United States · United States v. Jorn · Arizona v. Washington · Wade v. Hunter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In the absence of any record evidence or statement by the court indicating why a short continuance would have been unreasonable, unfair, or impractical, we decline to speculate as to factors that the trial judge might possibly have considered, such as the”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “in view of the importance of the [defendant’s right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal], and the fact that it is frustrated by any mistrial, the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. His burden is a heavy one. The prosecutor must demonstrate “manifest necessity” for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant. The words “manifest necessity” appropriately characterize the magnitude of the prosecutor’s burden. . . . Nevertheless, those words do not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Indeed, it is manifest that the key word “necessity” cannot be interpreted literally; instead, contrary to the teaching of Webster, we assume that there are degrees of necessity and we require a “high degree” before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]t is not enough that plausible reasons might conceivably exist for the trial judge's action. If we are to review his exercise of discretion, to which deference should ordinarily be accorded, we must know the basis for that decision as 'disclosed by the record'....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.