Ordunez v. Bean’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

55 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In computing the time by which the state must be ready for trial, the following periods shall be excluded: “(1) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings involving the defendant, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of competence to stand trial, hearing on pretrial motions, appeals, and trials of other charges; “(2) any period during which the defendant is incompetent to stand trial; “(3) a period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel, except that a defendant without counsel is deemed not to have consented to a continuance unless the court advised him of his right to a speedy trial and of the effect of his consent; “(4) a period of delay resulting from the absence of the defendant because his location is unknown and: “(A) he is attempting to avoid apprehension . or prosecution; or “(B) the state has been unable to determine his location by due diligence; “(5) a period of delay resulting from the unavailability of the defendant whose location is known to the state but whose presence cannot be obtained by due diligence or because he resists being returned to the state for trial “(6) a reasonable period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the state if the continuance is granted: “(A) because of the unavailability of evidence that is material to the state’s case, if the state has exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and th”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Fraire v. State

2. ““The provisions of the act itself, reasonably construed, further support this conclusion. Thus in describing times that may be excluded in determining when the State must be ready, Section 4 speaks of inability of the State to determine location of the accused by due diligence, (4)(B); of the State knowing the location of the defendant but being unable to obtain his presence by due diligence, (5); of the State requesting a continuance because of unavailable evidence when the State has exercised due diligence to obtain it or because the State needs additional time to prepare its case, (6); of the charge being dismissed upon motion of the State, (7); and of a period of delay caused by defendant’s detention in another jurisdiction and the State is aware of that detention and exercising due diligence to obtain his presence for trial. All of these instances plainly contemplate only the prosecuting attorney and just as clearly exclude the idea that the trial court is embraced within the term ‘the state’ being ready for trial.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Barfield v. State

3. “***** * § 4. In computing the time by which the State must be ready for trial, the following periods shall be excluded: ****** (10) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. De La Rosa v. State