United States v. Thompson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Abstractly stated, section 1, para-Title 49, U.S.C.A., gives to the Interstate Commerce Commisg unusualf drastic, and in some re8pectS dictatorial powers. Powers of guch character delegated to the Commission by this law can and ghould be exerciged only on the basis that they are necessary to meet an emergency — an emergency that does not admit of time for notice and hearing to those whose property would be affected by the order. Consequently the requirement appears in the law, and in our opinion properly so, that the Commission must find the existence of an emergency as a foundation for the exercise of any of the emergency powers to be exercised under the act. It would seem to follow that orders under the powers thus delegated, being justified only because of the existence of an emergency, the continuance in effect of such orders can only be justified because of and so long as the emergency continues. Hence the provision in the law that the emergency order issued would be for such “period” as in the determination of the Commission would meet the emergency. There should be not only the relationship and consistency in the order of the finding of the existence of an emergency, as a basis for its original issuance, but the duration of the order should bear on its face a relationship and consistency with reasonable expectation, based on the judgment of the Commission, of the duration or “period” of continuance of the emergency. If the order is for a period that is limited, it bear”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Southern Railway Co.

2. ““Petitioner claims that the Burlington and Frisco received benefits as a result of the * * * car directives while petitioner incurred only costs. We do not dispute the fact that petitioner may have incurred expenses in complying with the * * * car directives. We do, however, disagree with the premise that the Burlington and Frisco received benefits for which they must render an accounting. These directives were made to ‘best promote the service in the interest of the public and the commerce of the people.’ No other beneficiaries are mentioned in section 1(15) (b) and no other beneficiaries were intended by the * * * car directives. “Southern’s claims of constitutional infirmities of such construction, that, unless it is compensated in the manner it seeks for the empty car movements performed by it in obedience to Commission car service directions, it will have been deprived of its property without due process, are insubstantial. The lack of compensation for compliance with the lawful orders does not raise the constitutional issue of taking of property without compensation. Railroads historically move empty cars that have entered the national car fleet without compensation. “It is not altogether clear that Southern has not been compensated for such movements. Southern’s established rate structure includes an element of empty returns. “It is assumed that divisions of revenue derived from transporting loaded cars compensate for the movement of empties. The requirement that railr”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Southern Railway Co. v. United States