58 Md. App. 529 - Cotter v. Cotter’s Empirical Analysis
1984
Citation profile
40 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently September 2008 · most notably 116 Md. App. 605 - Commercial Union Insurance v. Porter Hayden Co. (1997), 64 Md. App. 487 - Rosenberg v. Rosenberg (1985)
40 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Deering v. Deering · 84 Wis. 2d 124 - Bloomer v. Bloomer · Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Service Corp. · 52 Md. App. 336 - Ward v. Ward · 58 Md. App. 158 - Gravenstine v. Gravenstine
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“After recognizing that the house, the household furnishings, the two automobiles, and the Colorado land fall within the definition of marital property, the chancellor gave them no further consideration, commenting that “they have been disposed of by agreement of the parties.” The only assets valued and considered for the purpose of making a monetary award were the husband’s pension, the jointly owned stock, and the boat. The chancellor apparently concluded that assets which the parties agree to divide equitably between them need not be regarded as factors to be considered in making a monetary award, but the statute requires the inclusion and evaluation of all marital property. Unless all marital properties are taken into account, the chancellor cannot properly consider all of the ... factors ... in determining a fair and equitable award.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“(1) the contribution, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family; (2) the value of all property interests of each party; (3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is made; (4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties; (5) the duration of the marriage; (6) the age of each party; (7) the physical and mental condition of each party; (8) how and when specific marital property was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property; (9) any award of alimony and any award of other provision that the court has made with respect to family use of personal property or the family home; and (10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[t]he fact that an award of a percentage of pension payments ‘if, as and when received’ is an available method for distributing retirement benefits as marital property (one which will prevent, eliminate or minimize certain types of inequities) does not mandate the adoption of that method in any case. As Deering, Ohm and Grant make clear, the chancellor has broad discretion not only with respect to evaluating pensions or retirement benefits as marital property but also in the manner of distributing them.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.