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58 Or. 281

Stocklen v. Barrett

Oregon Supreme Court

Decided March 21, 1911

Oregon Supreme Court · decided 1911-03-21

From Multnomah: William N. Gatens, Judge. Statement by Mr. Justice McBride. This is an action by Ed. R. Stocklen, doing business as the Yale Market & Grocery Company, against M. E. Barrett and wife. The facts are as follows: Stocklen, who is a dealer in groceries and meat, brought an action in the justice’s court to recover from defendants the sum of $55.25, which he alleged to be the reasonable value of goods, wares, and merchandise sold by him to defendants.

Relies on Cederson v. Oregon Navigation Co. · Wheelock v. Barney · Rossman v. Bock

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · Decided 1911-03-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently April 1950

5 state decisions

2019111920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Justice McBride

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶21. We think the court below erred in striking out or refusing to consider the testimony offered on behalf of plaintiff. The demand for a bill of particulars rests upon the same principles as a motion to make a pleading more definite and certain: Conover v. Knight, 84 Wis. 639 (54 N. W. 1002). In motions of that character a court will not require a party to be more definite in regard to matters concerning which he has no further knowledge: Cederson v. Oregon Nav. Co., 38 Or. 343, 358 (62 Pac. 637: 63 Pac. 763).

¶3*2842. In the case at bar the bill furnished was more definite than the complaint, in that it showed the character of goods furnished which the complaint wholly failed to show. There was not an entire failure to comply, but a part compliance, and whether plaintiff should be required to furnish a further bill rested in the sound discretion of the court.

¶43. It would be a reproach upon the law and a sacrifice of justice to procedure if a party should be wholly debarred from giving evidence of his claim merely because through the misfortune of fire the particular items that went to make up the total had been destroyed. The better opinion is that, where a party shows that it is an impossibility for him to make a more specific statement, he will not be punished for a failure to comply with the demand by having his evidence excluded: Rossman v. Bock, 97 Mich. 430 (56 N. W. 777); Mosheim v. Pawn (City Ct.) 18 N. Y. Supp. 166; Wheelock v. Barney, 27 Ind. 462.

¶54. It was claimed by defendants, and apparently held by the court, that evidence on behalf of plaintiff that defendant M. E. Barrett had admitted that the balance due was $55.25 was incompetent. . While it is true that the evidence offered tended to prove an account stated, it was also admissible in this action for goods sold as an admission by defendants of the justice of plaintiff’s demand: Duffy v. Hickey, 63 Wis. 312 (23 N. W. 707); Bonnell v. Mawha, 37 N. J. Law 198; Theus & Marbury v. Jipson, 3 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 189.

¶6Some claim is made by defendants’ counsel that the judgment entry shows that the court not only granted a nonsuit, but passed upon the merits of the testimony as well. But, while the record is not as clear on this subject as might be wished, we construe it to show that the court finally excluded all the testimony of plaintiff *285on the ground of his failure to furnish a bill of items, and thereupon granted a nonsuit.

¶7The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to grant a new trial. Reversed.

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