Bill in Chancery. Heard on the pleadings and testimony, September Term, 1885, Walker, Chancellor. Bill dismissed.

The bill alleged, that the orator commenced a suit against said defendant Ransley at March Term, 1883, and at the March Term, 1884,' recovered judgment; that the writ was served by attaching certain real estate in Jamaica, “ consisting of the ‘ Allen lot,’ so called, the ‘ Col. Cobb house,’ so called, and a'certain saw-mill”; “that said Lucinda C. makes her pretenses and claims of title by virtue of a certain deed of conveyance, made and executed to her by said Ransley, previous to her marriage with him, dated May 15, 1882, acknowledged June 2, 1882, by which said Ransley conveyed to her by the name of Lucinda C. Whitman; ” “ that he has been informed and believes that no consideration actually passed from said Lucinda C. to said Ransley for said' conveyance, but that the same was a voluntary conveyance and fraudulent as to said Ransley’s creditors.”

The prayer was that it be decreed that the defendants convey said real estate to the orator.

It was alleged in the joint and several answer of defendants, that the “conveyance was not made for the purpose of putting said property beyond the reach of the said Ransley’s creditors,” but “that said Ransley in consideration of the promise and agreement of the defendant, Lucinda C., to marry him, did on the 15th of May, 1882, convey to Lucinda C. Whitman, the parcels of land inherited, as aforesaid, which deed was recorded June 2, 1882, and afterwards on the 9th of July, 1882, in pursuance to said agreement and contract, the defendants were married.”

Agreements to marry are mutual, and as such, one is a consideration for the other, and binding upon both parties. In that sense they may be considered as constituting a “valuable” consideration as between the parties. But in this case it is attempted to add to the mutual character of such agreements another element — an additional consideration as to one party. This element of bargain and sale is all right as between them but cannot stand when affecting the rights of creditors. 1 Mad. Ch. Pr. 273.

A conveyance made in consideration of an agreement by the grantee to support the grantor through life, is void as to creditors who are thereby deprived of means of securing their debts. Crane v. Stickles, 15 Yt. 252; Jones v. Spear, 21 Yt. 426; Church v. Chapin, 35 Yt. 223.

No actual fraudulent intention need be shown. The law presumes fraud as to existing creditors. McLcmev. Johnson, 43 Yt. 48; 1 Story Eq. ss. 356, 363; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 40; Carpenter v. McClure, 39 Yt. 9; Beade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 500; R. L. ss. 4155-57; Cobb v. Cowdery, 40 Yt. 25; Piper v. Kingsbury, 48 Yt. 480.

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