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← 58 Wash. 2d 106 - Wise v. Hayes

58 Wash. 2d 106 - Wise v. Hayes’s Empirical Analysis

1961

Citation profile

16
cited by 16 later decisions
1
states following
August 2015
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently August 2015

3 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

60196119701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on St. Germain v. Potlatch Lumber Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[T]he evidence must present something more than a mere possibility or conjecture, [and] it is equally sound that the cause of an accident may be inferred from circumstances. A plaintiff in this character of case is not obligated to establish the material facts essential to a recovery beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a rule would amount to a denial of justice. It is sufficient if his evidence affords room for . . . reasonable minds to conclude that there is a greater probability that the accident causing the injury happened in such a way as to fix liability upon the person charged with such, liability, than it is that it happened in a way for which the person so charged would not be liable. 'There are very few things in human affairs, and especially in litigation involving damages, that can be established to such absolute certainty as to exclude the possibility, or even some probability, that another cause or reason may have been the true cause or reason for the damage, rather than the one alleged by the plaintiff. But such possibility, or even probability, is not to be allowed to defeat the right of recovery, where the plaintiff has presented to the jury sufficient facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence as to justify a reasonable juror in concluding that the thing charged was the prime and moving cause.' In other words, the plaintiff is only required to satisfy the jury, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the accident . . . occurred in the manner he cont”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “(2) The rule that, if there is no contractual privity, there can be no warranty, has three exceptions: (1) Where the article causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous nature, (2) where fraud or deceit has been shown on the part of the offending party, or (3) where the manufacturer has been negligent in some respect with reference to the sale or construction of an item not imminently dangerous. Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wn. (2d) 385, 389, 347 P. (2d) 1056 (1960).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.