58 Wash. 2d 528 - Grange v. Finlay’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “which would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed.”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 93 Wash. 2d 143 - Hojem v. Kelly · 95 Wash. 2d 773 - Hansen v. Washington Natural Gas Co.

2. “The test to be applied here is whether the jury could have determined that the appellants were liable as a reasonable inference from the evidence, or whether the verdict rests on conjecture. As was said in Home Ins. Co. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 18 Wn. (2d) 798, 802, 140 P. (2d) 507 , 147 A.L.R. 849 : “The rule is well established that the existence of a fact or facts cannot rest in guess, speculation, or conjecture. It is also the rule that the one having the affirmative of an issue does not have to make proof to an absolute certainty. It is sufficient if his evidence affords room for men of reasonable minds to conclude that there is a greater probability that the thing in question, such as the occurrence of a fire, happened in such a way as to fix; liability upon the person charged therewith than it is that it happened in a way for which a person charged would not be liable. In applying the circumstantial evidence submitted to prove a fact, the trier of fact must recognize the distinction between that which is mere conjecture and what is a reasonable inference.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 72 Wash. 2d 823 - Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Manufacturing Co.

3. “In this case, there was no attempt by the defendant to explain how the fire could have started, unless it sprang from the embers of the first fire. The evidence showed that the plaintiffs had conducted their moorage business at that location for about ten years and had never known of another fire on a boat anchored at their moorage. There was no evidence of arson or other possible origin of the fire, aside from the evidence which tended to support the theory proposed by the plaintiffs, that it resulted from failure to extinguish the first fire. The members of the jury were not asked to choose between two conjectural theories; rather they were offered one reasonable and probable explanation of the origin of the fire, but no substantial alternative explanation was suggested. Upon the evidence and under the instructions given, they were justified in finding that this was the most probable explanation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 66 Wash. App. 358 - Voorde Poorte v. Evans