Thompson v. Bell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We agree that the enactment of [Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 39] is an extraordinary circumstance, and that nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez undermined this Court’s reasoning in [In re Abdur'Rahman, 392 F.3d 174 (6th Cir.2004) (“Abdur'Rahman I ”), vacated by Bell v. Abdur'Rahman, 545 U.S. 1151 , 125 S.Ct. 2991 , 162 L.Ed.2d 909 (2005)]. Unlike the Supreme Court in Gonzalez, which found that a change in federal decisional law by itself was not an extraordinary circumstance, this Court in AbdurRahman I found the enactment of TSCR 39 to be an extraordinary circumstance because refusing to recognize it “would disserve the comity interests enshrined in AED-PA by ignoring the state court’s view of its own law.” 392 F.3d at 187 . A federal court’s respect for another state’s law was not at issue in Gonzalez, in which the Rule 60(b) motion was based solely on a change in federal decisional law interpreting a federal statute. See also Blue Diamond, 249 F.3d at 524 (“[A] change in decisional law is usually not, by itself, an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ meriting Rule 60(b)(6) relief.”) (emphasis supplied). Because this Court’s reasoning in AbdurRahman I is still valid after Gonzalez, today we reaffirm our previous holding that a motion based upon the promulgation of TSCR 39 is an extraordinary circumstance warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution

2. “What constitutes 'reasonable time’ [to bring a Rule 60(b)(1) motion] depends upon the facts of each case, taking into consideration the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the other parties.”) (quoting Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053 , 1055 (9th Cir.1981)); Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423 , 443 (6th Cir.2009) ("Whether the timing of the motion [pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) ] is reasonable 'ordinarily depends on the facts of a given case including the length and circumstances of the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party by reason of the delay, and the circumstances compelling equitable relief.' ") (quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357 , 365 (6th Cir.1990)); Farm Credit Bank of Baltimore v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62 , 66 (1st Cir.2003) ("The circumstances to be considered [in assessing the timeliness of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion] include the length of the delay, the justification for it, and the prejudice (if any) associated with the granting of relief.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404 , 1410, 1412 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that reasonable time determination in the context of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion “depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia

3. “Four expert witnesses testified on petitioner’s behalf in the District Court proceedings. One explained that petitioner's mental problems are indicative of "schizo-affective disorder,” resulting in a "genuine delusion” involving his understanding of the reason for his execution. According to the expert, this delusion has recast petitioner's execution as "part of spiritual warfare ... between the demons and the forces of the darkness and God and the angels and the forces of light." As a result, the expert explained, although petitioner claims to understand "that the state is saying that [it wishes] to execute him for [his] murder[s],” he believes in earnest that the stated reason is a "sham” and the State in truth wants to execute him "to stop him from preaching." Petitioner's other expert witnesses reached similar conclusions concerning the strength and sincerity of this "fixed delusion.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Irick