concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">SHIELDS, Judge,

concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in result in Judge Hoffman's opinion that Greg's various claims of error in the trial court's judgment dividing the marital estate are without merit. I disagree with Judge Rucker's opinion that judgment must be reversed because the judgment awards Greg more than one-half I agree the of the net marital estate. award is erroneous; however, Sandy failed to assert cross-error. Therefore, the error is not before this court.

1 also concur in result in the affirmance of the trial court's judgment ordering Greg to pay $280 per week in child support. However, I dissent from the affirmance of the trial court's judgment ordering Greg to pay all the children's medical expenses.

As noted by Judge Hoffman, the trial court determined Greg's support obligation within the framework of the Ind. Child Support Guidelines. The Guidelines support amount is based upon the share of the parental income that would have been spent on the child or children if the family were still intact. The assumption is an intact family spends an amount on usual and ordinary health care for the children in the family. The Guidelines have set six percent (6%) of the combined parental income as the amount of that expenditure and have included that amount in the presumptive guideline amount. Any deviation requires a written finding articulating the basis for the deviation. That written finding does not exist here. Hence, to the extent Greg is ordered to pay one hundred percent of the expense of the children's usual and ordinary health care, he is paying twice. Therefore, in my opinion, the trial court's medical expense order is erroneous and that part of the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a redetermination of Greg's obligation for health expenses consistent with the philosophy of the Guidelines. Grammer v. Grammer (1991), Ind.App., 566 N.E.2d 1080. In all other aspects, I fully concur in Judge Hoffman's opinion.

I vote to reverse the trial court's judgment only as to the determination Greg shall pay one hundred percent of the children's health expenses. In all other matters, I vote to affirm the judgment.

RUCKER, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds the deviation in the distribution of marital property is insubstantial.

*353By agreement of the parties the total net worth of the marital estate is $409,710.91. Thus, every 1% deviation from the presumptive equal distribution amounts to a net gain or loss of approximately $8,200.00. The trial court awarded marital assets to Husband valued at $230,680.91 and awarded marital assets to Wife valued at $179,-030.00. With all deference to the majority's calculations, my own calculations of the property division using these figures result in a 44% share to Wife and a 56% share to Husband. This 56/44 split represents a deviation of at least 6% and a monetary value which exceeds $50,000.00. While I agree with the majority that "insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality will not compel express trial court findings", on the facts before us I cannot agree that the deviation here is insubstantial.

In In re Marriage of Davidson (1989), Ind.App., 540 N.E.2d 641, reh. denied, the trial court awarded wife $150,818.00 in marital assets and awarded husband $166,-797.00 in marital assets (which did not include a $188,765 inheritance) We observed that even absent the inheritance, the trial court's distribution represented a 53% award of the marital assets to husband and a 47% award to wife. This court indicated "While this division is close, it is not equal. The statutory presumption speaks not in terms of approximation, but rather in terms of exactitude." Id. at 645. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions either to follow the statutory presumption of equality or to set forth its rationale for not doing so. In Euler v. Euler (1989), Ind.App., 537 N.E.2d 554, we also remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to correct the property division decree. In Hwler the trial court awarded wife $18,816.00 in marital assets and awarded husband $27,725.00 in marital assets. That distribution represented an award of marital property to the husband of approximately 54% and an award to the wife of approximately 46%. This court indicated "While this disposition is approximately equal, it is not a fifty-fifty split." Id. at 556.

In the case before us the trial court awarded husband 56% of the marital property and awarded wife 44%. While I would not characterize this disparity as great, I must observe that the percentage figures and the dollar value are greater than those in both Davidson and Euler.

The trial court in this case apparently intended an equal division of the parties' marital assets. In its findings the court specifically indicated, among other things, that the total net value of the marital property "should be equally divided between the parties." Record at 241. However, the court proceeded to divide the property unequally and failed to set forth its reasons for so doing.

As we noted in Euler, supra:

Although the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, can divide the marital property unequally, the dissolution decree in this case indicates no reason for straying from the presumption of equality. We believe that Ind.Code § 381-1, 11.5-11(c) requires the trial court to set forth the basis for a division of marital property which does not follow the fifty-fifty presumption.

Id. at 556-557. Here, neither the dissolution decree nor the trial court's separate findings indicate a reason for straying from the presumption of equality.

I would remand this case to the trial court with instructions to either divide the marital estate equally, or to set forth its rationale for dividing the estate unequally. In all other respects I agree with the majority and would affirm the trial court's judgment.

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