580 So. 2d 1182 - King v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 44 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 45 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The rule in this state is that an indictment which states the statutory language is generally sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Banks v. State · 270 So. 3d 17 - Charles Dye v. State of Mississippi

2. “[W]here there is direct evidence of a crime, the circumstantial evidence instruction need not be given.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Windham v. State · Foley v. State

3. “A conspiracy is an agreement or understanding between two or more people to commit a crime. The crime of conspiracy is complete when the agreement is made. Therefore, the crime of conspiracy is separate and distinct from the crime contemplated by the conspiracy. Whether or not the conspirators accomplished the crime they conspired to commit is immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence. In establishing a conspiracy, the State is not required to prove an expressed or formal agreement between the conspirators to commit a crime. It is sufficient for the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, from all of the facts and circumstances of this case, together with the acts of the parties, that Judge William Robert Taylor, and/or Charles Morgan, and/or Gregory Alston, and/or Scott Morgan, and/or Ike Farris knowingly and voluntarily entered into a common plan with the understood purpose to commit a crime. Express language or specific words are not required to prove involvement in a conspiracy If a conspiracy has been shown to exist beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, then any reasonably foreseeable act of a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is considered by law to be the act of any other member of the conspiracy. Each conspirator is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable acts of any other member of the conspiracy done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Furthermore, one may become a member ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 741 So. 2d 246 - Morgan v. State · 609 So. 2d 435 - Martin v. State