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580 So. 2d 885

Docket No. 90-01163.

Amaya v. State

Daniel Arita AMAYA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided June 7, 1991.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1991-06-07

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently September 2008

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(5) Possession in private conveyance. — Notwithstanding subsection (2), it is lawful and is not a violation of s. 790.01 to possess a concealed firearm or other weapon for self-defense or other lawful purpose within the interior of a private conveyance, without á license, if the firearm or other weapon is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate use. Nothing herein contained prohibits the carrying of a legal firearm other than a handgun anywhere in a private conveyance when such firearm is being carried for a lawful use. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize the carrying of a concealed firearm or other weapon on the person. This subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of the lawful use, ownership, and possession of firearms and other weapons, including lawful self-defense as provided in s. 776.012. (emphasis supplied)”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Smith v. State

“[t]his subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of ... lawful use... .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 601 So. 2d 1230 - State v. Ashley

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1991-06-07

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Ben Kay of Ben Kay, P.A., Sarasota, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

¶3*886 PER CURIAM.

¶4We reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss and defendant's sentence of probation in this prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1987).

¶5Defendant contends that the conduct with which he was charged falls within the exception created by section 790.25(5) that "it is lawful ... to possess a concealed firearm ... within the interior of a private conveyance, without a license, if the firearm ... is ... not readily accessible for immediate use." He argues that because, while the firearm was concealed under the passenger seat, its clip and bullets were lying separately in open view upon the seat, the firearm was not "readily accessible for immediate use."

¶6We must agree with that contention. We cannot agree with the state's argument that the statutory exception was not applicable because a firearm need not be operable in order to be accessible for immediate use, e.g., for use in pointing it at someone in a threatening manner. Section 790.25(5), we conclude, contemplates an operable firearm. In reaching this conclusion we are persuaded by that section's additional language that "[t]his subsection shall be liberally construed in favor of ... lawful use... ." We also cannot agree with the state's argument that the statutory exception was not applicable because the firearm could have been loaded and become operable. That exception requires that the firearm be "readily accessible for immediate use." (Emphasis added.)

¶7Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment of acquittal.

¶8SCHEB, A.C.J., and LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.

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