Commonwealth v. Hughes’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

130 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 134 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, trial counsel sought rulings respecting the presentation of evidence bearing upon certain mitigating circumstances, including whether the assertion that [a]ppellant did not have a significant history of prior criminal convictions, would allow the Commonwealth to rebut such claim with evidence that, as a 13-year-old juvenile in 1976, [a]ppellant had sexually assaulted a minor female in a vacant house at knifepoint. In this regard, the Commonwealth intended to call the detective who investigated that incident to testify to statements he elicited from witnesses and [a]ppellant. Notably, [a]ppellant received a consent decree disposition for the 1976 offenses. The trial court ruled that, if [a]ppellant offered the no significant history mitigating circumstance, the Commonwealth would be permitted to present testimony from the detective, but not the juvenile record.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 2012 Pa. Super. 157 - Commonwealth v. Barnett

2. “Generally, a prosecutor’s arguments to the jury are not a basis for the granting of a new trial unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility towards the accused which would prevent them from properly weighing the evidence and rendering a true verdict. Moreover, the prosecution and the defense alike are afforded wide latitude and may employ oratorical flair in arguing to the jury. The arguments advanced must, however, be based upon matters in evidence and/or upon any legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Finally, any allegedly improper prosecutorial comments must also be examined within the context of the conduct of defense counsel. If a challenged remark is made in response to the defense’s closing argument, it will generally be deemed fair response and hence permissible comment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Keaton

3. “While it would have been preferable for the trial court to avoid using the term “substantial”' in its reasonable doubt charge, see Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 19-20 , 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1250 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 . (1994), the court’s instruction is virtually identical to that which this Court upheld in both Commonwealth v. Murphy, 559 Pa. 71, 82-84 , 739 A.2d 141, 147-48 (1999), and Commonwealth v. Stokes, 532 Pa. 242, 253-54 , 615 A.2d 704, 709-10 (1992). Here, as explained in Murphy, .the reference to “substantial” was designed to distinguish the concept of reasonable doubt from that of an imaginary or possible doubt. Accord Victor, 511 U.S. at 20 , 114 S.Ct. at 1250 . Thus, trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for. failing to challenge the reasonable doubt instruction on direct appeal.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Wholaver, E., Aplt.