581 So. 2d 1255 - Wade v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Wade contends that the four separate indictments are multiplicitous in that all four indictments are based on the same set of facts and constitute only one crime. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred in imposing four separate sentences. "The State's evidence tended to show that the defendant and a co-defendant, Donald Nissen, agreed with two informants, James McMillon and Huey Shira, to obtain, by nefarious means, the contents of a safe located on the premises of the W.J. Word Lumber Company in Scottsboro, Alabama. The defendant was, according to the informants, the `promoter' of this scheme, having allegedly been told that this safe contained approximately one million dollars in cash and jewelry. Apparently, there were several meetings of various combinations of the four individuals involved during which the topic of discussion was obtaining the contents of the safe. According to the informant McMillon, several methods of obtaining access to the contents of the safe were discussed. These methods included utilizing a `safe man'; forcing the general manager, Bill Gross, to open the safe, either through physical violence or by holding a gun to his head; or taking Gross' wife and/or grandchildren hostage and thereby forcing Gross to open the safe. It appears that all of these methods were considered viable alternatives and that the conspirators were in agreement to do whatever was necessary to attain their objective of obtaining the contents of the safe.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 988 So. 2d 946 - Ex Parte Jallad

2. “317 U.S. AT 53-54, 63 S.Ct. AT 101-02 (citations omitted) (emphasis added), quoted in part in State v. Kitt , 8 Conn. App. 478 , 489 , 513 A.2d 731 , 737 , cert. denied, 202 Conn. 801 , 518 A.2d 648 (1986). See also State v. Reyes , 19 Conn.App. 179 , 185 , 562 A.2d 27 , 30-31 (1989), cert, denied, 213 Conn. 812 , 568 A.2d 796 (1990) (`Where the evidence establishes only one agreement, there can be only one conspiracy conviction, even though the conspirators planned, as part of the agreement, to engage in conduct violative of more than one criminal statute'). "because there was clearly only one agreement in this case, the objective of that agreement being to obtain the contents of the Word Lumber Company safe, there could be only one conspiracy *Page 949 conviction and only one sentence imposed. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. at 53 -54 , 63 S.Ct. AT 101-02; State v. Kitt , 8 Conn.App. AT 490, 513 A.2d AT 737. See U.S. Const. amend. V ; Ala. Const., of 1901 art. 1, § 9. This cause is therefore remanded to the trial court with instructions to set aside three of the defendant's conspiracy convictions and the corresponding sentences for those convictions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 988 So. 2d 946 - Ex Parte Jallad

3. “We find that the State's evidence in this case establishes only one agreement. The clear objective of that agreement was to obtain the contents of the Word Lumber Company safe. The fact that the parties, in order to attain this objective, contemplated engaging in conduct that would constitute several offenses does not, under the facts of this case, result in separate conspiracies. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Braverman v. United States , 317 U.S. 49 , 63 S.Ct. 99 , 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942):”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 988 So. 2d 946 - Ex Parte Jallad