Johnson v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Absent a fair grouping and valuation of § 1983 actions within the Virginia scheme of limitations periods and absent some other reasonable basis for applying a shorter period for remedying a "constitutional tort” than for remedying the underlying state tort, we will disregard this special limitation on § 1983 actions____”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 574 F. Supp. 1510 - Matthewman v. Akahane · Knoll v. Springfield Township School District

2. ““As a matter of evaluating the protection of remedies for wrongs which in some instances may constitute both state torts and deprivations of constitutional rights, we [. .. ] reasoned in Almond that violations of federally protected constitutional rights are more serious than violations of state protected private rights and therefore were deserving of at least the two-year step in the Virginia scale of values apparent in its statutes of limitations.” “Furthermore, we decline to adopt this special limitation period on § 1983 actions for some of the reasons set forth in two district court opinions which have not been reviewed by this court. In Edgerton v. Puckett, 391 F.Supp. 463 (D.C. 1975), Judge Turk refused to apply this special limitation period because to do so would be to undervalue the constitutional values at stake in § 1983 actions without rationally prescribing a limitation period for those actions in light of the object of the litigation as required by Virginia law. In Van Horn v. Lukhard, 392 F.Supp. 384 (D.C.1975), Judge Merhige refused to adopt this one-year limitation period because to do so would be to impose an unreasonably discriminatory limitation period on the assertion of important federally protected rights. “In the Van Horn opinion, Judge Merhige categorized § 1983 actions as ‘constitutional tort remedies’ which were intended to be available where state tort remedies, although available in theory, were not available in practice. It was noted that the Sup”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 535 F. Supp. 499 - Evans v. CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TEL. CO. OF MD.

3. “Of actions not before specified. Every action for personal injuries shall be brought within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued. Every personal action, for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within five years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for a matter of such nature that in case a party die it can be brought by or against his representative; and, if it be for a matter not of such nature, shall be brought within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued. The amendment extending the period within which an action for personal injuries may be brought under this section to two years shall not apply to any cause of action arising prior to July one, nineteen hundred fifty-four.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Howard v. Aluminum Workers International Union