¶1concurring.
¶2I can concur because Willard's request to the bank that Lennice's name be deleted from the C.D.s was not in writing. I am not convinced, however, that a written notice by one party to a joint account, pursuant to I.C. 32-4-1.5-5, cannot change the form of the account so as to alter or divest the interest of another party to the account unless that other party has agreed.
¶3Statutes which exempt banks from liability for paying funds to a survivor of a joint account do not control the question of ownership of the funds. Jones v. Jones (1982) Ala., 423 So.2d 205. While 1.C. 32-4-1.5-8 through 1.C. 32-4-1.5-12 are such provisions with respect to payments made by banks, L.C. 32-4-1.5-5 is not.
¶4In Call v. Bank of Gallatin (1985) Mo.App., 695 S.W.2d 138, trans. denied, the court held that a written change by one joint tenant without the consent of the other joint tenant, was effective to divest the other party of his joint interest. To the same effect is Hanover Bank of Pennsylvania v. United Penn Bank (1984) 326 Pa.Super. 593, 474 A.2d 1137. A seemingly contrary result was reached in Benfield v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Cawtawba County (1979) 44 N.C.App. 371, 261 S.E.2d 150. There, the court held that a joint account could be changed only by signature of all parties or by one party *1243withdrawing all funds and opening a new account. The result only seems contrary, however, because North Carolina does not have any statutory provision analogous to our 1.0. 32-4-1.5-5, which tracks precisely Section 6-105 of the Uniform Probate Code.
¶5Missouri is the only jurisdiction disclosed by my research to have a statutory scheme somewhat similar to Indiana's combination of bank payment protection legislation and the provisions set forth in I.C. 82-4-1.5-5. See Mo.Ann.Stat. section 362.470 (Vernon Supp.1991).
¶6Two Missouri cases are instructive. In McGee v. St. Francois County Savings and Loan Ass'n (1977) Mo., 559 S.W.2d 184, at the request of the joint tenant who had created the account and who was the only depositor, the name of the other joint tenant was lined through by the S & L officer. Although the court held that such procedure was not as desirable as cancel-ling the old deposit certificates and issuing new ones, it was effective to terminate the joint account and destroy the right of sur-vivorship in the other party. In Home Savings Ass'n of Kansas City v. Bratton (1986) Mo.App., 721 S.W.2d 40, one joint tenant, prior to his death, orally instructed the S & L not to pay out the proceeds to the other joint tenant, but was told that the certificates themselves would have to be surrendered. The other joint tenant, who had possession of the certificates, then attempted to cash them but the S & L refused in light of the earlier oral request. Later, the S & L received what was purported to be a written instruction from the original joint tenant's son pursuant to an alleged power of attorney. The court held that because the son did not have a power of attorney, the attempted written instruetion to the S & L was ineffective and that the mere intent to unilaterally terminate a joint account is not sufficient. The holding necessarily implied that had the son held the authority from his father, the written instruction to the S & L would have divested the other joint tenant's interest in the account.
¶7It may well be contended that I.C. 32-4-1.5-5 was intended as a protection to the financial institution in the event that all funds were paid out to one of the parties to a formerly joint account. The fact remains, however, that the statute is not so limited. It specifically states that the form of the account is altered. It further states that the rights of survivorship in such an account are determined by the form of the account at the death of a party. By specifically permitting one party to a joint account, whether or not that person created the account and has been the sole contributor to the account, to alter the form of the account, the statute necessarily results, in such instance, in a divestment of the sur-vivorship interest held by the other joint tenant.
¶8In my estimation, 1.0. 32-4-1.5-5, passed in 1976, rendered obsolete the 1948 holding in Clausen v. Warner (1948) 118 Ind.App. 340, 78 N.E.2d 551, or at least diluted it substantially. The question is one deserving of the attention of our Supreme Court even though the matter does not impact the result of this case.