State v. Lasley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

63 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““the ‘reasonable suspicion’ that entitles an officer to stop an individual is present when the officer is ‘able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Cross · State v. Johnson

2. ““A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason ...”, and “[pjroof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt.” See MAI-Cr2d 2.02, (revised, effective Oct. 1,1984); See also, MAI-Cr3d 302.04.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Lumsden · State v. Nichols

3. “"Mr. Justice Clark required as a condition precedent to dispensing with the reasonable hypothesis instruction that the jury be properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt. It is this condition precedent which causes the problem for Missouri courts. The law in Missouri is well-settled that a judge may not comment upon the phrase `reasonable doubt' and the notes on the use of MAI-Cr 2.20 forbid a trial judge from giving any other instruction that elaborates on, or attempts to define, `reasonable doubt.' State v. Amerson, 518 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Mo. 1975); State v. Taylor, 486 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo.1972); State v. Lafferty, 416 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Mo.1967). "Respondent seeks to harmonize the requirement of Holland and existing Missouri law. Respondent's Supplemental Brief at 11 states that `the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions when confronted with the issue [whether the reasonable hypothesis' instruction should be abrogated] have decided to excise the "reasonable hypothesis" instruction.' Unlike Missouri, most of the jurisdictions cited by respondent permit jury instructions to define the phrase `reasonable doubt.' Most of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the respondent indicate that some sort of elaboration on the phrase `reasonable doubt' was made at the trial level, and hedge the abrogation of the circumstantial evidence instruction with the qualification that it is not needed where the jury is adequately instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt. ”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hankins v. State · State v. Lumsden