Johnson v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
1991
Citation profile
10 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Coleman v. Alabama · Mempa v. Rhay · Cashell v. United States · Prince v. United States · McKee v. Harris
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“THE COURT: I don’t see any basis in light of the record, Mr. Johnson, in light of the fact the Court saw fit to impose a sentence of ten years to life before the— DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, if I may interrupt. That was for — that was for armed robbery, 15— THE COURT: No, I understand that. But the Court looked at the — I realize I can't impose that sentence again because the maximum is 15 years. In light of how the Court viewed the case previously and how the Court views the case today, a sentence of not less than five, not more than 15 years is appropriate in this case. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I would ask the Court if it could review the sentence, considering that he was sentenced to three years to life on assault with intent to rob the first time around. REMAND PROSECUTOR: Exposure’s two to 15, Your Honor. THE COURT: Exposure's two to 15. DEFENSE COUNSEL: But he’s being — under North Carolina versus Speth (phonetic),— THE COURT: The only thing I can tell you, Ms. Sosnick, is to take it to the Court of Appeals. Five to 15. Step back. TRIAL PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, if I could just correct, I think it was ten to life in the armed robbery and three to life on the [two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed], and that was to be consecutive. So it was a total of 13 years. THE COURT: All right. TRIAL PROSECUTOR: That was consecutive. I think the Court has the ability to fashion a sentence similarly. THE COURT: Oh, I agree. I agree, Mr. Motley. Thank you. DEPUTY CLE”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The usual remedy when a defendant successfully claims on appeal that the trial court failed to conduct a required Monroe/Farrell inquiry is to remand for a hearing to determine whether appellant received effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, 459 A.2d 1063 (D.C.1983). As indicated in Bass v. United States, 580 A.2d 669, 671 (D.C.1990), however, “Matthews teaches that either a remand or reversal may be the appropriate remedy, depending on the circumstances of each case.” Given the unusual circumstances in this case [issue raised at the sentencing stage], a remand for a nunc pro tunc Monroe/Farrell-type hearing may well be inappropriate.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The Court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.... A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within 2 years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending, only on remand of the case may the Court grant the motion. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7-day period.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.