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← 585 F.2d 83 - Smith v. Danyo

Smith v. Danyo’s Empirical Analysis

585 F.2d 83 · 1978

Citation profile

76
cited by 76 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
August 2019
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 76 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2019 · most notably Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (1990), Franks v. Nimmo (1986)

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 6 state decisions

41019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on United States v. Grinnell Corp. · Berger v. United States · Rodriquez v. United States · United States v. Louisiana · Kennedy v. Powell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 76 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he judicial process can hardly tolerate the practice of a litigant with knowledge of circumstances suggesting possible bias or prejudice holding back, while calling upon the court for hopefully favorable rulings, and then seeking recusal when they are not forthcoming.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[b]ut especially when the circumstances giving rise to the charge of bias occur or are discovered after the case has commenced, timeliness should be measured not in some absolute and arbitrary manner from the date of discovery, but with respect to the future stages of the case. " Id. at 86 (emphasis added). Danyo then instructs us that we are to consider an appropriate accommodation between the competing institutional interest in avoiding the appearance of impropriety, on the one hand, and avoiding the abuse of § 455(a) procedure, on the other. Cf. id. 141 The record informs us that the USG debtors had one meeting with Judge Wolin in early 2002. At the time that it filed its motion to recuse Judge Wolin, it had received but one ruling in all the intervening time, and that ruling was a decision that favored it. 27 As USG's Unsecured Creditors Committee has argued, § 455(a) contains no explicit timeliness requirement and "the seriousness of the grounds for recusal that exist on this record far outweighs any significance that might exist on the date the Motion was filed.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Rule 7(b) requires no more than that . . . a motion 'state with particularity the grounds' upon which it is based. Plainly, an affidavit which is filed to obtain an order disqualifying a judge satisfies the requirements of Rule 7(b). . . . The . . . failure to type in the word 'motion' above the word 'affidavit' in no way detracts from the notice which the affidavit gave of the nature of the application”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.