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← 585 So. 2d 142 - Hooper v. State

585 So. 2d 142 - Hooper v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1991

Citation profile

10
cited by 10 later decisions
1
states following
December 2012
most recently cited

10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently December 2012

10 state decisions

70199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Delaware v. Van Arsdall · Davis v. Alaska · Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants · Bauer v. Waldschmidt

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Although we are extremely reluctant to hold that any improper limitation of cross-examination constitutes harmless error, we are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the error in this case did not contribute to the verdict of the jury. See Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Violations of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). "`[W]e hold that the constitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to Chapman [v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ], harmless-error analysis. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. Those factors include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ ‘[A] party is given wide latitude on cross-examination to test a witness’s partiality, bias, or interest.’ Perry v. Brake-field, 534 So.2d 602, 608 (Ala.1988). The rule in this state, notwithstanding the general principle concerning the development of the interest or bias of a witness, is that the range of cross-examination rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and that the court’s rulings will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the defendant was prejudiced by the rulings. However, ‘where the witness’ testimony is important to the determination of the issues being tried, there is little, if any, discretion in the trial judge to disallow cross-examination on matters which tend to indicate the bias of the witness.’ Wells v. State, 292 Ala. 256, 258 , 292 So.2d 471, 473 (1973). “ ‘It is always competent on cross-examination to make such interrogation of a witness as would tend to test his interest, bias or prejudice or to illustrate or impeach the accuracy of his testimony. Both our appellate courts have approved the principle stated in 2 Wig-more on Evidence, 2d Ed., § 949, p. 232: “The range of external circumstances from which probable bias may be inferred is infinite. Too much refinement in analyzing their probable effect is out of place.” Louisville & N. R. v. Martin, 240 Ala. 124 , 198 So. 141, 144 [ (1940) ]; Sowell v. State, 30 Ala.App. 18 , 199 So. 900 [ (1941) ]. And for emphasis we repeat the oft-stated rule that the latitude and extent of ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Although we are extremely reluctant to hold that any improper limitation of cross-examination constitutes harmless error, we are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the error in this case did not contribute to the verdict of the jury. See Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Violations of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.