Crawford v. Astrue’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 10 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant ... who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled ... In ease of any such judgment, no other fee may be payable ... for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jeter v. Astrue · 814 F. Supp. 2d 957 - Chapa v. Astrue

2. “By beginning with the lodestar calculation, the district courts plainly failed to respect the “primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Lawful attorney-client contingent fee agreements do not result in “enhancements” that modify a lodestar fee that might otherwise be too low. Rather, they are the “primary means” by which fees are determined. The district courts’ methodology in these cases under-emphasizes the contingent-fee agreements, contravening the Supreme Court’s instruction that the agreements be the primary means for determining the fee.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 806 F. Supp. 2d 272 - Siraco v. Astrue